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Abstract

Counterfeit products, especially in the pharmaceutical sector, have plagued the international community for decades [56]. To combat this problem, many anti-counterfeiting
approaches have been proposed [43,79,88,99]. They use either Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) or Near Field Communication (NFC) physical tags affixed to the
products. Current anti-counterfeiting approaches detect two counterfeiting attacks:
(1) modifications to a product’s tag details, such as changing the expiration date;
and (2) cloning of a genuine product’s details to reuse on counterfeit products. In
addition, these anti-counterfeiting approaches track-and-trace the physical locations
of products as the products flow through supply chains.
Existing approaches suffer from two main drawbacks. They cannot detect tag
reapplication attacks, wherein a counterfeiter removes a legitimate tag from a genuine
product and reapplies it to a counterfeit or expired product. Second, most existing
approaches typically rely on a central server to authenticate products. This is not
scalable and creates tremendous processing burden on the server, since significant
volumes of products flood through the supply chain’s nodes. In addition, centralized
supply chains require substantial data storage to store authentication records for all
products. Moreover, as with centralized systems, traditional supply chains inherently
have the problem of a single-point of failure.
The thesis of this dissertation is that a robust, scalable, counterfeiting-resistant
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supply chain that addresses the above drawbacks and can be simultaneously achieved
by (i) using a combination of NFC tags on products and a distributed ledger such as
blockchain for reapplication-proof, decentralized, and transparent product authentication (ii) a novel game-theoretical consensus protocol for enforcing true decentralization, and enhancing the protocol’s security and performance.
In this dissertation, we first propose a new Tag Reapplication Detection (TRD)
system to detect reapplication attacks using low-cost NFC tags and public key cryptography. To detect reapplication attacks, TRD tracks the number of times a tag
has been read in the supply chain using a ’central’ authentication server. Second,
leveraging the blockchain technology, we propose the Block-Supply Chain, a transformation of TRD into a decentralized supply chain. In this chain, each node maintains a
blockchain (distributed public ledger) per product. This blockchain comprises chained
blocks, where each is an authentication event. The Block-Supply Chain can detect
tag reapplication attacks and can replace the centralized supply chain design, thus
overcoming the centralization issues.
One of the fundamental characteristics of blockchain technology is the consensus protocol. Consensus protocols ensure that all nodes in the blockchain network
agree on the validity of a block to be included in the public ledger. The first and
most popular of the existing consensus protocols is Proof of Work (PoW). However,
PoW requires massive computational effort, resulting in high energy and computing
resources consumption. Alternatively, Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocols,
such as Tendermint [9, 47], were adapted in blockchain technology to be efficient and
easy to implement. Nevertheless, not all of BFT protocols guarantee true decentralization, and they are mostly based on fixed-validators. BFT fixed-validators protocols
typically rely on fixed, static validators responsible for validating all newly proposed
blocks. This opens the door for adversaries to launch several attacks on these valida-
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tors, such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and Eclipse attacks. In contrast,
a truly decentralized protocol ensures that variable sets of anonymous validators execute the blocks’ validations. Building on this observation, we propose the TrueBFT ,
a truly decentralized BFT-based consensus protocol that does not require PoW and
randomly employs a different set of validators on each block’s proposal. TrueBFT
is designed for permissioned blockchains (in such blockchains, the participants who
can transact on the blockchain are limited, and each participant is required to have
permission to join the system). Our simulations show that TrueBFT offers remarkable performance with a satisfactory level of security compared to the state-of-the-art
protocol Tendermint.
Another issue with current consensus protocols, particularly the BFT, is that
the majority of them do not take the number of employed validators into consideration. The number of validators in a blockchain network influences its security and
performance substantially. In response, we integrate a game theoretical model into
TrueBFT that analyzes the risk likelihood of each proposer (i.e., the node that creates and proposes the new block). Consequently, each time a new block is proposed,
the ’number of validators’ becomes proportional to the risk likelihood block’s proposer. Additionally, the game model reinforces the honest behavior of the validators
by rewarding honest validators and punishing dishonest ones.
Together, TRD, Block-Supply Chain, and the game-theoretical TrueBFT consensus protocol enable robust, scalable, decentralized anti-counterfeiting supply chain
that is resistant to tag reapplication attacks, as well as attacks to consensus protocols
such as DDoS and Eclipse attacks.
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1.1

Introduction

Motivation

The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that globally, 10% of medicines
are counterfeit, rising to 30% in developing countries [13]. Moreover, the Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau (CIB) claims that counterfeit goods comprise up to 7% of
world trade [84]. In 2011, MarkMonitor Inc. reported that counterfeit sales cost the
legitimate market $135 billion in online shopping around the world [22]. In a recent
review published in 2017 [56], the authors mentioned that ”studies have estimated
that as high as 40–50% of antimalarials may be counterfeit” in areas like Southeast
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, in 2018, the Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI) reported that counterfeit incidents increased by 60% over the past five
years and the majority of these incidents occurred in North America [36].
The problem of counterfeit products is of significant concern. In particular, counterfeit or expired pharmaceutical products can cause severe illness or even death.
Additionally, counterfeit high-value products can result in serious economic ramifications for both businesses and customers. In response to this situation, several product anti-counterfeiting approaches have been proposed in recent years. The problems
with these existing approaches are: (1) they cannot detect tag reapplication attacks,
and (2) most of the existing works are centralized and rely on a trusted server to
coordinate and manage product authentication.
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Most traditional centralized supply chains utilize tags such as Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) or Near Field Communication (NFC) and an authentication
server to detect counterfeiting attacks. Nevertheless, this typical architecture of centralized supply chains still experiences single-point processing, storage, and failure.
To overcome such issues, blockchain technology stands out as a potential framework to establish a modernized, decentralized, trustworthy, accountable, transparent,
and secure supply chain against counterfeiting attacks [56]. Despite the potential of
blockchain technology to elevate security, work and storage distribution, as well as the
transparency of supply chains, there have been only a few projects that examine the
integration of anti-counterfeiting supply chains with blockchain technology [56]. This
has motivated us to exploit this promising technology to combat counterfeit goods to
ensure transparency, information security, and quality assurance.

1.2

Problems and Challenges

In this dissertation, we first address the problems of current anti-counterfeiting
supply chains. Then, we tackle some of the drawbacks of the existing blockchain
consensus protocols (in particular, the BFT protocols).
Lehtonen et al. [51] define three kinds of product counterfeiting attacks: (1) the
modification of a product’s details on a tag, such as changing the expiration date,
(2) the cloning of a genuine product’s details to reuse on counterfeit products, and
(3) the removal of a legitimate tag from a genuine product and its reapplication to a
counterfeit product. Although several approaches have been proposed in the past few
years, none currently detects all of these attacks. In other words, the tag reapplication
attack remains a threat in many product authentication systems [51], and requires
manual, complex verification to detect it [69], as will be discussed in Chapter 2.
The second problem pertains to the limitations of the current centralized anti-
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counterfeiting supply chains. Most existing anti-counterfeiting supply chains rely on
central servers to authenticate products. Despite their potential in mitigating counterfeit products, their centralization dependency imposes several limitations. First,
they impose a tremendous processing burden on the server, since significant volumes
of products flood through supply chain nodes. Second, substantial data storage is
required to store authentication records for all products. Third, as with centralized
systems, traditional supply chains inherently suffer from a single-point of failure. Additionally, they do not offer transparency, as they do not allow supply chain nodes
to verify the authenticity of a product’s data. One potential solution to address the
limitations of centralization is to use distributed ledger technology (i.e., blockchain)
to store products records. However, applying blockchain technology is non-trivial.
Using blockchain technology enables supply chain nodes to authenticate products
and maintain a public ledger per product that consists of valid, chained blocks (each
of which represents an authentication record) without central servers.
Although the use of blockchain technology in product supply chains potentially
eliminates the need for centralized authentication servers, the nodes in the supply
chain need a mechanism to authenticate products and agree on their authenticity efficiently and securely. To achieve this, blockchain technology requires robust, yet scalable consensus protocols. Consensus protocols ensure that all nodes in a blockchain
network agree on the validity of a block to be included in a public ledger. Consensus
protocols also guarantee that all nodes have the same order of blocks in their copies
of public ledgers. This is of significance because blockchains are trustless, distributed
nodes that need a way to synchronize their copies of stored data. The nodes responsible for validating the blocks and executing consensus protocols are the validators.
There is a considerable number of existing consensus protocols. The first and
most popular of them is Proof of Work (PoW) (Bitcoin [63]). However, PoW re-
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quires massive computational effort, which results in high energy and computing
resources consumption. Alternatively, Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocols
were adapted in blockchain technology to be efficient and easy to implement (e.g.,
Tendermint [9, 47], Hyperledger Fabric [34], and Ripple [83]). Nevertheless, not all of
BFT protocols guarantee true decentralization, and they are mostly based on fixedvalidators. BFT fixed-validators protocols typically rely on fixed, static validators
responsible for validating all newly proposed blocks, which exposes these validators
to several attacks such as DDoS, Bribery, and Eclipse (these attacks will be discussed
in Chapter 4). In contrast, a truly decentralized protocol ensures that the blocks’
validations are executed by variable sets of anonymous validators, which results in
greater security, since the identities of validators are anonymous. In this dissertation,
we mainly focus on the BFT consensus protocols. We aim to exploit their efficiency,
taking into consideration the security and efficiency trade-off.
Another issue with current consensus protocols, particularly the BFT, is that the
majority of them do not take the number of employed validators into consideration.
The number of validators in a blockchain network influences its security and performance substantially, especially in a fully decentralized blockchain with no special
nodes. The larger the number of validators, the more secure the system, but the
poorer the performance. The optimal number of validators in such blockchains that
achieves optimal security would be all nodes in the network except the proposing
node (i.e., the node that creates and proposes the new block). However, this choice
results in: (1) substantial validating work as of O(n) for each validation event (n is
the number of nodes in the blockchain network), (2) high communication overhead
to reach consensus with O(n2 ) in protocols like Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
(PBFT) [12] and Tendermint [9], and (3) large block size due to including each validator’s signature in the block as evidence of its validity. An alternative choice to the
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n − 1 validators is to rely on a fixed, static number of validators (e.g., Tendermint and
Hyperledger Fabric [34]). This choice, however leads to: (1) validators’ vulnerability
to attacks such as DDoS since the identities of the fixed validators are known, and
(2) partial centralization.
The last problem that we address in this dissertation is the validators’ diversion
from honest behavior. For example, a dishonest validator might perform a block
withholding attack [78], in which this validator either does not participate in the validation process or does not reveal the result of the verification in favor of a malicious
proposing node. This attack can result in undermining the consensus process. Thus,
a reward and punishment mechanism is needed to reinforce good behavior. Additionally, the always-validation (i.e., validators always validate even if the risk likelihood
of a block’s proposer is low) might be unnecessary computational work particularly
found in blockchains with low hostility. Hence, the validators should validate with
some probability proportional to the proposers’ risk likelihoods, which would enhance
protocol efficiency.

1.3

Thesis Statement

The thesis of this dissertation is that a robust, scalable, counterfeiting-resistant
supply chain that addresses the above problems and can be simultaneously achieved
by (i) using a combination of NFC tags on products and a distributed ledger such as
blockchain for reapplication-proof, decentralized, and transparent product authentication (ii) a novel game-theoretical consensus protocol for enforcing true decentralization, and enhancing the protocol’s security and performance.
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1.4

Solutions

In this section, we briefly introduce the four proposed solutions that build on our
thesis. To detect tag reapplication attacks, we first propose a new Tag Reapplication
Detection (TRD) authentication system that uses low-cost NFC tags and public key
cryptography. In this system, each product instance is affixed with an NFC tag containing the product’s details such as a serial number, a name, and an expiration date.
Each NFC tag has a read-only counter that increases each time the tag is read and a
read-only, unique tag ID. TRD relies on a centralized product authentication server.
Upon receiving a product, each node in the supply chain contacts the authentication
server to verify its authenticity. The authentication server has a database in which
each product’s details are stored, including how many times the tag has been read
in the supply chain (authenticated using an online authentication protocol). This
approach enables TRD to detect reapplication attacks. When tagged products are in
the market, TRD allows customers to use NFC-enabled cell phones to authenticate
products using an offline authentication protocol. TRD also can detect (1) modification attacks by signing the details of the products on their tags, and (2) cloning
attacks by including the value of the read-only tag ID in the signed details. We will
discuss the proposed system in detail in Chapter 2.
Although TRD can detect all three counterfeiting attacks (i.e., modification,
cloning, and tag reapplication), its architecture inherits the centralization limitations
discussed in Section 1.2. To overcome this, we propose the Block-Supply Chain, a
decentralized supply chain that exploits blockchain technology. In this chain, each
node maintains a blockchain (i.e., public ledger) for each product. This blockchain
comprises chained blocks, each of which represents an authentication event. A new
block is proposed to the network by the node that currently has the product (i.e.,
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the proposing node). This newly proposed block is then validated by a number of
validators to ensure that the new block is valid. Upon successful validation, all nodes
in the Block-Supply Chain network add this block to their copies of the blockchain.
The Block-Supply Chain is a permissioned blockchain that can track-and-trace products and their tags’ reads without a centralized server. Moreover, it detects the three
counterfeiting attacks (modification, cloning, and tag reapplication) by involving the
supply chain nodes transparently. In the Block-Supply Chain, the validators play the
role of the centralized authentication server in TRD, and each node in the network
stores the authentication records of a product as a blockchain.
The Block-Supply Chain eliminates the need for a centralized party to orchestrate the authentication process. Instead, a proposing node, which currently has the
product, proposes a block of the current product’s details to all nodes in the network. Then, the validators validate this block to ensure the product’s authenticity
and communicate their decisions to the other nodes. Reaching an agreement on these
decisions (votes) requires a consensus protocol. As previously discussed in Section
1.2, the current consensus protocols do not offer true decentralization.
In response, we propose the TrueBFT , a truly decentralized consensus protocol
that does not require PoW and randomly employs a different set of validators on each
block’s proposal. Our TrueBFT protocol is a BFT-based protocol and is designed
to work only with permissioned blockchains. Additionally, the proposed TrueBFT
leverages the consensus mechanism offered by the state-of-the-art consensus protocol
Tendermint [9, 47]. Nevertheless, the validators’ set in Tendermint can be known in
advance, which makes them exposed to attacks such as DDoS. In TrueBFT, the set of
validators is replaceable and selected randomly from the set of ”all nodes” each time
a new block is proposed. As a result, TrueBFT achieves the true decentralization and
withstands powerful adversaries.
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TrueBFT employs three types of nodes: (1) the proposer which creates and proposes the new block, (2) the leader which determines the number of validators and
randomly selects them, and (3) the validator which is responsible for validating the
newly proposed block. The key idea of our solution is to anonymously map each
proposer in the network to some leaders in a way that none of them knows its corresponding peer. However, these nodes communicate with each other via secrets
assigned to them at the genesis state by the blockchain initiators. When the proposer
proposes a new block, its leaders select the validators at random. This way, the identity of each node (i.e., leader/validator) remains unknown and only revealed after it
accomplishes its job.
To overcome the limitations of having a fixed number of selected validators, the
proposed TrueBFT decides the ’number of validators’ according to a hostility risk
factor called risk. In our premier version of the protocol and for illustration purpose,
we set risk so that the protocol randomly employs log n validators, rather than the
optimal choice of n − 1 validators (excluding the proposing node). The reasoning
that has led to this specific value (i.e., log n) is to reduce the validation work from
O(n) to O(log n), and the communication overhead from O(n2 ) to O((log n).n). This
reduction results in a considerable performance enhancement and reduction of the
communication and the storage overhead. Our simulations show that the proposed
TrueBFT offers remarkable performance with a satisfactory level of security compared to Tendermint. Nevertheless, we improved TrueBFT by making the number
of validators dynamic and variable based on the hostility of the network, as will be
discussed shortly.
Despite the security provided by true decentralization, TrueBFT, like most existing protocols, does not guarantee that the validators are always honest and do
not deviate from the protocol. To overcome such a vulnerability, we integrate a
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game theoretical model into TrueBFT to reward honest validators and punish dishonest validators that do not adhere to the protocol. Additionally, the game-theoreticalbased TrueBFT eliminates the always-validation. Alternatively, it utilizes the theoretical game outcomes to enable the validators to validate with some probability proportional to the proposers’ risk likelihoods (i.e., risk). Furthermore, TrueBFT exploits
the proposers’ risks to make the ’number of the selected validators’ dynamic and
variable. In other words, instead of selecting a fixed number of validators, TrueBFT
selects a different number of validators (on every block’s proposal) proportional to
the block’s proposer risk.
It is worth mentioning that TrueBFT protocol is designed to work with permissioned blockchains. In addition, TrueBFT is highly dependent on the consensus
mechanism used in Tendermint; that is, how the validators communicate with each
other to reach a consensus on a proposed block. TrueBFT only addresses the issue
of the validators’ selection in terms of validators’ replacement and validators’ number to enhance security with respect to efficiency. Moreover, in this dissertation, we
compare our proposed TrueBFT protocol to the BFT protocols. We mainly focus on
their issues due to relevance, and offer a light touch on other consensus mechanisms.

1.5

Contributions

The contribution of this dissertation is fourfold:
1. TRD: We propose a new authentication scheme that detects tag reapplication
attacks and has the following features:
• It detects tag reapplication attacks automatically, without the need for
manual verification.
• It uses low-cost NFC tags that do not have special features, such as pro-
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cessors (to perform cryptographic operations) or inaccessible memory.
• It involves the end customers in the authentication process using their
NFC-enabled cell phones and offline authentication protocol.
2. Block-Supply Chain: We propose a decentralized supply chain that exploits the blockchain technology, thus overcoming the centralization limitations previously mentioned in Section 1.2. The Block-Supply Chain is a permissioned blockchain that can track-and-trace products without a centralized
server. Moreover, it detects the three counterfeiting attacks (modification,
cloning, and tag reapplication) by involving the supply chain nodes transparently.
3. TrueBFT (True decentralized consensus protocol): We propose a BFT-based
consensus protocol (TrueBFT) that achieves true decentralization by randomly
replacing the set of validators on every block’s proposal. Also, the proposed
protocol addresses the problem of how to select the number of validators. Our
solution is to select the number of validators based on a hostility factor called
risk. TrueBFT has the following advantages:
• When we set risk to employ log n validators, TrueBFT is very efficient
and scalable. In particular, it achieves a considerable improvement in
performance when compared to the optimal secure Tendermint with n − 1
validators.
• With log n validators, TrueBFT offers a satisfactory level of security. For
example, it was able to detect the Bribery attack with a detection rate of
99.8% in a blockchain network with 200 nodes, where 33% of them were
malicious.
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4. Game-theoretical-based TrueBFT: We integrate a game theoretical approach
into TrueBFT to a) analyze the risk likelihood of the proposing nodes in order
to decide the number of validators, and b) mitigate attacks presented by dishonest nodes. The game theoretical approach exploited by TrueBFT has the
following benefits:
• It reinforces the honest behavior of the consensus participants by rewarding
honest ones and penalizing dishonest ones.
• The number of the selected validators is dynamic and variable. Hence,
instead of selecting a fixed number of validators, TrueBFT utilizes the
outcomes of the proposed theoretical game to select a different number of
validators (on every block’s proposal) proportional to the risk likelihood
of the proposing node (i.e., risk).
• It eliminates the always-validation mode. Instead, the validators validate
with probability proportional to the proposing node risk.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to propose: (1) a robust,
scalable, decentralized anti-counterfeiting supply chain that is resistant to tag reapplication attacks, as well as (2) a BFT truly decentralized consensus protocol that
determines the number of validators based on the risks of the propping nodes, and
mitigates attacks like DDoS, Bribery, and Eclipse attacks.

1.6

Dissertation Overview

Chapter 2 covers the problem of tag reapplication attacks and proposes the TRD
system. Chapter 3 discusses the centralization problem and introduces the Block-Supply
Chain. Chapter 4 presents the TrueBFT and addresses the validators’ number problem. Chapter 5 introduces the game theoretical model to our TrueBFT consensus
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protocol and discusses how this approach overcomes the problems of dishonest validators. Chapter 6 introduces a new proposers-to-leaders mapping mechanism to make
TrueBFT suitable for blockchain applications other than the Block-Supply Chain. In
Chapter 7, we summarize the dissertation and describe directions for future work.
The content of the dissertation is based on four publications. Our first contribution
(i.e., TRD) was published in [3]. Our second contribution (i.e., Block-Supply Chain)
was published in [4]. Our third contribution (i.e., TrueBFT) was published in [5].
Our fourth contribution (i.e., game-theoretical model) was published in [2].
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2

Tag Reapplication Detection (TRD) System

In this chapter, we present our first contribution (Section 1.5). This chapter
describes in detail the problem of tag reapplication attacks and our proposed TRD
that overcomes this problem.

2.1

Introduction

Product counterfeiting has increasingly become a threat to the world economy [56].
In response to this threat, the people in academia and industries put considerable
effort into combat counterfeiting. However, the battle against counterfeiting remains
a significant challenge because products flow from their manufacturers to end users
through many nodes. Not all of these nodes are trustworthy. This has created and
encouraged the growth of counterfeit goods [65].
The current digital anti-counterfeiting systems utilize RFID and NFC tags to
track-and-trace products and ensure their legitimacy. In such systems, each product
is given a tag containing details such as serial number, name, and expiration date. An
authenticating entity (e.g., a supply chain node, or customer) reads these details and
checks if the product is genuine via an authentication mechanism. Counterfeiters,
however, can perform three kinds of attack on the tagged products [51]. First, they
can modify the product’s details on the product’s tag (modification attack) such as
changing the expiration date. Second, counterfeiters can clone a genuine product’s
details to reuse on counterfeit products’ tags (cloning attacks). The third attack is
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tag reapplication, in which a counterfeiter removes a legitimate tag from a genuine
product and reapplies it to a counterfeit product.
The problem of tag reapplication has been addressed by many researchers. Nochta
et al. [69] point out that the link between a tag and an object is an adhesive bonding.
As a result, “a tag can be removed from an original article and attached to another
object, thereby compromising the security system” [69]. Staake et al. [87] recognize
the need to consider tag reapplication attacks, stating that “the consideration of
this attack is of importance especially when protecting high-value goods”. Potdar et
al. [76] address tag reapplication attacks on the pharmaceutical industry, giving an
example of replacing a tag from a cheaper pharmaceutical product with a tag from
an expensive one.
Whilst tag reapplication does occur in developed countries, it is more prevalent
in developing countries [13]. The motivation for such counterfeiting attacks is profit,
especially when products are expensive. An example of tag reapplication is replacing
the tag of an unconsumed but expired product, or a counterfeit product, with the tag
of a consumed but unexpired product. This type of attack can occur anywhere in the
supply chain, but it is more likely to happen when products are on the market. This
is why we aim to involve end consumers in products authentication.
Tag reapplication attack is hard to detect because it mostly requires manual inspection [51]. Also, the link between a tag and a product, as mentioned, is only
an adhesive bonding that can be easily removed and reapplied or used [69]. To the
best of our knowledge, none of the existing anti-counterfeiting approaches have digital means to detect tag reapplication. Therefore, we propose the Tag Reapplication
Detection (TRD) approach that uses NFC tags and public key cryptography. The use
of NFC tags makes TRD user-friendly, since a large number of existing cell phones
are NFC-enabled [79]; therefore, end consumers can use their phones to authenticate
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products.
TRD has two authentication protocols. The first is an online protocol within the
supply chain, between the supply chain nodes (e.g., distributor, warehouse, retailer)
and an authentication server. This protocol requires each node to contact the authentication server to authenticate a tagged product. The second is an offline protocol
between a customer’s NFC-enabled cell phone and the tag on the product. The offline protocol does not require the customer to contact the authentication server to
authenticate the product.
TRD tracks the number of times a tag has been read to determine whether the
tag has been reapplied. Tracking the number of times a tag has been read indicates
that the product arrived at the final destination through certified nodes, and was not
exposed to a tag reapplication attack between these nodes. At the end of the supply
chain (i.e., the final node), the tag is set to be verified exactly once; if an attempt is
made to verify it a second time, the customer is warned. In addition to reapplication
detection, TRD detects modification and cloning attacks, using a digital signature.
Our security analysis of TRD shows that it can detect tag modification, cloning, and
reapplication attacks.

2.2

Background

In this section, we provide a brief background on the concepts used in our work
to better understand it.
2.2.1

RFID Tags

Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tags are used in most identification applications to automatically identify and track tags affixed to objects. Each tag contains
information about the object and requires a specialized reader to read this informa-
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tion. RFID tags are either passive or active. Passive tags do not have onboard power
supplies, and they draw power from the reader. However, the active tags are powered
by a battery and automatically broadcast their signal [43].
2.2.2

NFC Tags

NFC (Near Field Communication) is a wireless technology that allows two NFCenabled devices to communicate data, such as text or numbers. NFC technology is
compatible with contactless smart cards (tags) [79]. Similar to RFID tags, NFC tags
can be affixed to objects and store information about these objects. However, NFC
tags do not require specialized readers to communicate stored information. As an
alternative, an NFC tag can be read by a cell phone, which makes this technology
user-friendly. The use of NFC technology is significantly increasing. According to a
research study conducted by Information Handling Services (IHS) Technology Inc.,
“NFC was integrated into just 18.2 percent of the 1.5 billion cell phones shipped
worldwide in 2013. In 2018, NFC penetration is rising to 64 percent” [90]. NFC tags
are small in size (as shown in Figure 2.1), passive (i.e., powered by their readers),
and are of four types [66]:
• Types 1 and 2: These types of tags are very similar. Memory size can be
between 48 bytes and 2 Kbytes. Communication speed is 106 kbit/sec. These
two types are cost-effective and ideal for many NFC applications.
• Type 3: Memory size can be up to 1 Mbyte. Communication speed with the
tag is 212 kbit/sec. The unit price of this type of tag is high.
• Type 4: Memory size can be up to 32 Kbytes. Communication speed can be
between 106 kbit/sec and 424 kbit/sec. The unit price of this type of tag is
high because they contain cryptographic processors.
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Figure 2.1: An NFC tag, designed by NXP, diameter 21mm. Source: [68].

2.2.3

Public key cryptography:

This cryptographic system uses two keys (private and public). The private key
is known only to the owner and cannot be published to other parties in the system.
The public key is published to all parties. To perform an encryption using public key
cryptography, a sender encrypts a message using the receiver’s public key, resulting
in a cipher (encrypted) text. The receiver decrypts the cipher text, using its private
key to obtain the original message [61].
2.2.4

Digital Signature

In this scheme, a message is signed by a sender, and verified by a receiver. In
public key cryptography digital signatures, the message is signed by the sender’s
private key, and verified by the receiver using the sender’s public key. A valid digital
signature gives the receiver reason to believe that the message was created by a known
sender (authenticity of the message), and the message was not modified (integrity of
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Figure 2.2: Public key digital signature process. The sender sends the plain message
and its signature to the receiver. The receiver knows the sender’s public key; given the
message, its signature, and the public key, the receiver can determine if the signature
is valid.
the message) [28]. As shown in Figure 2.2, to digitally sign a message, the sender
performs the following:
• Hashes the plain message using a hash function (takes a message as input and
produces a unique hash as output in which two messages cannot have the same
hash), resulting in hash 1.
• Encrypts hash 1 using the sender’s private key, resulting in a signature.
• Sends the plain message and its signature to the receiver.
The receiver knows the sender’s public key. To verify the signature of the message,
the receiver performs the following:
• Decrypts the signature using the sender’s public key, resulting in hash 1.
• Hashes the plain message using the same hash function used by the sender,
resulting in hash 2.
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• Compares hash 1 to hash 2. If they are the same, the signature is valid.

2.3

Related Work

In this section, we will examine some related existing works. The relevant literature falls into two general camps: (1) works that track-and-trace products to mitigate
counterfeiting, and (2) works that utilize cryptography to detect counterfeiting attacks.
2.3.1

Track-and-Trace Approaches

This kind of approach uses RFID tags to track the physical locations of a product,
which are then stored in a centralized database. Koh et al. [43] proposed one of
the first track-and-trace approaches, which uses Electronic Product Codes (EPC) to
uniquely identify and track products in pharmaceutical supply chains. This approach
can detect cloning attacks because the EPC of a counterfeit product will appear
at least twice in the database. For example, a product with an EPC registered in
Switzerland for sale cannot be registered in America at the same time. Similarly, TRD
tracks the number of times a tag is read and updates this number in a manufacturer’s
database. However, the problem with Koh et al.’s approach is that it cannot detect
tag reapplication attacks.
In 2007, the EPCglobal and US Federal Drug Administration (FDA) designated
the drug e-Pedigree to be used in securing pharmaceutical supply chains in the USA
[21]. Each product is linked to an RFID tag that has a unique EPC. e-Pedigree
is an electronic certified record that contains the product information (e.g., serial
number, name, expiration date), manufacturer information, transaction information
(e.g., transaction ID, time, location), distributor information, recipient information,
and signatures. Products’ e-Pedigrees are stored in a central database accessible to
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the supply chain nodes. In this track-and-trace approach, the product’s manufacturer
performs the following:
• Creates an e-Pedigree for the product, which has the product and manufacturer
information.
• Digitally signs the e-Pedigree using the manufacturer’s private key.
• Stores the e-Pedigree along with its digital signature in the central database.
As the product moves through the supply chain, each node performs the following:
• Uses the EPC of the product’s tag to query the central database about the
product’s e-Pedigree.
• Verifies the signature of the e-Pedigree.
• If valid, updates the e-Pedigree by adding the node information (distributor
information), the transaction information, and the recipient information.
• Digitally signs the updated e-Pedigree using the node’s private key.
• Stores the updated e-Pedigree along with its digital signature in the central
database.
The benefit of e-Pedigree is to quickly track products through the supply chain and
make counterfeiting more difficult [17]. This approach can detect cloning attacks by
tracking-and-tracing the product with a complete product e-Pedigree as the product
moves from the manufacturer to retailers [14]. In addition, it can detect modification
attacks by using digital signatures. However, tag reapplication attacks remain a
challenge for e-Pedigree-based approaches. This is because if a counterfeiter removes
a tag from a genuine product and reapplies it to a counterfeit one, the e-Pedigree will
remain valid, and the system therefore will not detect this attack.
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2.3.2

Cryptographic Approaches

Cryptographic approaches use public or private key cryptography to authenticate
products. These approaches usually use a challenge-response protocol. For example,
Saeed et al. [79, 80] propose a cryptographic challenge-response protocol in which a
tag’s reader sends a challenge to the tag. The tag then signs this challenge with a
private key stored on the tag and sends the signature to the reader. The reader verifies
the signature using the corresponding public key, and can thus determine whether
the tag is legitimate.
Cryptographic approaches are of two kinds. The first are online approaches,
which use a centralized database to authenticate products. Staake et al. [88] propose
an online private-key challenge-response protocol in which each tag has a private
key, and the centralized database stores all the tags’ private keys. The tag’s reader
communicates the EPC of the tag to a Cryptographic Unit (CU), located at the
manufacturer’s site. The CU generates and sends a challenge to the reader, which
in turn sends it to the tag. The tag then encrypts the challenge with its private
key and sends the encrypted challenge (response) to the CU. The CU searches the
centralized database for the tag’s private key using the tag’s EPC, and uses this
key to verify the response. If the verification is successful, the product is genuine,
or else the product is counterfeit. It is assumed that the tag’s private key is only
accessible to the tag’s processor. This approach as analyzed by Saeed et al. [79] results
in significant communication and computation overheads because the manufacturer
stores the unique private key for each tag, generates a challenge for each received EPC
request, and verifies the corresponding response. In addition, this approach cannot
detect tag reapplication attacks.
The second are offline approaches, which authenticate products without con-
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tacting a database. Offline approaches are suitable when products are on the market,
and involve customers in the authentication process [79]. Lehtonen et al. claim that
offline authentication needs further research and state, “Offline authentication remains unsolved as practically all existing techniques need online servers” [51]. Saeed
et al. [79] propose an offline approach that uses NFC tags and is based on public key cryptography. This approach allows customers to check the authenticity of
products using their cell phones and does not require access to a database. Their
approach assigns each instance of a product a unique public/private key pair, and
uses a challenge-response protocol between the customer’s phone and the tag on the
product. The tag contains the private key in a secure location that is accessible only
to the tag’s processor. The corresponding public key is stored on the tag too, but
can be obtained by the customer’s phone. The main benefits of this approach are
that it involves customers in product authentication, and it is offline. However, this
approach does not detect tag reapplication attacks, and requires expensive NFC tags
that have processors, secure storage, and support encryption. TRD is inspired by
Saeed et al.’s approach, but aims to detect tag reapplication attacks and to use less
expensive NFC tags that do not require these special features.
Recently, TagPrint [99], an offline cryptographic approach, was proposed by Yang
et al. to detect counterfeit products using RIFD. According to the authors, TagPrint is the first RFID-based offline approach in existing anti-counterfeiting systems.
This approach involves three parties: a tag provider, a product manufacturer, and
a customer. First, the tags provider fingerprints its RFID tags by extracting some
physical layer information to identify each tag. The tags and their fingerprints are
offered to the product manufacturer. Second, the manufacturer affixes a group of tags
(at least four) to each product in randomized geometric locations. The manufacturer
encrypts the tags’ fingerprints and geometric relationships and stores them in the
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tags’ memories. Third, the customer employs an RFID tag’s reader, which contains
the manufacturer’s public key. The reader reads and decrypts the encrypted fingerprints and geometric relationships from the tags’ memories. After that, the reader
obtains new tags’ fingerprints and geometric relationships and compares them to the
decrypted ones to check if they are the same and hence determine the authenticity
of the product. TagPrint can detect modification and cloning attacks using passive
low-cost RFID tags and can be executed offline. However, as acknowledged by the
authors, TagPrint cannot detect tag reapplication attacks. In addition, TagPrint is
based on RFID tags, that require specialized readers, making this approach unsuitable for ordinary consumers. In contrast, TRD is more user-friendly since it is based
on NFC tags, which are integrated into an increasing number of cell phones and aims
to detect reapplication attacks.
On the subject of tag reapplication attacks, Nochta et al. [69] propose a cryptographic approach based on RFID tags to detect such attacks by digitally signing the
tag’s ID and product-specific features. These features can be chemical or physical
properties used to identify the product, such as the product’s weight. Therefore, if a
counterfeiter removes a tag from a genuine product and reapplies it to a counterfeit
one, these features will not correlate. The verifier still needs to check these features
manually after verifying the digital signature. Although this approach detects reapplication attacks, Lehtonen et al. [51] analyzed this approach, and recognized the
complexity of verification. TRD eliminates manual verification, and simplifies the
verification process by using a NFC-enabled cell phone.

2.4

Proposed Approach

This section describes the TRD approach in detail. The approach uses an authentication server located at the manufacturer’s site to communicate with the supply
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Figure 2.3: TRD architecture. Three parties are involved: (1) the manufacturer and
its authentication server, (2) the supply chain nodes, and (3) the final consumers.
There are two product authentication protocols: (1) online between the nodes and
the authentication server, and (2) offline by a consumer’s phone when the product is
on the market.
chain nodes. The authentication server has access to the manufacturer’s database
in which the products’ details are stored. When a product is in the supply chain, a
supply chain node contacts the authentication server through a secure channel (i.e.,
the Internet), to authenticate the product using an online authentication protocol.
After successful authentication, the authentication server updates the product’s details in the database. When the product is on the market, an ordinary customer
can authenticate the product by executing an offline authentication protocol between
their cell phone and the NFC tag on the product. The overall architecture of the
TRD approach is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
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The product’s manufacturer assigns each product with an NFC tag that contains
the product’s details such as serial number, name, and expiration date. TRD aims to
use NTAG216F, the new NFC forum-compliant type 2 tag, developed by NXP [71].
These tags offer 888 bytes of user memory; each tag has a 7-byte read-only unique
serial number (T ID), and includes an NFC counter function. The counter function
enables the tag to automatically increase a 24-bit counter value (Counter) each time
the tag is read. The Counter value cannot be otherwise adjusted or overwritten.
In addition to the read-only memory, this kind of NFC tags has rewritable memory.
TRD has two phases: initialization and verification.
2.4.1

Initialization Phase

This phase is responsible for initializing the details of each product, securing them,
and storing them on the product’s NFC tag. As mentioned earlier, each NFC tag has
a read-only, unique T ID and a read-only Counter, which is increased automatically
on each reading of the tag. The product’s manufacturer executes this phase using its
unique private/secret key (m.sk) and public key (m.pk). As shown in Figure 2.4, for
each product, the manufacturer performs the following:
1. Forms the product’s details (PDetails) defined by:
P Details ← P SN ||P N ame||P ExpiryDate||T oSignT ID
Where:
• P SN is the unique product serial number, P N ame is the product name,
and P ExpiryDate is the product expiration date.
• T oSignT ID = T ID (i.e., the tag’s ID, that is attached to this product, is
included in the product’s details (P Details) to be signed).
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Figure 2.4: Product’s manufacturer initialization. The manufacturer digitally signs
the product’s details (P Details), and the number of the number of times the tag is
read (ReadingsOnT ag), and writes them on the tag. The read-only Counter value
is equal to the value of ReadingsOnT ag.
• || is a concatenation operator.
Note, we choose the product’s details (P Details) to be (P SN , P N ame, ExpiryDate)
because they are common features of most products.
2. Digitally signs P Details with m.sk as follows:
SignedP Details ← Signm.sk (P Details)
Where:
• SignedP Details is the product’s details digital signature.
• Signm.sk (P Details) is a digital signature function in which m.sk is the
signing key, and P Details is the data to sign.

27
3. Concatenates P Details and SignedP Details and writes them to the tag.
4. Reads the current value of the read-only tag’s counter (Counter), that is, the
value of how many times the tag has been read so far. We call this value
ReadingsOnT ag defined by:
ReadingsOnT ag ← Counter
5. Digitally signs ReadingsOnT ag with m.sk as follows:
SignedReadingsOnT ag ← Signm.sk (ReadingsOnT ag)
Where: SignedReadingsOnT ag is the digital signature of ReadingsOnT ag.
6. Concatenates ReadingsOnT ag and SignedReadingsOnT ag and writes them
to rewritable memory on the tag.
After that, the product’s details (P Details) will be stored in the manufacturer’s
database. In addition the P Details, the authentication server stores in the database
the number of times the product’s tag has been read (we will call it ReadingsOnDB).
The values of Counter, ReadingsOnT ag, and ReadingsOnDB are equal. Then, the
manufacturer affixes the NFC tag to the product and distributes the product through
the supply chain.
2.4.2

Verification Phase

Once the product is distributed, two methods of verification phase can be used
to authenticate the product. The first is executed in the supply chain, the second by
the customer.
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2.4.2.1

Verification in the Supply Chain

This verification is executed between the authentication server and the supply chain
nodes. The authentication server uses the manufacturer’s keys (m.sk, m.pk) to manage authentication in the supply chain. It checks and updates the value of ReadingsOnDB each time the product is authenticated by a supply chain node.
The purpose of this phase is to track the number of a tag’s readings to ensure
the tag has not been reapplied and has been authenticated by certified nodes. When
node i receives a product, the node:
• Verifies the product’s details signature (SignedP Details) using the manufacture’s public key (m.pk) to ensure that the product’s details have not been
modified.
• Checks if the value of T oSignT ID is equal to the tag’s read-only T ID to ensure
that the product’s details have not been cloned.
• Verifies the SignedReadingsOnT ag using m.pk to ensure that the value of
ReadingsOnT ag has not been modified.
The node then contacts the authentication server to check if the number of
readings stored on the tag (i.e., ReadingsOnT ag) is equal to the number of readings in the database (i.e., ReadingsOnDB). The values of ReadingsOnT ag and
ReadingsOnDB must be equal to the value of the tag’s counter (i.e., Counter) before the authentication. Table 2.1 shows the notation of the online authentication
protocol, and Figure 2.5 illustrates its process.
After successful authentication between the node and the authentication server,
the node updates the value of the ReadingsOnT ag on the tag to have the same
value of Counter after the authentication. Also, the authentication server updates
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Table 2.1: The notation of the online authentication protocol
Symbol
m.sk
m.pk
T ID
Counter

Definition
The manufacture’s private key
The manufacture’s public key
The unique read-only tag ID
The read-only counter value, increased automatically
each time the tag is read
P Details
The product’s details
SignedP Details
The digital signature of P Details
ReadingsOnT ag
The value of how many times the tag has been read so
far, stored on rewritable memory on the tag
SignedReadingsOnT ag The digital signature of ReadingsOnT ag, stored on
rewritable memory on the tag
V erif ypk (D, S)
A verification function that returns true if S is a valid
signature on data D (with the public key pk) or false
if not
T oSignT ID
The tag’s ID that is included in P Details
P SN
The unique product serial number, which is included
in P Details
Query
The concatenation of P SN , ReadingsOnT ag, and
Counter, sent by node i to the authentication server
ReadingsOnDB
The value of how many times the tag has been read so
far, stored in the database
(Counter − 1)
The value of the tag’s Counter minus 1, because we
need the value of Counter before node i’s authentication. We can substitute 1 by the value of node i’s
readings (reads) if node i performs multiple readings
prior to contacting the authentication server. reads is
then sent to the authentication server in the Query
Ack
An acknowledgement from the authentication server
indicating that the values of ReadingsOnDB,
ReadingsOnT ag, and (Counter − 1) are equal
U pdatedCounter
The value of Counter after the product is authenticated by node i
Signsk (D)
A digital signature function where sk is the signing
private key and D is the data to sign
the value of the ReadingsOnDB in the database to hold the value of the updated
ReadingsOnT ag.
At the end of the supply chain, the product’s tag is set to be authenticated
offline without contacting the authentication server. This is achieved by writing
the manufacturer’s public key (i.e., m.pk) to the tag along with ReadingsOnT ag,
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Figure 2.5: Online authentication protocol. In all steps, if not pass or no received
Ack, abort; the product is counterfeit. This protocol first authenticates the product,
and secondly updates the readings value. The Authenticate process ensures that
the values of ReadingsOnDB, ReadingsOnT ag, and (Counter − 1) are equal. After
successful authentication, the Update process updates the values of ReadingsOnDB,
and ReadingsOnT ag to hold the same value of Counter after the authentication. The
two keys (pk, sk) utilized in the protocol are for the manufacturer.
and SignedReadingsOnT ag. The signature on the tag is stored as a “Signature
Record” based on NFC Forum’s Signature Record Type Definition [67]. This record
contains the message (i.e., ReadingsOnT ag), the signature of this message (i.e.,
SignedReadingsOnT ag), and a digital certificate that has the verification key (i.e.,
m.pk). The process at the final node ensures that the tag can be verified exactly once
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Figure 2.6: Offline customer authentication protocol. In all steps, if not pass, abort;
the product is counterfeit. The public key (pk) utilized in the protocol is for the
manufacturer.
when the product is on the market.

2.4.2.2

Verification By the Customer

On receipt of the product, the customer executes this phase using their NFC-enabled
cell phone. This phase is an offline authentication that does not require contacting the
authentication server. As shown in Figure 2.6, when the customer scans the tagged
product with their phone, the verification application will automatically execute the
offline authentication protocol as follows:
1. Retrieve the product’s manufacturer public key (m.pk), which is stored in the
signature record on the tag.
2. Given the product data (P Details), verify its signature (SignedP Details) using
m.pk to detect modification on P Details. If pass, proceed; if not, abort.
3. Check if the tag ID (T oSignT ID) included in P Details is the same as the
read-only tag ID (T ID) to detect cloning of P Details. If pass, proceed; if not,
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abort.
4. Given the number of readings (ReadingsOnT ag), which was updated by the
final node, verify its signature (SignedReadingsOnT ag) using m.pk to detect
modification on ReadingsOnT ag. If pass, proceed; if not, abort.
5. Check if the value of the tag’s read-only (Counter − 1) is equal to the value of
ReadingsOnT ag to detect tag reapplication. Note that the protocol subtracts
one from the Counter value because of the customer phone’s reading. If pass,
proceed; if not, abort.
6. Display the product details (the product serial number P SN , name P N ame,
and expiration date P ExpiryDate).
If the verification is successful, the product is authentic; if not, it is counterfeit.
The product can be verified by only one customer. For example, if the product is
sold and verified by Customer A, and an attempt is made by Customer B to verify
this product, Customer B will get a warning message indicating that the product has
been sold (used).

2.5

Analysis and Evaluation

In evaluating TRD, we followed the common practice of evaluating a product
authentication system. Lehtonen et al. [51] stated that the security of a product
authentication system can be evaluated by its ability to detect modified, cloned, and
reapplied tags. However, active attacks, such as session-replay, and man-in-the-middle
attacks in which a counterfeiter participates in the authentication session “are not
considered realistic threats against a product authentication system” [51]. In addition
to the security evaluation, the economic costs of the approach have to be considered.
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2.5.1

Security Analysis

In this section, we analyze TRD from a security standpoint. The main goal of this
approach is to detect tag reapplication attacks. In addition, it is possible to detect
modification and cloning attacks.

2.5.1.1

Tag Reapplication Attacks

Tracking the number of times a product’s tag has been read can successfully detect
reapplication attacks. This is because the hardware Counter value is increased automatically each time the tag is read and cannot be adjusted. In addition, ReadingsOn
T ag and ReadingsOnDB are initialized by the product’s manufacturer to be equal
to the Counter, and are incremented each time the product reaches a supply chain
node. Consider the following scenario:
• Product P1 with tag T1 has Counter = 0, ReadingsOnT ag = 0, and Readings
OnDB = 0 at the initialization phase at the product’s manufacturer.
• Suppose that ReadingsOnT ag at the final node is 20. The final node will write
ReadingsOnT ag, its signature SignedReadingsOnT ag, and the manufacture’s
public key m.pk to the tag. Signing ReadingsOnT ag protects it from modification.
• Assume that Product P1 has been sold to Customer A. Customer A uses
their phone to verify the product resulting in Counter = 21, as this value increases automatically due to the phone’s reading. The verification application
on Customer A’s phone executes the offline authentication protocol (Section
2.4.2.2) and indicates that the product is authentic. Now, Counter = 21, but
ReadingsOnT ag = 20, as this value is not affected by the verification process.
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• Assume that a tag reapplication attack occurs —for example, a counterfeiter
removes the tag of Product P1 (after Product P1 has been consumed) and
reapplies it to a counterfeit Product P2.
• The victim customer (i.e., Customer B ) buys the counterfeit Product P2 and
uses their phone to authenticate it. The verification application will read the
tag resulting in Counter = 22.
• The protocol requires the application to verify SignedReadingsOnT ag to ensure that ReadingsOnT ag is not modified. After that, the application will
compare the (Counter − 1) value, which in this case is 21 because the tag has
been read at least once, to the ReadingsOnT ag value, which is 20. This results
in detecting the reapplication attack.

2.5.1.2

Modification Attacks

The product’s details (P Details) are digitally signed by the product’s manufacturer’s
private key (m.sk). The offline authentication verifies this signature (SignedP Details)
using the manufacturer’s public key (m.pk) (step 2 in Figure 2.6). Therefore, the signature is invalid if any of the product’s details is modified, such as the product’s
expiration date.

2.5.1.3

Cloning Attacks

Each NFC tag has a read-only unique T ID, which cannot be modified or overwritten.
This T ID is included in the product’s details (P Details), as T oSignT ID. P Details
is digitally signed by the manufacturer’s private key (m.sk). Verifying this signature
involves reading the T ID. Consider the following scenario:
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• The details of Product P1 are stored on a tag that has a T ID = T1. Therefore,
T oSignT ID = T1.
• A counterfeiter copies these details and uses them for a counterfeit product by
writing them on another tag which has a T ID = T2.
• When the offline authentication is executed, the verification application reads
the counterfeit tag’s T ID (i.e., T2 ), the product’s details (P Details), and the
product’s signature (SignedP Details). The application uses the manufacturer’s
public key (m.pk) to verify SignedP Details, given P Details. If the counterfeiter modifies P Details to have T oSignT ID = T2, verifying SignedP Details
will detect this modification (step 2 in Figure 2.6). If the counterfeiter does
not modify P Details, checking T oSignT ID = T ID (step 3 in Figure 2.6) will
compare the T oSignT ID (which holds the value T1 ) to T ID (which holds the
value T2 ). This results in cloning detection.
2.5.2

Economic Analysis

The economic costs of an approach can be evaluated by considering the cost of the
used tags and the cost of their readers [51]. Since TRD can be executed using NFCenabled cell phones and does not require specialized readers (such as RFID readers),
we will not consider the readers cost. The cost of the tag is a key factor in using
it for certain applications. For example, product authentication systems require a
very large quantity of tags, which makes the price of the tag an essential factor. The
price of NFC tags is influenced by several factors, such as memory capacity, and other
features (e.g., processors, secure storage). The tags used for TRD are of type 2, which
are low in cost compared to types 3 and 4 [16].
Table 2.2 compares TRD to the existing related approaches in Section 2.3 in terms
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Table 2.2: Comparison of TRD to existing product authentication approaches.
Approach
Koh et al. [43]
e-Pedigree [21]
Staake et al. [88]
Saeed et al. [79] [80]
TagPrint [99]
Nochta et al. [69]
TRD

Modification
detection
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Cloning
detection
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Reapplication
detection
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

Cost
of tag
Low
Low
Low
High
Low
Low
Low

of ability to detect modification, cloning, and tag reapplication attacks. In addition
to these security aspects, the cost of the tag is compared.

2.6

Discussion and Conclusion

We have described the Tag Reapplication Detection (TRD) approach to detect tag
reapplication attacks based on low-cost NFC tags and public key cryptography. We
have shown that TRD can detect a tag reapplication attack by tracking the number of
times the tag has been read. The approach employs a database at the manufacturer
to track the number of times a tag has been read in the supply chain. At the end
of the supply chain, the final node sets the tag to be verified exactly once. After
the product is distributed, the approach requires customers to authenticate products
using their phones. Once a tag has been authenticated, it cannot be authenticated a
second time, so reapplication is useless.
Although the proposed approach can detect tag reapplication attacks, detection
failure is possible. This occurs when a counterfeiter removes and reapplies a tag
without reading it. TRD cannot detect this attack, because the Counter value is not
increased. However, the counterfeiter must buy the product to perform this attack,
which conflicts with their financial motivation.
TRD can detect all three counterfeiting attacks (i.e., modification, cloning, and
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tag reapplication). Nevertheless, this approach still suffers from the centralization
limitations discussed in Section 1.2. The following chapter addresses this problem
and presents a solution.
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3

Block-Supply Chain

This chapter discusses the problem of centralized anti-counterfeiting supply chains
(Section 1.2) and presents in detail our second contribution (the Block-Supply Chain)
to overcome this problem.

3.1

Introduction

Explosive growth in pharmaceuticals and other products across the world has led
to growth in large, globalized, digital supply chains [56]. The structure of modern
supply chains is mostly centralized, in which a central authority stores and manages
products’ authentication records. In this typical structure, each node authenticates
a product upon its arrival. This authentication is carried out by executing authentication protocols between a supply chain node and an authentication server. Trackand-trace-based supply chains function similarly, where a centralized tracking server
tracks the physical locations of products and updates their records.
Centralized supply chains, however, face several limitations, as mentioned in Section 1.2. First, there is an enormous processing burden on the authentication server,
since significant volumes of products flood through the supply chain nodes. Second,
substantial storage is required to store authentication records for all products. Third,
they have the problem of a single-point of failure. Additionally, they do not offer
transparency, as they do not allow supply chain nodes to verify the authenticity of a
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product’s data. To overcome such limitations, blockchain technology stands out as a
potentially promising solution.
Over the last few years, blockchain technology has been an attractive solution for
many different industries beyond cryptocurrency [30]. The reasoning behind this is
the transparency, security, quality assurance, global peer-to-peer transactions, and
decentralization that the blockchain provides [74]. Fundamentally, a blockchain is
a public, distributed ledger that contains chained blocks, each of which is made up
of several transactions. These blocks are validated globally and transparently to
guarantee security (i.e., they only comprise valid and correct transactions). The
blocks are shared and synchronized across nodes via a peer-to-peer, distributed, and
decentralized structure [56].
Despite the potential of blockchain technology to better establish supply chain
provenance, there have only been a few projects that examine leveraging blockchain
technology in anti-counterfeiting supply chains. In a recent review published in 2017
[56], Mackey and Nayyar stated that ”we were only able to extract a single 2016 IEEE
non-research article that summarized a few blockchain projects initiated by different
organizations and explored it as a potential solution for fake medicines among other
healthcare problems.” This has encouraged us to exploit this promising technology to
combat counterfeit goods by transforming our previous centralized supply chain (i.e.,
TRD) to a decentralized Block-Supply Chain to ensure transparency, information
security, and quality assurance.
In this chapter, we propose the Block-Supply Chain, a permissioned, decentralized
supply chain that employs blockchain technology. In this chain, each node maintains
a blockchain for each product. This blockchain is comprised of chained blocks where
each is an authentication event. A new block is proposed to the blockchain network
by the node that currently has the product (i.e., the proposing node). This newly
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proposed block is then validated by a number of other nodes called validators to
ensure that the block is valid. Upon successful validation, all nodes in the BlockSupply Chain network add this block to their copies of the blockchain, as will be
explained in more detail in Section 3.4.
The Block-Supply Chain eliminates the need for the authentication server utilized
in TRD. Instead, it involves the nodes in the supply chain to do the authentication.
Additionally, it can trace-and-track products without a centralized tracking server.
Moreover, it detects the three counterfeiting attacks (modification, cloning, and tag
reapplication) by involving the supply chain nodes transparently.

3.2
3.2.1

Background
Blockchain Technology

A blockchain is a distributed digital ledger of transactions. This ledger cannot
be changed or tampered with because of the use of cryptographic methods [74]. The
public/distributed ledger consists of blocks that are chained together. Each of these
blocks has a hash. The hash is derived from the information included in the block.
A new block is added to the blockchain by including the previous block’s hash in
it. This is how the blocks are bound together. Hence, if someone tampers with the
previous block, its new hash will be different from the one included in the successive
block. This mismatch will break the chain. As a result, the purpose of hashing is
to ensure no one tampers with the blocks once they are validated and added to the
chain. This chain of blocks is replicated on every node in the network.
There are three basic properties of a blockchain [30]:
1. It is decentralized: The blockchain’s network is entirely run by its nodes,
eliminating the need for a central authority that establishes trust. Thus, to add
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a block to the ledger, this new block must be shared across the blockchain’s
peer-2-peer network. All nodes in the network keep their own local copy of the
ledger.
2. It is verified: The blockchain nodes sign the transactions using public-privatekey cryptography before broadcasting them to the network. Hence, only the
owner of the private key can initiate them.
3. It is immutable: A blockchain network must utilize a consensus algorithm
to preserve immutability. One or more transactions are grouped together to
create a new block. This newly created block is proposed to the network by
a node. Other nodes in the network can verify the transactions in the block.
The consensus algorithm enables the nodes in the network to reach a decision
on the validity of the new block. If consensus on the validity is reached, this
indicates that all of the transactions in the block have been verified and are
valid. Consequently, the block is added to the chain. Similarly, if no consensus
is reached, the block is rejected. When a block is valid, a cryptographic hash is
generated for that block to be included in the successive block.
There are two types of blockchain networks:
1. Public blockchain: This type is totally open, and anyone can join and participate in the blockchain network. In other words, any participant is able
to read the chain and can write a new block into the chain. Typically, this
type has an incentivizing mechanism to encourage more participants to join the
blockchain [30]. Bitcoin [63] is one of the most known public blockchain networks. However, one of the shortcomings of this type is the substantial amount
of computational power required due to maintaining a distributed ledger on a
large scale [37].
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Figure 3.1: Traditional supply chain authentication. As products ship from node to
node in the supply chain, each node authenticates the products by contacting the
authentication server.
2. Private/permissioned blockchain: This type of blockchain limits the parties
who can participate in the blockchain network. Each participant must have
permission to join the system. Participants can be determined at the startup of the blockchain (genesis state), or by a set of rules put in place by the
blockchain initiator [30]. This puts constraints on who is allowed to participate
in the network, and on which transactions.
3.2.2

Traditional Centralized Supply Chains

Most of the existing products’ supply chains rely on a third party (i.e., trusted
server) to coordinate and manage the products’ authentication as shown in Figure 3.1.
In this typical architecture, each node authenticates a product upon its arrival. This
authentication is carried out by executing some authentication protocols between a
supply chain node, and the authentication server.
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Figure 3.2: A general overview of the decentralized products’ authentication architecture. It is a blockchain where the product’s authentication records are grouped
into a public ledger (i.e., blockchain) seen by every node in the supply chain. Each
block includes an authentication record (Record), in addition to the hash (H) of the
previous block.

3.2.3

Decentralized Supply Chains

Decentralized, blockchain-based supply chains maintain an open ledger in which
every node in the supply chain can see and examine, as shown in Figure 3.2. This
ledger shows the authentications history of a specific product. Hence, any counterfeit
activity can be detected early by the supply chain nodes.
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This type of supply chain structure authenticates products by involving the supply
chain nodes without an authentication server. This is achieved by storing the product’s authentication records as blocks. The chain of blocks (i.e., the public ledger) is
the chain of authentication events records, executed through the supply chain. Each
event is created when a product is sent to the next node. Every node has the most recent ledger of the product. When a node tries to ship the product, this node proposes
and broadcasts a new block to all nodes in the supply chain. This newly proposed
block contains the recent product’s details such as the current location of the product
in the supply chain. The new block is then chained to the product’s ledger by every
node in the supply chain. This way, all nodes maintain the same copy of ledgers.

3.3

Related Work

In this section, we only present the works

1

that have integrated blockchain

technology into supply chains. Although blockchain technology has gained considerable attention from the computer science community, the use of this technology in
products’ supply chains is limited [56].
Tian [91] proposed a conceptual framework of an agri-food supply chain using
RFID and blockchain. This supply chain is designed to trace agri-food ”from farm
to fork.” The author analyzed the advantages of using blockchains and stated that is
it can be used to fight fake products.
Saveen et al. [1] discussed the potential benefits of using blockchain technology in
manufacturing supply chains. Then they proposed a framework for a manufacturing
supply chain for cardboard boxes that involves blockchain as a platform to collect,
store, and manage the details of each product throughout its life cycle. This work
1

Our dissertation is not strictly chronological. Several of the systems discussed here, such as
TradeLens and the work introduced by Tseng et al. were proposed after we published our research
on Block-Supply Chain.

45
introduced a general overview of replacing the centralized system with a decentralized
system using blockchain technology.
In a study published by Hackius et al. [30], the authors conducted an online
survey and asked professionals for their opinions on using blockchain in supply chain
management. The authors found that most of the participants were positive about
blockchain and the benefits that it can offer. This includes employing blockchain to
fight counterfeit products.
Korpela et al. [44] conducted a study about integrating blockchain into digital
supply chains. The use of blockchain would provide better access to customers by
sharing information about products effectively. Besides, products and service deliveries can be tracked to provide visibility in the supply chain. Their analysis showed
that many of the digital supply chains’ functionalities can be embedded in blockchain
technology. In addition, blockchain provides security and cost-effective transactions
in supply chains networks with no central system.
Recently, TradeLens [35] was introduced by IBM and Maersk to digitize current
global supply chains using blockchain technology. TradeLens is a network of industry participants used to maintain a distributed, permissioned ledger. This ledger
records the supply chain events, authority approval status, and full audit history.
Each change or event creates a new, immutable block. TradeLens is a permissioned
blockchain network that enables access only the parties participating in a specific
shipment. TradeLens can track shipments in real time, and improve data sharing
between shipping partners using the blockchain encryption and powerful permissionbased sharing. However, TradeLens is a blockchain project that aims to transform the
traditional track-and-trace supply chains, but does not undertake the hard-to-detect
counterfeit attacks on products such as cloning and tag reapplication.
Tseng et al. [93] applied Gcoin blockchain’s double-spending prevention mecha-
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nism to mitigate the problem of counterfeit drugs. The authors exploited the Consortium Proof-of-Work in the Gcoin blockchain to tackle the counterfeiting problem
in the pharmaceutical sector. Their approach tracks every pharmaceutical product
in the supply chain, where the authors treated the shipping node as a seller and the
receiving node as a buyer. The miners in the proposed approach are suggested to
be the large manufacturers and government agencies, where the other nodes in the
supply chain are full nodes, which are responsible for storing a backup of historical transactions about products. The proposed approach tracks and traces products
using the records on the Gcoin blockchain, and protects against injecting new fake
products into the supply chain. However, this approach fails to address the cloning
and reapplication attacks on tagged products. In addition, it is partially centralized,
since it does not shift the mining or validation responsibility away from the products’
manufacturers.
In a more relevant work, Toyoda et al. [92] proposed a product ownership management system of RFID-affixed products to protect against counterfeiting in the
post supply chain. This system utilizes RFID tags and Bitcoin’s blockchain to prove
the ownership of a product once the product is distributed to the market (i.e., post
supply chain). The proposed work protects against cloning attacks by making the job
for counterfeiters to clone genuine tags hard, since they cannot prove the possession
of products. The main goal of the proposed system is to enable customers to reject
purchasing counterfeit products, even with a genuine tag’s Electronic Product Code
(EPC), in case if the seller does not possess their ownership. Although this work was
able to encounter the cloning attacks on products, it did not discuss the problem of
reapplied tags.
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3.4

Proposed Block-Supply Chain

This section explains our Block-Supply Chain in detail. The Block-Supply Chain
is a ’permissioned’ blockchain that comprise the nodes in the supply chain. It authenticates every product and detects counterfeit products without the need for a
centralized authentication server. Rather, it involves the nodes in the authentication
process utilizing blockchain technology. Every node in the blockchain has a unique
pair of keys (public pk and secret sk) and is identified by its public key. There are
three types of nodes in our Block-Supply Chain:
1. Proposing (proposer): This is the node that currently has the product. It
creates, proposes, and broadcasts the new block to the network.
2. Validator: This node is responsible for validating the newly proposed block.
Moreover, validators communicate their votes on the block to reach consensus.
3. Idle: This node does nothing except wait for the decision to be reached by
validators on whether to accept or reject the proposed block. All other nodes
in the network are idle.
The Block-Supply Chain has two phases; the initialization phase, and the verification phase. The products’ manufacturer executes the initialization phase, and
the supply chain nodes execute the verification phase. Each product has an NFC
tag, which contains the product’s details such as serial number, name, and expiration
date.
3.4.1

Initialization Phase

This first phase is responsible for initializing the details of each product, securing
them and storing them on the product’s NFC tag. We utilize the same NFC tags used
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in TRD, where each NFC tag has a read-only unique tag ID (T ID) and a read-only
Counter. The read-only Counter is increased automatically on each reading of the
tag and keeps track of the number of times that the tag is read by the nodes.
The manufacturer executes this phase in the same way described in TRD (Section
2.4.2). It forms the product’s details (P Details), which includes the following:
• The unique product ID (P ID).
• The product name (P N ame).
• The product expiration date (P ExpiryDate).
• A field called (T oSignT ID) that is equal to the read-only (T ID).
Then, the manufacturer digitally signs P Details using its private key (m.sk) to
produce the product’s data digital signature (SignedP Data). After that, it writes
the product data (P Details) and its signature (SignedP Data) to the product’s tag.
Once the tag is prepared, the manufacturer creates a genesis block for the product.
Each other block in our system represents an event of a successful product’s authentication. A valid block is added to the blockchain if it is validated by a number of
validators in the network. Figure 3.3 shows the block structure and how the blocks
are chained. A block contains three parts:
1. The block header, which includes the following:
• The blockchain ID (to identify each product’s blockchain).
• The block height (order) in the blockchain.
• The fee to be paid to the block’s validators.
• The time stamp.
• The hash of the previous block (Hi−1 ).
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Figure 3.3: Blocks’ structure and chaining them. Two blocks are chained by including
the hash of the previous block in the new block.
2. The validation of the previous block to provide evidence of its validity; that is,
the data on that block is valid and sufficient signatures are included. This part
includes the digital signatures of all the validators of the previous block.
3. The block data, which contains:
• The product’s details (P Details).
• The shipping source node address (Src).
• The address of the node the product is being shipped to (D).
• The current number of reads on the product’s tag (ReadingsOnBlock) to
track how many times the product’s tag has been read (this field is for
detecting the tag reapplication attack).
Finally, the manufacturer broadcasts the genesis block to all nodes in the supply
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chain and ships the product to the supply chain. The manufacturer is the initiator
of the product’s blockchain and is no longer involved in authenticating the product.
3.4.2

Verification Phase

This phase is executed between the supply chain nodes. As a product flows
throughout the supply chain, its blockchain gets updated each time it leaves a node
and moves to the next by adding a new block to it. When a node (i) receives a
product, two types of authentication are performed: local and global.

3.4.2.1

Local Authentication

When node i receives a product, the node authenticates the product locally by executing the local authentication algorithm, as shown in Algorithm 1. The local authentication involves the following:
1. Read the product’s tag. Then, given the product details on the tag (P Details),
verify its signature (SignedP Details) using the manufacturer’s public key (m.pk)
to detect modification of P Details as follows:
V erif ym.pk (T ag.P Details, T ag.SignedP Details)
If pass, proceed; if not, abort.
2. Check if the P Details on the tag is the same as the P Details on the last block
in the node’s own copy of the product’s blockchain.
3. Check if the tag ID (T oSignT ID) included in P Details is equal to the readonly tag ID (T ID). This is to detect cloning of P Details. If pass, proceed; if
not, abort.
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Algorithm 1: Local authentication
Input : Block(i−1) , Data On Tag
Output: P roductStatus (Authentic, or Counterfeit)
1 P roductStatus ← ”Counterfeit”
2 if V erif ym.pk (T ag.P Details, T ag.SignedP Details) then
3
if T ag.P Details = Block(i−1) .P Details then
4
if T ag.T ID = T ag.T oSignT ID then
5
if (T ag.Counter − 1) = Block(i−1) .ReadingsOnBlock then
6
P roductStatus ← ”Authentic”
7
end
8
end
9
end
10 end
11 Return P roductStatus
4. Check if the value of the tag’s read-only (Counter − 1) is equal to the value of
ReadingsOnBlock stored on the last block of the product’s blockchain. This
is to detect tag reapplication. Note that we subtract one from the Counter
value because of the node i’s reading. If they are equal, then this means that
no reads have been performed on the product’s tag between Src and D. If pass,
proceed; if not, abort.
If the local authentication succeeds, the product is authentic, and node i proceeds accordingly. If the product is counterfeit, node i broadcasts this finding to
the other nodes in the network so further inspection can be conducted to find the
origin of the counterfeiting attack. Unlike TRD, the node that has the product (i.e.,
proposer) can check for all three types of attacks (modification, cloning, and reapplication) by relying only on its own copy of the product’s blockchain (assuming a valid
blockchain). There is no need for remote authentication at this point because the
product’s blockchain serves as a distributed database that contains valid information
about the product. Hence, it is safe for the node to consult this blockchain. The data
on the product’s tag and blockchain is sufficient to execute the local authentication
algorithm and check for the three attacks. Ensuring that the blockchain is valid is
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the responsibility of the validators, which will be explained in the following section.
3.4.2.2

Global Authentication

After successful local authentication, and before dispatching the product to the next
node in the supply chain, node i becomes a proposing node, and proposes a new block.
The proposed block contains some updating details as given below:
• The new source node (Src), which is the address for the current proposing node.
• The destination node (D), where the product is going to be shipped.
• The new value of ReadingsOnBlock which is the current number of reads of
the tag’s read-only Counter.
• The hash of the previous block (Hi−1 ).
• The digital signatures of the previous block’s validators.
The proposing node then broadcasts this newly created block to all nodes in the
blockchain network. The validators validate the block globally and vote on it.
The validators, as shown Algorithm 2, execute the global authentication algorithm,
which includes the following steps:
1. The validators ensure that the blocks are well-chained and have the appropriate
order. This is done by hashing the previous block (blocki−1 ) and comparing it
to the Hi−1 that is included in the current proposed block (blocki ).
2. They check if P Details in the previous block is the same as the one in the
proposed block.
3. They trace-and-track the product by ensuring that the source (Src) in the block
(blocki ) is equal to the destination (D) in its previous block (blocki−1 ). This is
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Algorithm 2: Global authentication
Input : The proposed Blocki , current blockchain [Block1 - Blocki−1 ]
Output: BlockStatus (Valid, or Invalid)
1 BlockStatus ← ”Invalid”
2 if hash(Blocki−1 ) = Blocki .H(i − 1) then
3
if Blocki−1 .P Details = Blocki .P Details then
4
if Blocki−1 .D = Blocki .Src then
5
BlockStatus ← ”Valid”
6
end
7
end
8 end
9 Return BlockStatus

to ensure that the product has been supplied through certified, valid nodes in
the supply chain.
If the three checks are successful, then the block is valid, and it is safe to include it
in the blockchain. The validators guarantee that the blockchain always contains valid
blocks, so the next proposing node (i.e., node i + 1) can safely rely on the last block
in the blockchain (i.e., Blocki ) when executing its local authentication algorithm.
3.4.2.3

Verification By Customers

Once the product is distributed to the market, the end consumer can authenticate
the product. There are two options to consider for authenticating the product in
this phase. First, offline authentication, in which we do not involve the blockchain
technology in the authentication process. Instead, a customer, as in TRD, can simply
check the validity of a product using their NFC-enabled cell phone. The number of the
tag’s reads (i.e., ReadingsOnBlock) needs to be stored on the tag as ReadingsOnT ag
along with its digital signature, similar to TRD. The only difference here is that this
value (i.e., ReadingsOnT ag) will be signed by validators of the last proposing node
in the supply chain. The second option is the online authentication, which treats the
customers as nodes in the blockchain. However, this option will need applying new
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roles to grant access to new members, since Block-Supply Chain is a permissioned
blockchain.

3.5

Discussion and Conclusion

We have proposed a new decentralized supply chain (Block-Supply) utilizing
blockchain and NFC technologies. The Block-Supply Chain is a transformation of
our centralized TRD (Chapter 2), and is able to track-and-trace products and detect
modification, cloning, and tag reapplication attacks without relying on an authentication server.
This far, we have only discussed the role of validators, but how do we select them,
and how can they communicate to reach an agreement on a block’s validity? Our
proposed consensus protocol answers these two questions in Chapter 4.
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4

True Decentralized Consensus Protocol

This chapter discusses the problem of the lack of true decentralization in the
existing BFT consensus protocols (Section 1.2) and presents in detail our third contribution (TrueBFT: a truly decentralized consensus protocol).

4.1

Introduction

Blockchain technology was introduced to solve the problem of reaching agreements
on a state among distributed nodes without a coordinating third party [9]. These
nodes are trust-less and may contain faulty nodes (e.g., malicious, crashed). Reaching
a consensus on a proposed block in the presence of faulty nodes requires a consensus
protocol executed by some selected nodes called validators or miners. In response to
this, much research has been conducted to come up with robust yet efficient consensus
protocols that guarantee consensus in blockchains.
As mentioned in Section 1.2, a consensus protocol ensures that all nodes in the
blockchain network agree on the validity of a block to be included in the public
ledger. It also guarantees that all nodes have the same order of blocks in their
blockchains [9]. Consensus protocols are significant because blockchains are trustless,
distributed nodes that need a way to synchronize their copies of stored data. Hence, a
consensus protocol is designed to achieve the reliability in a network that has multiple
unreliable nodes [9].
There are a considerable number of existing consensus protocols. Among these
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protocols, the Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocols which are known for their
efficiency (in terms of the time taken to reach a consensus on a proposed block).
Nonetheless, despite the efficiency of BFT protocols, not all of them guarantee true
decentralization in which variable sets of anonymous validators execute the blocks’
validation. Instead, many of them rely on fixed, known validators (e.g., Tendermint
[9, 47], Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [12], and Hyperledger Fabric
[34]). This fixed-validators approach opens the door for various risk threats, that
will be discussed shortly. In addition, most of the current consensus protocols, such
as PBFT [12], Tendermint [9, 47], Hyperledger Fabric [34], and Stellar [60], do not
take the number of validators into consideration. The number of selected validators
greatly influences a protocol’s security and performance. In this chapter, we mainly
address the problem of lacking true decentralization in the current consensus protocol
and, briefly, the problem of validators’ selection in terms of how many validators to
select (more on this problem on Chapter 5).
The first and most popular consensus protocol to secure and decentralize blockchains
is the Proof of Work (PoW) (e.g., Bitcoin [63]). This protocol requires powerful
nodes known as miners to validate the transactions in a blockchain and propose new
blocks. This consensus approach, however, demands massive computational effort
from the miners, which ultimately results in high consumption of energy and computing resources. Furthermore, such blockchains frequently fork. As a result, the
blockchain nodes are not able to rely on a new block as soon as it appears. Alternatively, they must wait until this block is deep enough in the chain, which results
in very high latency [29]. To overcome these issues, the blockchain community has
introduced new alternative approaches in which a chosen set of nodes known as validators are responsible for handling the block validation process. Next, we discuss
some of these approaches as well as their strengths and weaknesses.
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An alternative approach that does not require the expensive PoW computation
and therefore enhances efficiency is the BFT Fixed-Validators Decentralization
(e.g., Tendermint [9, 47], Hyperledger Fabric [34], and Ripple [83]). In this approach,
a small fixed number of nodes are chosen to be validators. This approach ensures the
integrity of the blockchain as long as the majority of the validators are honest [9, 12,
34,47]. The validators are typically selected at the genesis state, and they are usually
selected based on the stake they have (e.g., Tendermint). However, the efficiency of
such protocols is influenced by the number of selected validators. This is because each
validator performs some work to check the validity of a block and communicates with
other validators in the committee to reach a consensus. This incurs computation
and communication overhead proportional to the committee size (i.e., number of
validators). Besides efficiency, Fixed-Validators Decentralization approach enjoys the
ease of implementation, since the validators are known in advance [48].
Although the fixed-validators approach is efficient, it has several limitations. First,
it relies on an extreme trust assumption that the majority of validators are honest;
nevertheless, it is possible for a powerful adversary to corrupt or bribe most of them
over time [26]. Second, a fixed committee of validators is vulnerable to adversarial
attacks, since they are known and fixed. For example, an adversary can launch
a DDoS attack against the validators, preventing them from validating new blocks
or receiving messages from each other. Third, although this approach is efficient,
utilizing a relatively small number of validators in a large network with a massive
amount of transactions or blocks can bottleneck the performance.
The second alternative approach to the PoW is the Rotating-Validators Decentralization (e.g., Casper [100], and the new version of Tendermint). In this
approach, the fixed committee of validators is replaced with a rotating-committee every period of time. An example is where there are N sets of committees, and upon
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every block proposal, one of these committees is selected to carry out the validation
process. This approach is efficient based on the size of the committee, as discussed before. However, it also relies on a strong trust assumption as most committee members
remain fixed over a long period of time. As a result, we must assume that they should
remain honest for that time and are not corrupted by an adversary [26]. Moreover,
this approach is vulnerable to attacks mounted by a powerful adversary. Clearly, an
adversary can not attack most of the nodes in the network, but can definitely launch
attacks like DDoS on the majority of the members of a few, small committees [26].
The third approach is True Decentralization, in which every node in the system
can be chosen to be a member of the validators. In such an approach, a set of validators is selected randomly from the set of ”all nodes” on every block’s proposal. In
other words, it does not require a single set of validators to validate all the proposed
blocks. As a result, the true decentralization approach distributes the validation
work among all nodes, and can withstand powerful adversaries. Note that the fixedvalidators approach is defined on the same group of validators and do not support
validators’ replaceability. In response, we propose a novel, robust yet straightforward,
truly decentralized consensus protocol (TrueBFT) that selects a different set of random validators on every block’s proposal. TrueBFT mainly addresses the issues of a)
the lack of true decentralization, b) the fixed number of validators in BFT consensus
protocol. Besides, the proposed protocol is designed to work only with permissioned
blockchains.
In TrueBFT, at the genesis state, the blockchain initiator randomly maps each
proposing node to four validation-leader nodes. The validation-leaders are responsible for randomly selecting the validator nodes for this particular proposer. The
selected validators are responsible for validating the block proposed by this proposer.
TrueBFT achieves true decentralization by, first, using anonymous mapping between
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the proposers and their leaders. In other words, no proposer knows its leaders; nor
does the leader know its proposer or its other peer leaders. They, however, communicate with each other via private secrets assigned to them at the genesis state. Second,
to further enhance true decentralization, TrueBFT requires each validation-leader to
select a random set of validators without any communication with other peer leaders. Therefore, the identities of leaders and validators remain anonymous, preventing
powerful attackers from launching attacks such as DDoS and Eclipse. This is because
the attackers do not know these nodes in advance. Additionally, the set of selected
validators are different for each proposed block due to exploiting randomness. More
on this in Section 4.4.
Te proposed TrueBFT protocol is BFT-based, and leverages the consensus algorithm utilized by Tendermint. Tendermint is notable for its simplicity, performance,
and fork-accountability [48]. However, Tendermint’s performance depends on the
number of validators [9]. The smaller the number of validators the higher the performance. This is due to the validation work performed by every validator and the
communication overhead between validators to reach the consensus. Consequently,
TrueBFT deals with the number of selected validators issue by selecting a relatively
small number of validators proportional to the network’s hostility, and total number
of nodes. Put differently, we allow TrueBFT to select a number of validators proportional to a risk threshold (risk). Hence, in a less hostile network environment,
fewer validators are employed. This risk threshold, however, is static and set manually. We overcome this drawback (in Chapter 5) by integrating a game theoretical
model into TrueBFT which can determine the risk likelihood of each proposing node
dynamically.
To illustrate the trade-off between security and performance, we have simulated
the proposed TrueBFT protocol. Our base reference protocol was Tendermint due
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to its noteworthy performance. We chose Tendermint to be optimally secure (i.e.,
employs n − 1 of the nodes as validators), so that we can compare the security and
performance of TrueBFT relative to this choice. We set the risk, so that TrueBFT
employs log n validators, rather than the optimal choice of n − 1 validators. The
reasoning that has led to this specific value (i.e., log n) is to reduce the validation work
from O(n) to O(log n), and the communication overhead from O(n2 ) to O((log n).n).
We found that this reduction resulted in a considerable enhancement in performance
with a satisfactory level of security when compared to Tendermint, as will be shown
in Section 4.5.

4.2
4.2.1

Background
Blockchain Consensus Protocols

A blockchain is a decentralized peer-to-peer network without a central authority.
Although this architecture defeats corruption from a single source, it introduces a
new problem. This problem can be illustrated in the following questions [81]:
• Who controls decisions? How to agree on them?
• Since the data is not stored in a single centralized storage, how to replicate this
data on nodes? How to synchronize these replicas?
In a typical centralized architecture, all the decisions are made by a single controlling authority/leader or a committee of decision makers. This, however, is not
possible in a blockchain network, since there is no leader or a group of leaders that
controls the system. Therefore, making decisions in a blockchain requires a ”consensus mechanism” to come to a consensus on any decision. Moreover, the data in a
centralized organization is stored on a machine or a group of machines, so the nodes
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in the network can read and write. In a decentralized blockchain, every node has its
own copy of data, grouped in a ledger of blocks. The role of a ”consensus mechanism”
is to synchronize the copies of these ledgers, and ensure that they contain valid blocks.
A blockchain consensus mechanism/protocol is a series of actions and votes taken
by a group of nodes to reach an agreement on a proposed block [81]. It guarantees
that the blocks in a public ledger are always valid and have the same order. Consensus
protocols must satisfy the following aspects [11]:
• Liveness: It means that something good eventually will happen. In distributed
computing, it guarantees that the computation terminates. In consensus, all
processes (nodes) will eventually agree on a value.
• Safety: Guarantees that something bad will never happen. In consensus, no
two processes (nodes) decide on different values (i.e., correct decisions).
4.2.2

Broadcast and Consensus

In a fault-tolerant distributed system, an atomic broadcast is a broadcast where
all correct nodes in the system receive the same set of messages in the same order [11].
Such a broadcast is either completes correctly at all nodes, or all nodes abort with
no side effects. For a message m, atomic broadcast satisfies the following properties
[10, 31]:
• Validity: If a correct node broadcasts m, it delivers m eventually.
• Agreement: If a correct node delivers m, then all correct nodes deliver m
eventually.
• Integrity: Message m is received (delivered) by each node at most once, and
only if it was previously broadcast.
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• Total order: If the correct nodes p and q deliver m1 and m2 , then p delivers
m1 before m2 if and only if q delivers m1 before m2 .
Intuitively, consensus and atomic broadcast perform remarkably alike. The only
critical difference is that atomic broadcast is a continuous protocol, while consensus
expects to terminate [9].
4.2.3

Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) in Distributed Systems

Byzantine faults problem is one of the serious problems that face distributed
systems, including blockchains. The goal of Byzantine fault tolerance in a distributed
system, is to defend against failures, where parts of a system fail in arbitrary ways
[62]. These failures could be crashing, processing requests incorrectly, or even acting
maliciously. An example of a Byzantine fault problem is illustrated in Figure 4.1. In
this example, each node has a sensor that reads a value. The value is then broadcast
to all other nodes in the network. The nodes, however, need to agree on a single value
(i.e., state) so each node will have the same value as the other nodes. Consider the
following:
• Assume that the voting algorithm is to take the median of all broadcast values
as the state value.
• Assume that node C is Byzantine. Hence, C sends value = 9 to node A and
value = 12 to node B.
• A computes the median of {10, 11, 9} = 10, and B computes the median of
{10, 11, 12} = 11.
• As a result, C ’s malicious behavior causes A and B to work with inconsistent
state values.
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Figure 4.1: An example of a Byzantine fault problem. This is a network of three
nodes, in which nodes A and B are honest (regular) nodes, and node C is malicious
(Byzantine). Source : [62].
This problem can be defined in blockchains as how the distributed nodes in the
network reach an agreement on a non-replicated block in the presence of Byzantine
faults [31]. In this case, simple voting algorithms that involve all nodes will not be
able to deal with Byzantine faults [62].

4.3

Related Work

In this section, we will examine related existing consensus protocols. The related
literature falls into four general camps: (1) Proof of Work (PoW) protocols, (2) Proof
of Stake (PoS) protocols, (3) Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocols, and (4)
non-Byzantine Fault Tolerance protocols.
4.3.1

Proof of Work (PoW)

In 2009, Satoshi Nakamoto introduced Bitcoin [63], the first known implemented
blockchain. Bitcoin utilizes the PoW consensus mechanism to reach an agreement
on a proposed block. In PoW, transactions are grouped into a block, which is then

64
validated and confirmed by ’miners.’ The miners are required to solve a challenge
by computing cryptographic hashes. They achieve this by making trial-and-error
computations until a consensus is reached. The way PoW works is that all miners
compete to find a ’nonse,’ so when combined with the proposed block, the block will
hash to a target value determined by the mining difficulty. The successful miners are
then rewarded due to their consumed computational power.
Blockchains that involve and rely on PoW mining to ensure consensus, such as
Bitcoin entail the following drawbacks:
1. Time-consuming: confirmation of transactions is slow. For example, it can take
an average of 10 minutes to commit a block in Bitcoin [9].
2. High consumption of resources: due to the significant computation to solve a
challenge that requires computing cryptographic hashes.
3. High energy consumption: which results in massive expenses.
4. Specialized hardware: which is sometimes required to increase the mining power.
4.3.2

Proof of Stake (PoS)

The most common alternative to PoW is Proof of Stake (PoS). In 2012, King
and Nadal [42] introduced PoS to solve the problem of Bitcoin mining’s high energy
and computation consumption. In PoS, mining new blocks depends on who holds
the highest amounts of cryptocurrency, in which a deterministic algorithm selects
nodes according to the number of coins each one has. Hence, instead of investing in
expensive computational power to mine blocks, miners invest in the currencies of the
system. As a result, a miner’s likelihood of being chosen to mine a block depends on
the fraction of coins the miner owns in the system. For example, a miner with 400
coins is four times more likely to be picked as another miner with 100 coins.
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PoS protocols require less energy consumption than PoW and mitigate the hardware centralization risk [53]. However, some argued that PoS is not ideal for blockchains
[75]. This is because of a problem called ”nothing at stake,” where miners have nothing to lose by voting for multiple blocks and claim various sets of transaction fees,
since a participant with nothing to lose has no reason not to misbehave. This problem
prevents the consensus from resolving.

4.3.2.1

Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS)

Permissionless/public blockchains that utilize the tradtional PoS often face scalability
issues [50]. As a result, Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) [50], a variation of the PoS,
was adapted by some blockchains such as Lisk [59], EOS [16], BitShares [82], and
Ark [45], seeking to reach consensus more efficiently.
In DPoS, nodes vote to select witnesses. A witness is a node that has been selected
(i.e., voted on) to validate transactions. Each node votes for the witnesses, whom it
trusts. The top tier of witnesses (i.e., the nodes collecting most of the votes) win the
privilege to validate. Moreover, in DPoS, nodes are allowed to delegate their voting
power to other nodes, that they trust to vote for witnesses on their behalf. The
votes for a witness are weighed based on the size of every voter’s stake. As a result,
a node does not need to have a significant stake to be in the top tier of witnesses.
Instead, votes from nodes with large stakes can elevate a node, with a small stake,
to be a member of the witnesses in the top tier, which are responsible for validating
transactions and creating blocks for these transactions, and as a result are awarded
the associated fees.
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4.3.3

Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT)

In this section, we present the most widely used consensus protocols that can
tolerate Byzantine faults. These protocols are known to reach consensus and maintain
liveness even in the presence of Byzantine faults (crashing, or malicious nodes). Our
proposed TrueBFT protocol falls into this category.

4.3.3.1

Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)

PBFT [12] is a replication algorithm that can tolerate Byzantine faults. PBFT was
first introduced in 1999, after many Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocols were
proposed to improve its robustness and performance [9]. PBFT works in asynchronous
environments that might contain Byzantine faults such as the Internet [12].
PBFT progresses through a chain of views. Each view has a primary (i.e., proposer) which is selected in round-robin order. The other nodes (replicas) in the view
are called backups. A client sends a request to the primary. The primary assigns the
request a sequence number and multicasts a signed pre-prepare message to the other
backups. The pre-prepare message contains the view and sequence numbers. If the
backups did not already accept a pre-prepare message for the same view and sequence
numbers, they accept the pre-prepare message. After accepting, a backup broadcasts
a signed prepare message. For a replica to be prepared for a given request, the replica
must receive 2f prepare messages for that request (where f is the maximum number
of replicas that may be faulty), with the same view and sequence number. When a
replica is prepared, it multicasts a signed commit message. After a replica receives
and accepts a commit, it checks the client’s request to the state machine and sends
back the result to the client. Figure 4.2 illustrates this process.
PBFT uses a timeout mechanism to deal with faulty primaries. Backups keep
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Figure 4.2: Normal case operation of PBFT. Source: [12].
a timeout that starts every time they receive a new request. This timeout finishes
when the requested pre-prepare message is received. Hence, if backups did not receive
a pre-prepare message within the timeout for a request, they execute a view change
protocol. PBFT has the following issues [9]. First, changing the view in case of a
faulty primary is subtle and a bit complicated. Second, all previous clients’ requests,
since the last commit, migrate to the new view.

4.3.3.2

Tendermint

Tendermint [9,47] is a protocol used to deliver security and consistency for replicating
an application on multiple nodes. Tendermint guarantees the security, as it can work
even if up to one-third of the nodes in the network fail in arbitrary ways [9]. The
consistency means that every non-faulty node can view the same transaction log and
compute the same state. Tendermint is a consensus protocol that does not include
PoW mining, which overcomes the energy and resource consumption issues and speeds
up blocks’ validations [47].
Tendermint is based on PBFT, and it involves three stages of voting to reach
consensus (propose, prevote, and precommit). A proposer proposes a new block, then
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the validators prevote on the block and only proceed to precommit if they receive
more than two-thirds of prevotes. Likewise, validators only accept the block if more
than two-thirds of precommits are received. Tendermint, as mentioned earlier, is a
fixed-validators protocol; that is, it has a fixed known set of validators. Voting on a
block proceeds in rounds, where each round has a new proposer. The validators vote
on whether to commit the block or advance to the next round.
Tendermint is notable for its simplicity, performance, and fork-accountability [48].
However, the number of validators yields a powerful influence on Tendermint’s performance. This is due to the communication overhead created by the two stages of
voting (i.e., prevote and precommit). This creates a trade-off between performance
and security, where more validators strengthen security, but degrade performance.
TrueBFT is based on Tendermint and inherits all the features offered by Tendermint.
However, it deals with the validators’ selection issue by selecting a different, random
set of validators on each block proposal (i.e., true decentralized). Furthermore, the
’number’ of selected validators in TrueBFT is a fraction of the total number of nodes
in the network proportional to the risk likelihood of the proposing nodes.

4.3.3.3

Hyperledger Fabric

Hyperledger Fabric [34] employs PBFT as its consensus algorithm. Thus, it can
tolerate up to one-third Byzantine nodes in a blockchain network. In Fabric v0.6,
there exists a fixed number of validation peers responsible for executing the consensus
protocol. A proposer can submit a transaction to any of them. Then, the chosen peer
broadcasts this transaction to the other peers. One of the validation peers is selected
as a leader.
When generating a block, the leader orders the block’s transactions and broadcasts this ordered list of transactions to all validation peers. When a validation peer
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receives the ordered list, it proceeds as follows. First, the validation peer executes
the transactions in order. Second, after executing all transactions, it calculates the
hash for the newly created block (i.e., for the executed transactions plus final state of
the blockchain). Third, it broadcasts the resulting hash to all other peers and begins
counting their responses. Finally, if two-thirds of the responses were received with
the same hash, it commits the new block to its local ledger. Hyperledger Fabric, like
Tendermint, suffers partial centralization since it employs a fixed, known number of
validation peers.

4.3.3.4

Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP)

SCP [60] is a consensus protocol that utilizes quorums, where a quorum is a set of
nodes from a network sufficient to reach an agreement. SCP is based on Federated
Byzantine Agreement (FBA), in which SCP exploits the concept of a quorum slice. A
quorum slice (can be smaller than a quorum) is the subset of a quorum that can cause
one particular node to reach an agreement. A node can have one or more quorum
slices. The key idea in FBA is that every node chooses its own quorum slices. For
example, a node might choose a reputable bank and other financial company to sign
on all transactions. A node accepts a vote or a transaction when a threshold (e.g.,
two-thirds) of nodes in its quorum slice confirms it. However, SCP requires the
quorum slices to overlap.
The previously discussed protocols such as PBFT, Hyperledger Fabric, and Tendermint employ a fixed and globally known set of nodes to reach a consensus. In
contrast, SCP gives each node a choice to select one or more quorum slices, each of
which might have different nodes. Despite the beauty of this design, it might result
in undermining the consensus as quorum slices might not overlap [48]. If quorums are
disjointed, quorum A might, for example, agree on a statement X, while quorum B
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agrees on a statement Y. As a result, A and B independently agree on contradictory
statements. Therefore, no consensus is reached. SCP relies on the assumption that
every node is responsible for choosing a quorum slice that doesn’t violate quorum
intersection (i.e., non-empty intersection) [48].

4.3.3.5

Ripple

Ripple [83] was introduced in 2012 to enable global payments using ’XRP’ cryptocurrency by connecting payment providers, banks, and businesses via a network called
’ripplenet.’ Ripple uses a BFT consensus protocol to maintain a valid, distributed
ledger.
In Ripple consensus, a proposer collects new transactions initiated by end users
and combines them into a list known as the “candidate set” (i.e., block). Each node
in the network has a Unique Node List (UNL). UNL is a list of other nodes whom
the node trusts. The nodes in a UNL are so-called validating nodes. Each node
amalgamates the candidate sets of all nodes on its UNL, and votes on the integrity
of all transactions. After 50% of the nodes approve the transactions, the candidate
set is pushed further to a higher round of voting. The final round of voting needs a
minimum of 80% of a node’s UNL in agreement on a transaction. All transactions
that fit this requirement are then written to the ledger.
Ripple, however, requires (4/5).n of all n validating nodes to be correct for maintaining correctness [11]. This corresponds to tolerating f < n/5 faulty nodes. Additionally, Ripple, like Stellar, requires a minimal overlap among the Unique Node
Lists to avoid forking. Moreover, as argued by Cachin et al. [11], Ripple ”is by far not
as decentralized as advertised”, since Ripple offers a default list of validating nodes
operated by Ripple and third parties.
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4.3.3.6

Tangaroa

Tangaroa [15] or BFTRaft is a Byzantine Fault Tolerant variant of the Raft [73]
consensus algorithm. It was introduced to address the Byzantine behavior in which
Raft is not tolerant to. Tangaroa, like Raft, works in views, each of which has a
leader. The leaders are responsible for driving the consensus process. Tangaroa
utilizes randomized timeouts to trigger the elections of leaders.
In Tangaroa, a client sends a request to the leader once a leader has been elected.
When the leader receives a request from a client, it sends an append command to
each replica/follower. As in PBFT, the client needs to wait for f + 1 matching replies
to the request, in which f < n/3 where n is the total number of nodes in the network.
Cachin et al. [11] analyzed Tangaroa, and they argued that Tangaroa is neither live
nor safe (we refer the reader to [11] for in-depth details). Another issue of Tangaroa
is that the consensus process cannot be accomplished without a single leader for each
view. This exposes the leaders to adversaries who could launch attacks on these
leaders such as DDoS to undermine the consensus process.

4.3.3.7

Algorand

Recently, Algorand [26], a new fast Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocol, has
been introduced to avoid the scalability and power-hungry issues presented by PoW.
It combines a revamped Byzantine Agreement protocol (BA*) with a cryptographic
method so-called ’Cryptographic Sortition’ to propose and agree on new blocks.
Algorand advances in rounds. In each round, to propose a block, each node in
the network executes cryptographic sortition to determine if it is selected to propose
the block. The sortition ensures that a small number of nodes are randomly selected
based on their account balance. Each selected node has a priority and a proof. For
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each round, multiple nodes are selected and propose the block for this round, but the
one with the highest priority is adopted.
To agree on the proposed block, Algorand uses BA* consensus. Each node initializes BA* with the highest-priority block that it received. The cryptographic sortition
is also used to select a committee of verifiers. The verifiers are the nodes responsible for validating the proposed block and voting on it. Each verifier is required to
broadcast a proof of selection, so any other node can verify this proof. These steps
repeat until in some phase of BA* enough nodes in the committee (a threshold level
of votes) reach consensus.
Unlike most of the previously discussed protocols, Algorand does not rely on
fixed known validators, which makes it robust against DDoS and Eclipse attacks.
Nevertheless, Algorand provides no incentive [46], and does not guarantee that the
verifiers will adhere to the protocol. It is possible for attacks like block withholding
and lazy verifiers to appear in Algorand. TrueBFT, in contrast, avoids this issue by
leveraging a rewarding mechanism based on a game theoretical model (Chapter 5).
4.3.4
4.3.4.1

Non Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Paxos

Paxos [49] is an asynchronous consensus protocol and is quite similar to PBFT. However, it requires only 2f + 1 nodes to tolerate f faults [9]. In Paxos, there are two
parties: (1) the proposer (leader), which proposes a value (block), and (2) the acceptors, which accept the value. A client can connect to the proposer to add a
transaction (value) to the log (ledger). The proposer proposes the value to the acceptors and counts the votes for acceptance of the majority. The value is accepted
when there is a majority/quorum.
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4.3.4.2

Raft

Raft [73] is a consensus protocol that has been introduced to be easy to understand.
It is similar in spirit to Paxos in fault-tolerance. Raft works by electing a leader who
coordinates some followers. When a client sends a request to the leader, the leader
instructs its followers to append the entry. The entry is committed only when at least
a majority of the followers have confirmed the appending command. Raft is used by
many blockchains such as R3 Corda [32], and Kadena [58].

4.3.4.3

Casper “The Friendly GHOST”

Casper [100] is the consensus mechanism in Ethereum [96]. It is an adjustment of some
of the principles of the GHOST protocol [86] (Greedy Heaviest-Observed Sub-Tree).
Casper in Ethereum was presented with a security-deposit based economic consensus
protocol. In other words, each node that wishes to participate in the validation and
consensus process needs to have a security deposit that reflects how much stake it
has. These nodes are known as ”bonded validators” and must place their security
deposits prior to participating in the consensus. In this way, Ethereum addresses the
“nothing at stake” problem since each bonded validator has its deposit at stake. As a
result, if the bonded validator misbehaves in an objectively verifiable manner, it will
lose its security deposit.
In Casper, to produce a block, a validator bundles the new transactions in a block,
validates them, and securely signs the block. Then, the validator places bets (security
deposit) on the consensus process known as ’gambling on consensus.’ The likelihood
that this validator is chosen is directly proportional to the deposit it makes.
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4.4

The Proposed TrueBFT Consensus Protocol

In this section, we propose the TrueBFT, a new consensus protocol that achieves
true decentralization by employing a different, random set of validators every time a
new block is proposed. Additionally, TrueBFT addresses the problem of validators’
selection regarding ’how many to select’ by selecting a number of validators proportional to the environment’s hostility. TrueBFT is based on Tendermint and exploits
its capability to overcome up to one-third of Byzantine faults. Unlike other protocols
that rely on a fixed, static set of validators responsible for validating all proposed
blocks, TrueBFT replaces the set of validators each time a new block is proposed.
Thus, TrueBFT improves security, since the validators are not known before proposing the new block. This factor makes the job more difficult for an adversary to attack
or to bribe the set of validators. With respect to efficiency, TrueBFT decides the
number of validators based on the risk likelihood (i.e., risk) of the proposing nodes.
To show how secure is TrueBFT even with a relatively small number of validators,
we set risk so that the number of validators is equal to log n. This choice saves
substantial computational and communication costs and achieves high security.
Each node in the blockchain has a unique pair of keys (public pk and secret sk)
and is identified by its public key. Moreover, each node has a public trust/reputation
value (R) where this value affects the selection of a node to be validator over time.
The calculation of R is presented in Section 4.4.2.4. There are four types of nodes in
TrueBFT:
1. Proposing (proposer): This is the node which executes the local authentication algorithm in our Block-Supply Chain (Section 3.4.2.1). After successful
authentication, it creates, proposes, and broadcasts to the network the new
block for the product.
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2. Validation-leader: This is the node responsible for determining the number
of validators for the proposing node and randomly selecting them.
3. Validator: This node is responsible for validating the newly proposed block
by executing the global authentication algorithm (Section 3.4.2.2). Moreover,
validators communicate their votes on the block to reach consensus.
4. Idle: This node does nothing except waiting for the decision to be made by
validators on whether to accept, or to reject the block. All other nodes in the
network are idle.
It is worth noting that the validation-leader and validator nodes are rewarded
some fees associated with the proposed block for carrying out the consensus process.
TrueBFT works in two phases, the initialization phase and the verification (validation) phase. The blockchain initiator executes the first phase at the genesis state,
in which it randomly maps each proposer to its validation-leaders. In the second
phase, each node becomes a proposer in a round-robin order, where the nodes have
a pre-determined schedule specifying when each node becomes a proposer. When a
node is a proposer, it proposes a block, broadcasts it to all nodes, and its corresponding validation-leaders randomly select the validators to verify (validate) this block.
The next two subsections present an in-depth description of how these two phases are
executed.
4.4.1

Initialization Phase

The main task of this phase is mapping proposers to validation-leaders. At the
genesis state (i.e., when the genesis block is proposed), the blockchain initiator randomly maps four validation-leaders to each proposer in the network. The reasoning
behind this choice is that four is the minimum number to provide tolerance to a sin-
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gle Byzantine fault [9]. As TrueBFT is based on Tendermint, it is assumed that a
Tendermint network has two-thirds non-Byzantine nodes. A simple approach is to
employ only one validation-leader per proposer; however, to ensure the safety and
liveness of the consensus process, we need to utilize more. It is worth noting that this
number (i.e., four) can be changed based on factors such as the network’s size and
hostility, or the blockchain application that utilizes TrueBFT. Our approach works
with any number of validation-leaders per proposer other than four, but we utilize the
minimum for efficiency. Additionally, this number can be random to further increase
robustness.
The mapping is executed randomly according to the nodes’ weights/reputations
(R). As shown in Algorithm 3, we use the Weighted Random Sampling (WRS) algorithm [20] due to its simplicity, flexibility, and its ability to select a weighted random
sample in one-pass [20]. The weights in our algorithm are the nodes’ reputation
values. Furthermore, this mapping is anonymous and done blindly; that is, no proposer knows its corresponding validation-leaders, and no validation-leader knows its
proposer. This way, we prevent a malicious proposer from corrupting or bribing its
validation-leaders and vice versa.
After selecting the validation-leaders for a proposer and to accomplish the anonymous mapping, the blockchain initiator first includes a proposer’s secret (S1 ) in
every proposer’s genesis block, so this proposer uses this secret when it is ready to
propose its block. S1 is a hash that includes the proposer’s public key (pr.pk), all
four of the selected validation-leaders’ public keys [vl1 .pk − vl4 .pk], the blockchain ID
(blockchainID), and a random number (Rand1 ) as follows:
S1 ← hash(pr.pk||vl1 .pk||vl2 .pk||vl3 .pk||vl4 .pk||blockcahinID||Rand1 )
We introduce the random number (Rand1 ) to prevent brute force attacks on S1 in
which an attacker tries all the possibilities until he finds a hash that matches S1 ,
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and hence discovers the identities of the leaders. This attack is feasible because the
attacker knows pr.pk, blockcahinID, and all the public keys of the nodes in the
network. As a result, without Rand1 , when a proposer broadcasts S1 , the attacker
can find the identities of the leaders by hashing every possible combination of four
nodes’ public keys with pr.pk and blockcahinID. A powerful attacker can accomplish
that quickly, especially in a network with a small number of nodes. Utilizing Rand1 ,
where each proposer in the network has a unique, random Rand1 prevents such an
attack because Rand1 is not known to the attacker (note that Rand1 is not published
to the system). It is worth noting that the larger the size of Rand1 , the securer the
system.
There is only one proposer’s secret (S1 ) per node in the network to use it when
the node becomes a proposer. Each proposer in the system has its own S1 . When a
proposer broadcasts its S1 , this S1 is checked by each node in the network to determine
if it is a leader for the proposer, as will be discussed shortly.
Second, the blockchain initiator generates a validation-leader’s secret (S2 ) for
each of the selected four leaders. S2 is a hash that includes the corresponding proposer’s secret (S1 ), and a random number (Rand2 ) as follows:
S2 ← hash(S1 ||Rand2 )
Here, we use different, unique Rand2 for each selected validation-leader to make S2
different for each one of them. Note that S2 and Rand2 are private and are only
known to its particular validation-leader node.
To ensure that a validation-leader is legitimate, and that it has been elected by
the blockchain initiator, we need to utilize a verifiable proof (π). This proof is a
digital signature signed by the initiator using its private key (in.sk). The proof π
includes the proposer’s secret (S1 ), the validation-leader’s public key (vl.pk), and the
blockchain ID (blockchainID) as below:
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Algorithm 3: Proposers to leaders mapping
Input : A population A of n nodes having reputation values (R)
1 foreach pr ∈ A do
2
for k ← 1 to 4 do
3
Try:
Ri
4
pi (k) ← Σs ∈A−B
Rj
j

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Randomly select vli with probability pi (k) from A − B
if Ci .size > 4 then
Go to Try
else
B.add(vli .pk)
end
end
Randomly generate Rand1
S1 ← hash(pr.pk||vl1 .pk||vl2 .pk||vl3 .pk||vl4 .pk||blockcahinID||Rand1 )
foreach vli ∈ B do
Randomly generate Rand2
S2 ← hash(S1 ||Rand2 )
π ← Signin.sk (S1 ||vli .pk||blockcahinID)
g ← d((i − 1). n4 ) + 1 , i. n4 e
Ci .add(S2 ||Rand2 ||π||g)
end
Flush B
end

π ← Signin.sk (S1 ||vli .pk||blockcahinID)
The validation-leader must submit this proof to its selected validators, so that each
can verify π using the initiator’s public key (in.pk) prior to becoming involved in the
validation and consensus process. This protects against ’malicious nodes’ claiming
that they are ’validation-leaders’ for a proposer.
As mentioned, for one proposer, there exist four leaders responsible for selecting
the validators for the block proposed by this particular proposer. This raises a new
problem of selection conflict, since each validation-leader selects the validators blindly
without knowing its peer leaders. Consequently, the four leaders perform the validators’ selection from the same pool of nodes without any communication or agreement
between them. This can result in selecting a validator more than once by different
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leaders. TrueBFT overcomes this problem by dividing the pool of nodes into four
pools, each of which is assigned to a leader. Specifically, each validation-leader will
have a range (g) to choose from, determined at the genesis state. Note that we assume
that all the nodes in the network have the same set of nodes in the same order. As
shown in Algorithm 3, g is predetermined by the blockchain initiator and is defined
as below:
g ← d((i − 1). n4 ) + 1 , i. n4 e
Where 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 and is the index of a validation-leader among its peers.
In Algorithm 3, there are three lists. The first list (A) is a population of n nodes
each of which has a reputation value R. The second list (B) is a temporary list for a
proposer to hold the public keys for the selected validation-leaders; this list is flushed
after selecting the validation-leaders and initializing their secrets and proofs. The
last list (C) is for a validation-leader. There exist four corresponding proposers for
each validation-leader. Thus, C stores four tuples, and each of them corresponds to
one proposer. Each tuple includes the secret (S2 ), the random number (Rand2 ), the
proof (π), and the range (g). After executing Algorithm 3, each node in the network
will have exactly one proposer’s secret (S1 ) used when the node becomes a proposing
node, and a list (C) used whenever this node becomes a validation-leader for one of
its four proposing nodes. This concludes the initialization phase.
4.4.2

Verification (Validation) Phase

This phase is executed upon proposing a new block. It is carried out by three
parties (proposer, validation-leaders, and validators). The main purpose of this phase
is to decide the validity of the newly proposed block and to reach a consensus on this
decision.
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Algorithm 4: Validation-leader checking
Input : The node’s list C, and the received proposing node’s secret S1
Output: A decision of weather or not this node is a validation-leader
1 decision ← false
2 foreach tuplei ∈ C do
3
if S2i = hash(S1 ||Randi2 ) then
4
decision ← True
5
end
6 end
7 Return decision

When a node becomes a proposer, it broadcasts its secret (S1 ) to all nodes in
the network. Every other node checks if it is a validation-leader for this proposer
by looping through its list (C) and hashing the received S1 and each private random
number (Rand2 ) it has. If the resulting hash matches its secret (S2 ), then this node
is a validation-leader for this proposer as shown in Algorithm 4.

4.4.2.1

Deciding the Number of Validators (M )

Each validation-leader decides its number of validators (m), of which m < n where
n is the total number of nodes in the network. TrueBFT utilizes a risk likelihood
threshold (risk). The number of validators (m) is proportional to the risk likelihood
(risk). risk, as mentioned in Section 4.1, is set manually for all proposers in the
network and is static. However, in Chapter 5, we enhance TrueBFT to make risk
dynamic and proportional to each proposer’s likelihood.
For each validation-leader, the number of validators (m) will be a number bound
by the minimum number of validators (i.e., four) and a fraction of
risk (we choose

n
4

n
4

proportional to

because we have four validation-leaders). The reasoning behind

this choice (i.e., minimum number of validators) is that, as mentioned earlier, four
is the minimum number to provide tolerance to a single Byzantine fault [9]. So, a
validation-leader selects its m to be: (a)

risk.(n−2)
4

(note n − 2 because we exclude the
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Algorithm 5: Deciding the number of validators per a leader (m)
Input : The number of nodes in the network n, the risk likelihood risk
Output: The number of how many validators to select m
risk.(n−2)
> 4 then
1 if
4
2
m ← risk.(n−2)
4
3 else
4
m←4
5 end
6 Return m
proposing and the validation-leader nodes), or (b) four if [ risk.(n−2)
] is less than four
4
as shown in Algorithm 5.
After a validation-leader decides its m, it selects its validators, instructs them,
and broadcasts m to all nodes. When a node in the network receives all the ms from
the validation-leaders, it calculates the overall number of the validators involved in
the protocol (M ) as follows:
M = Σ4i=1 mi
This way, the overall number of validators is proportional to risk. Note that
TrueBFT inherits the Byzantine tolerance provided by Tendermint. In other words,
the system can work with less than one-third of Byzantine leaders (one faulty leader),
of which M is the aggregation of only three ms. However, if more than one-third of
leaders are faulty, TrueBFT, like in Tendermint, stalls momentarily, and then switches
to a new round of proposing; thus preserving liveness.

4.4.2.2

Selecting Validators

Each validation-leader selects its set of m validators from the set of

n−2
4

nodes (note

each leader has its own pool to select from defined by g excluding itself and the
proposer). The four sets of selected validators will be responsible for validating the
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Algorithm 6: Validators’ selection
Input : A population V of n−2
nodes having reputation values (R)
4
Output: A set of validators/pre-voters P V and a set of pre-committers P C of
size m
1 for k ← 1 to m do
i
2
pi (k) ← Σv ∈VR−P
V Rj
j

3
4
5
6
7

Randomly select vi with probability pi (k) from V − P V
P V.add(vi )
end
for l ← 1 to mi do
i
pi (l) ← Σc ∈VR−P
C Rj
j

8
9
10
11

Randomly select ci with probability pi (l) from V − P C
P C.add(ci )
end
Return P V AND P C

proposed block. The validators are selected randomly, and each set of selected validators is only known to its selecting validation-leader. TrueBFT is based on Tendermint, which involves two steps of voting (pre-vote and pre-commit). A validator
is only known to the other nodes in the network when it contributes to one of the
voting steps. Therefore, an adversary can observe the validators after revealing their
identities in executing the first stage of voting (i.e., pre-voting). As a result, a powerful adversary might be able to attack or corrupt a sufficient number of them, which
can result in not executing the second step of voting (i.e., pre-committing). In response to this issue, TrueBFT requires each validation-leader to select two sets of
nodes of size m. The first set is the validators/pre-voters, and the second one is the
pre-committers. The pre-voters are responsible for executing the first step of voting,
and the pre-committers execute the second step. As a result, the adversary discovers a participating node in the voting only after giving its vote, which is not useful
knowledge. Algorithm 6 shows the process of selecting the validators/pre-voters and
pre-committers.
After selecting the validators and pre-committers, each validation-leader needs
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to include a proof of eligibility (τ ) for each selected node to prove that a legitimate validation-leader has selected this node. τ is a digital signature signed by the
validation-leader’s private key (vl.sk) and includes the validation-leader’s public key
(vl.pk), the selected node’s public key (pv.pk for a pre-voter and pc.pk for a precommitter), and the validation-leader’s proof (π) as follows:
τ ← Signvl.sk (vl.pk||pv.pk||π)
A node that receives a vote accompanied by τ from a voting node (i.e, pre-voter
or pre-committer) needs to perform two verifications. First, it needs to verify τ using
the validation-leader’s public key (vl.pk). Second, after successful verification of τ ,
the node verifies π using the initiator’s public key (in.pk).

4.4.2.3

Consensus Mechanism

Thus far, we have covered how the validators are selected. However, these validators
need a way to reach consensus in the presence of Byzantine nodes. TrueBFT is
based on Tendermint and adapts its consensus approach. The pre-voters in TrueBFT
pre-vote on the proposed block, and when the pre-committers hear from more than
two-thirds of M ’s other nodes, they pre-commit the block. The block is committed
when more than two-thirds of M pre-commits are received. The consensus algorithm
is summarized as follows:
1. When a node in the Block-Supply Chain becomes a proposing node, this node
creates the new block and proposes it to the network along with its secret S1 .
2. Upon receiving the proposal, each node in the network checks if it is a validationleader, as mentioned earlier. If a node is a validation-leader, then it executes the
”validators’ selection” algorithm to randomly select m validators/pre-voters and
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m pre-committers. Then, it sends a validate command to the selected validators
and a pre-commit command to the selected pre-committers. Moreover, each
leader broadcasts its m to all nodes.
3. After that, if a node receives a validate command, then it acts as a validator
and carries on the validation process. However, if the node receives a pre-vote
message, then it is an idle node, and it waits to hear the remaining two-thirds
pre-votes.
4. After receiving the validate command, the validators wait for a ”proposer-timeout” to receive the proposed block. This time-out protects the protocol’s liveness from faulty proposing nodes. The validators begin this step by initializing
the proposing’s ”round-number ” to zero (round-number is a number that represents how many times a proposer has been given a chance to re-propose).
Proposers are given multiple proposing rounds to allow them to re-propose in
case if they fail to propose on time. The validators’ votes depend on two factors:
a) whether or not they receive the proposed block within the proposer-time-out,
and b) whether or not the proposed block is valid. If a validator receives the proposed block within the proposer-time-out, it validates the block, and pre-votes
’valid’ if the block is valid or ’invalid’ otherwise. However, if the proposer-timeout terminates, then the validator pre-votes ’timed-out’, as illustrated in Figure
4.3.
5. When a pre-committer receives more than

2.M
3

pre-votes, it pre-commits ’valid’,

’invalid’, or ’timed-out’ according to the received pre-votes’ type.
6. When a node receives more than

2.M
3

pre-votes followed by more tahn

2.M
3

pre-

commits, it commits ’valid’, ’invalid’, or ’timed-out’ according to the received
pre-commits’ type.
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Figure 4.3: Our consensus mechanism. The first step is ”Propose.” After this step,
validators only advance after hearing from more than two-thirds of M other nodes.
By the end of the consensus, either the block is committed and the blockchain height
increases, or the proposed block is rejected and the protocol aborts.
7. There is a final subsequent step following the commit step, and it is of three
types, as shown in Figure 4.3. First, if a node commits ’valid,’ then it adds the
proposed block to the blockchain and extends it to a new height. Second, if the
node commits ’invalid,’ then it aborts the protocol (in applications other than
the Block-Supply Chain, the protocol allows the next proposer inline to propose,
as will be discussed in Chapter 6). Third, if the commit is of type ’timed-out,’
then the validators check the round-number against a rounds’ counter that
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limits how many times a proposer can re-propose, we call it rounds-limit. If
the round-number is less than or equal to the rounds-limit, the validators: a)
increase the round-number by one, b) increase the proposer-time-out based on
the network conditions, and c) start a new proposing round giving a chance for
the proposing node to re-propose. However, if the round-number is greater than
the rounds-limit, the validators pre-vote ’invalid’.
It is worth mentioning that the proposed block and all types of messages (i.e.,
pre-vote, and pre-commit) are digitally signed by the sender using its private key, and
verified by the receiver using the sender’s public key.
4.4.2.4

Calculating the Reputation Values (R) for the Consensus Nodes

Each node in the network has a global reputation/trust value (R) associated with its
public key, which affects the node’s chance to be selected as a validator or leader over
time. Each node in the network has a list of other nodes’ public keys and reputation
values. Hence, the reputation of a node in the network represents its value [24]. This
encourages the network’s nodes to build good reputations by behaving well. At the
genesis state, all nodes have the same initial R. However, as more blocks are proposed
and validated, a participating node in the proposing and validation process will have
a different value of R based on its behavior.
The reputation of a node participating in a ledger height H is updated in the
next height (i.e., H + 1). The ledger is extended to a new height when a new, valid
block is added to it; that is, a proposer proposes the block, and its validators and
pre-committers reach agreement on its validity. When a proposer tries to propose
a new block for height H + 1, it calculates the reputation values for all nodes that
participated in height H. After that, this new proposer broadcasts these reputation
values to all nodes in the network along with the newly proposed block. Accordingly,

87
the validators of height H + 1 validate the correctness of the proposed reputations
and vote on them. When the validators and pre-committers of height H + 1 agree
on the proposed reputation values, all the nodes in the network update R for each
node that was involved in height H. This way, the nodes will have consistent global
reputation values for other nodes without exchanging a large number of messages or
performing much computation.
Note that the participating nodes in height H do not know the identities of the
validators in height H + 1 due to anonymity and random selection. As a result,
TrueBFT prevents bribing or corrupting the validators in height H + 1 to agree on
false Rs provided by a colluding proposer in height H + 1. Furthermore, due to
validating and voting on Rs by anonymous random validators, TrueBFT withstands
the bad-mouthing attack [19], in which a dishonest proposer in height H + 1 provides
dishonest Rs to deframe good nodes in height H.
To calculate R, we use the EigenTrust algorithm [39] due to its simplicity and
effectiveness. In this algorithm, the proposer calculates the new Rs of the height H’s
participants as follows:
1. Rate every node in height H as positive (trij = 1) or negative (trij = -1), where
node i is the rating node (i.e., the proposer) and node j is the rated node.
2. Calculate the trust value (sij ) for node j by aggregating all the ratings of node
j as follows:
sij = sj + trij

(4.1)

Where sj is the sum of all the ratings of node j provided by the previous rating
nodes except node i defined as:
sj =

X
z

trzj

(4.2)
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3. Calculate the reputation value (Rj ) of node j by normalizing the trust value for
node j as follows:
max(sij , 0)
Rj = P
j max(sij , 0)

(4.3)

This ensures that all Rs will be between 0 and 1. For more details about the
EigenTrust algorithm, we refer the reader to [39]. After calculating all the Rs for the
participants in height H, the H + 1’s proposer broadcasts the rating (trij ), the trust
value (sij ), and the reputation value (Rj ) for every rated node j. Each corresponding
validator first vitrifies the integrity of each provided tr; that is, ensuring that the
proposer provides an honest, fair rating. Then, the validator ensures the correctness
of each calculated Rs. The validators then vote on Rs. Note that the remaining nodes
in the network wait for the decision to be made by the validators and pre-committers.
Once the consensus is reached, all nodes update their copies of Rs.

4.5

Experiments and Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the performance and security of our proposed TrueBFT
protocol. One of our most important design goals is to balance between performance
and security. We chose Tendermint as a reference protocol due to its noteworthy
performance, ability to maintain liveness and safety in the presence of Byzantine
nodes, and most importantly its similarity to our blockchain use case (i.e., miningless).
TrueBFT achieves remarkable performance and at the same time maintains a reasonable level of robustness in a fully decentralized and distributed manner. The high
performance is accomplished by decreasing the number of validators. The security is achieved by the anonymous leaders-proposers’ mapping and the random
validators’ selection. We set the risk value in TrueBFT so the ’number’ of the
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employed validators would be log n nodes. This is only to show that even if we select
a relatively small number of validators, TrueBFT can still be secured when compared
to an optimal secured protocol where all the nodes in the network are selected to be
validators. However, as mentioned before in Section 4.4.2.1, the number of validators
in TrueBFT is dynamic and changes based on the proposing node’s risk likelihood,
as will be covered in Chapter 5.
4.5.1

Experiments Setup

In our experiments, we used Omnet++ as our simulation platform. OMNeT++
is a C++-based discrete event simulator for modeling communication networks [95].
It has gained wide-spread popularity in peer-to-peer (p2p) protocols simulations [7],
which makes it very suitable for our use case. Besides, OMNET++ proves to have
better performance than some well-known simulators such as NS2 and OPNET [97].
Other advantages of OMNET++ are that it is well structured, highly modular, not
limited to network protocols simulation, and source code is publicly available [72].
Nevertheless, OMNET++ doesn’t have a blockchain-based platform; however, we
had to use it due to the lack of blockchain-enabled simulators and its popularity in
modeling p2p networks.
We simulated the Block-Supply Chain as a p2p network. The two protocols (Tendermint and TrueBFT) were exactly simulated as described before (Sections 4.3.3.2
and 4.4). The only thing that we had to introduce was how to simulate the physical
products and their movement between nodes. In this regard, we treated a product as
a ’control ’ message that propagates between nodes in the same way that the product might geographically flow in a real supply chain. This newly introduced control
message contains the data that are supposed to be on the product’s NFC tag. It is
assumed that there are fields in the control message that are read-only (i.e., TID and
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Counter ). However, without loss of generality, we had to update the tag’s Counter
variable in a way that simulates updating it automatically upon readings in the real
world.
The control message triggers the proposing nodes. Put differently, when a node
in our simulated network receives a control message, it becomes a proposing node.
Similarly, when the product is valid (that is, the consensus protocol was executed
and the new block is committed), the proposing node sends this control message to
the next node in the network and becomes an idle node. This way, we model our
p2p network as a supply chain where real physical products are treated as control
messages. As in our Block-Supply Chain, where each product is uniquely identified
by a P ID, each corresponding control message is uniquely identified by the same
P ID.
4.5.2

Performance

We have conducted several experiments to examine TrueBFT performance with
different numbers of nodes. The question we were trying to answer by conducting
these experiments is: ”if we validate the same number of products on two blockchain
networks, each one of them uses a different consensus protocol (i.e., one uses TrueBFT,
and another uses Tendermint), having the same number of nodes, under the same
network conditions, which protocol will outperform the another?”
Our reference protocol was Tendermint employing n − 1 nodes as validators. We
chose n − 1 validators for Tendermint because the only way that Tendermint can
guarantee true decentralization, and optimal security is by involving n − 1 nodes in
the validation process. Besides, our goal was to compare TrueBFT’s security to an
optimally secured protocol.
We chose networks of sizes 100, 125, 150, 175, 200 nodes respectively to investigate
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Figure 4.4: Consensus latency for committing one block.
the scalability of the protocols when the number of nodes increases. We evaluated
two performance metrics:
1. Latency: Measured as the time taken to commit one proposed block. Figure
4.4 shows that TrueBFT outperforms the optimal secured Tendermint.
2. Scalability: Measured as the changes of latency when increasing the number
of nodes in the network. To better illustrate the scalability of each protocol,
we measured the total time taken to validate a product in its supply chain
life cycle (i.e., from the first node to the last node). This way, we were able
to observe a clear illustration of how a consensus protocol might affect the
validation and consensus time. Figure 4.5 illustrates the comparison between
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Figure 4.5: Scalability: TrueBFT’s consensus latency with log n validators increases
gradually, while Tendermint’s time with n − 1 validators increases significantly on
networks of sizes between 100 - 200 nodes.
our log n validators protocol and the n − 1 validators Tendermint.
Despite the overhead that we introduced by the random validators’ selection,
TrueBFT outperforms Tendermint and shows great scalability. After analyzing the
simulation results, we found that two factors influence a protocol’s performance:
1. Communication overhead: The number of exchanged messages to reach a consensus was the most dominant factor. In TrueBFT, this number was reduced
due to a small number of communicating validators. This contributes significantly to lower latency compared to the n − 1 Tendermint.
2. The validation work: Another important factor was the computational cost
resulted from validating a new block. This cost is proportional to the number
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of validators performing the validating computation.
4.5.3

Security

As mentioned in Section 4.4.1, each proposer is blindly and randomly mapped
to four leaders. Then, each of the leaders randomly selects a portion of validators
without any communication with its peer leaders. This selection approach protects
against the following attacks:

4.5.3.1

DDoS Attacks

The DDoS attack is more likely to happen if the set of validators is known in advance. Such an attack can happen to undermine the blockchain and can be launched
from inside or outside the network [38]. Leaders’ and validators’ replaceability and
randomizing their selection can significantly mitigate this attack. This is because the
set of validators changes randomly, and their identities remain anonymous until they
participate in the consensus voting. Besides, each step of voting has a different set
of voters. Thus, launching a DDoS attack is almost impossible and requires attacking all the nodes in the network to undermine the system. Similarly, attacking the
validation-leaders is hard too, since leaders are known only after completing their
tasks (i.e., broadcasting the m value and instructing their selected validators/prevoters and pre-committers). Note that we aim only to protect the validation and
consensus process from DDoS attacks.

4.5.3.2

Eclipse Attacks

This attack is presented by Heilman et al. [33] and allows an attacker who controls
an adequate number of IP addresses to manage all connections to and from a victim
node. As a result, the adversary can utilize the victim nodes for attacks on block
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validation and consensus system [33]. As in the DDoS attack, an adversary mounting
this attack needs to know the identity of the node participating in the validation and
consensus process in advance. Introducing variable, anonymous leaders and validators
on each block’s proposal makes the adversary’s job more difficult.

4.5.3.3

Bribery Attacks

Bonneau et al. [8] introduced a new attack on blockchain consensus, the so-called
Bribery attack. In this attack, a malicious node deliberately pays miners/validators
to work on specific blocks and forks. The goal of such an attack is to generate an
arbitrary fork that benefits this malicious node [8]. The attack generally works by
the adversary offering the miners/validators a bribe to misbehave and deviate from
the protocol. This bribe is higher than the fees/reward that the miners/validators
obtain if perform correctly and adhere to the protocol. An example of this attack is
when a malicious proposer bribes and convinces other leaders or voters to accept and
vote for an invalid block. Performing such an attack requires knowing the identities
of the targeted nodes. TrueBFT anonymizes the interaction between the consensus
and validation parties, which significantly mitigates such an attack.

4.5.3.4

Hijack and Wait

One possible attack is for an adversary to hijack a number of nodes (sufficient to
undermine the consensus process), and wait for them to be selected to exploit. For
example, an adversary can hijack

logn
3

nodes and wait for them to be selected in one

of the validation rounds (we assume here that the adversary is very powerful to hijack
such a number). In this case,

logn
3

since the protocol only tolerates <

is sufficient to undermine the consensus process,
logn
3

faulty nodes. This attack is rare-occurrence,

but feasible. TrueBFT does not provide a means to prevent such an attack, but it
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Figure 4.6: Event of Interest, where A is the set of n elements, B is the subset of
logn elements, and C is the subset of

logn
3

elements.

greatly mitigates it. Below we give a probabilistic analysis to illustrate how such an
event is rare to occur.
Let A be the set of all n nodes in the blockchain network. Let B be the subset
of the random, selected logn validators responsible for driving the consensus process.
Assume that an advisory was able to hijack the smallest number of nodes enough to
undermine the consensus. That is, a subset C of

logn
3

nodes. Our goal is to find the

probability that C will lie in B.
To calculate this probability, first consider the Event of Interest in the Venn
diagram in Figure 4.6, where all elements of C (i.e.,
logn
3

logn
)
3

lie in B. In other words,

elements are common for the B and C. Intuitively, this common region is also

obtained from the n elements set A.
For simplicity and for illustration purpose, we will assume a uniform distribution,
and the randomly selected nodes are selected and allocated to each subset without
repeating elements. Having that said, let:
logn
3

= j, and logn = k
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The probability p that all elements of C will lie in B (i.e., successful attack) is:

n−j
p=

k−j

n
k

(4.4)


In Equation 4.4, the set A of n elements is fixed. There are n−j
ways of selecting
k−j

the subset C, and nk ways of selecting the subset B. The probability p shows that
this event is rare to occur. For example, with a network of size 150 nodes (i.e., set
A), the probability that the hijacked

logn
3

nodes (i.e., subset C) will be in the chosen

set of logn validators (i.e., subset B) is:
p ≈ 0.0018
Which can translate to if we run the experiment (i.e., proposing new blocks and
validating them) for 555 times this attack might occur once.
4.5.3.5

Experimental Evaluation

Proving a consensus protocol security experimentally requires examining all the possible strategies for an adversary, which is infeasible [26]. However, for illustration
purposes, we chose the Bribery attack. In this attack, a malicious proposing node
tries to corrupt the nodes responsible for executing the consensus (i.e., leaders and
validators) by bribing them. In other words, a malicious proposer (i.e., the bribing
party) proposes an invalid block, and the corrupted nodes (i.e., the bribed parties)
agree and vote on this block. The incentive for such an attack is financial for both
the bribing and bribed parties.
The question that we were aiming to answer here is: ”if we apply the same attack
on two blockchain networks, each one of them uses a different consensus protocol (i.e.,
one uses TrueBFT, and another uses the optimally secured Tendermint), having the
same number of malicious nodes under the same network conditions, which protocol
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will achieve the higher security?” We modeled the attacks and evaluated the protocols
as follows:
• We randomly selected a 0.33% fraction of the nodes to be malicious from each
network. The reason for this choice is that Tendermint and TrueBFT tolerate
up to one-third of Byzantine nodes, which is in this case malicious. To evaluate
a critical aspect such as security, we need to maximize the risk to the highest
limit. In our case, the highest we can do is the 0.33% of the network being
malicious.
• We assumed without loss of generality that these malicious nodes are bribable
(corruptible). On the other hand, the remaining nodes are honest and would
not accept a malicious bribe.
• Our security metric was Detection Rate (DR), in which undetected (successful) attack is when a malicious node proposes an invalid block, and the other
malicious consensus nodes agree on it.
• For each experiment, we selected the 0.33% random malicious nodes for each of
the five networks (i.e., the 100, 125, 150, 175, or 200 nodes networks). Then,
we evaluated each of the following protocols:
– Tendermint with n − 1 validators (optimal security).
– TrueBFT without validation-leaders (i.e., fixed-validators).
– TrueBFT with validation-leaders, but without anonymous proposer-leaders’
mapping.
– TrueBFT with validation-leaders and anonymous mapping.
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The reason that we selected these four types of protocols is that we were aiming to illustrate how our true decentralized TrueBFT protocol evolved and to
show the importance of applying anonymity and the validators’ replaceability
to TrueBFT.
• In each of the above protocols, a successful attack is:
– Tendermint with n − 1 validators: an adversary (i.e., malicious proposer)
needs to corrupt/bribe all the nodes in the network, which is infeasible,
since the security of blockchains is based on the assumption that the majority of the nodes are honest [74].
– Fixed-validators: the malicious proposer would try to bribe the fixed set
of validators over time. If more than two-thirds of these validators are
malicious (i.e., corruptible), the attack succeeds. Note that if the goal of
the attack is to stall or undermine the liveness of the protocol, one-third
of validators is sufficient to bribe.
– TrueBFT without anonymous proposer-leaders’ mapping: the malicious
proposer would try to bribe a chosen set of log n nodes over time. Then,
the proposer bribes its corresponding known leaders to convince them to
select these nodes as validators (note that we are not applying the anonymous proposer-leaders’ mapping).
– TrueBFT with anonymous proposer-leaders’ mapping: the malicious proposer bribes a chosen set of log n nodes over time. However, in TrueBFT,
the proposer does not know its corresponding leaders in advance, as they
are anonymous. Hence, it can only try to blindly select a set of nodes
hoping they are its leaders and bribe them. We call this set a ’lottery
pick.’
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Figure 4.7: Detection Rate (DR) with 95% Confidence Intervals.
Figure 4.7 shows the Detection Rate (DR) with 95% Confidence Intervals (CI).
This figure nearly offers a clear vision of how the true decentralization (anonymous
proposers-leaders’ mapping and random validators’ selection) contributes to the consensus protocol security. TrueBFT with the anonymous proposers-leaders’ mapping
achieves high attack detection rates, ranging from 99.5% when the network size is 100
nodes to 99.8% with 200 nodes on the network. Note we only examined one attack
(Bribery), but we argue that true decentralization withstands many other attacks
that require knowing the identities of the attacked nodes such as DDoS and Eclipse.
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4.6

Limitations and Concluding Remarks

We have proposed a new truly decentralized consensus protocol utilizing anonymous mapping and randomness. TrueBFT randomly employs a different set of anonymous validators each time a new block is proposed to protect against several real attacks mounted by powerful adversaries. Our simulations show that TrueBFT is very
scalable for large networks when utilizing a relatively small number of validators. At
the same time, it maintains a satisfactory level of security.
Despite the security that true decentralization offers, attacks that resulted from
form dishonest behavior such as block withholding and denial of service cannot be mitigated, as we will discuss in Chapter 5. To overcome this, we in Chapter 5, integrate
a game theoretical model into TrueBFT to incentivize honest behavior and penalize
the dishonest one. Besides, as we have seen in Section 4.5.3.5, knowing the number of
validators (the size of the validators’ committee) might provide useful knowledge for
powerful adversaries. As a result, in our game theoretical-based TrueBFT (Chapter
5), the number of validators is not static and is changeable based on the risk likelihood of every proposer. In addition, making the number of validators proportional
to the likelihood of proposers contributes towards efficiency.
One possible threat that we are not providing a solution for in this dissertation
is the reputation boosting and dumping attack, in which some nodes may behave well
for a long time to gain good reputation values, but begin to be malicious in a time
point. That may be a serious problem for the blockchain then.
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5

Game Theoretical Consensus Protocol

This chapter discusses the problem of the dishonest behavior of the consensus
parties (i.e., validation-leaders and validators) and the attacks resulting from this
behavior. Additionally, this chapter addresses the issue of the number of selected
validators. This chapter also presents in detail our fourth contribution (a game theoretical model integrated into our TrueBFT protocol) to overcome these issues.

5.1

Introduction

Blockchain technology was introduced to be secure by design and resistant to
modification [9]. Despite its potential to elevate security, as with all new technologies,
security risks can be found beneath the hype [85]. Moreover, blockchain technology
has introduced new kinds of attacks such as block withholding and selfish mining.
Such attacks occur for various incentives, mostly financial. To defend against such
attacks and to strengthen blockchain security, game theory stands out as a potentially
powerful means.
The consensus protocol that we proposed in Chapter 4 enjoys true decentralization, which makes it immune to attacks that require knowing the victims’ identities
before attacking them (e.g., DDoS, Eclipse, and Bribery attacks). Nevertheless, it
does not consider the following two issues:
First, true decentralization does not guarantee that the validators are always
honest and do not deviate from the protocol. For example, a dishonest validator might
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perform a block withholding attack [78] in which the validator does not participate in
the validation process, or does not reveal the results of the verification in favor of a
malicious proposing node. Such an attack can result in undermining the consensus
process. Another example is the denial of service attack [18], where an omission fault
occurs due to: (a) a leader avoiding selecting validators as instructed by the protocol,
or (b) a validator avoiding the validation process or broadcasting a vote. To overcome
such vulnerability, we integrate a game theoretical model into our consensus protocol
that rewards honest consensus participants and punishes dishonest or lazy ones that
do not adhere to the protocol.
The second problem with most of the current consensus protocols (including
TrueBFT) is that the number of validators is fixed, despite the variation in hostilities in blockchain environments. As we observed from our simulation results (Section
4.5.2), the number of validators in a blockchain network influences its security and
efficiency substantially. In response to this, our game theoretical model enables our
consensus protocol to select a different size of the validators’ committee for each block
proposal. This size (i.e., the number of validators) is proportional to the risk likelihood of the proposing node. The number of validators is based on the outcome of a
game played between the proposing node and its validation-leaders.
In addition to overcoming the above issues, TrueBFT utilizes the proposed game
theoretical model to enable validators to validate with some probability proportional
to the proposers’ risk likelihoods instead of the always-validation (i.e., validators
always validate, even if the risk likelihood of a block’s proposer is low). The alwaysvalidation might be unnecessary computational work particularly found in blockchains
with low hostility.
In this chapter, we study the incentives of malicious nodes to deviate from the
consensus protocols, and we apply a game theoretical model to reinforce honest be-
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havior. Also, we address the problem of validators’ selection in terms of how many
validators to select to achieve a satisfactory trade-off between security and efficiency.
Our proposed game theoretical model is a two-stage attacker-defender Bayesian
game integrated into TrueBFT. The first-stage game takes place between the proposing node as a potential attacker and its corresponding validation-leaders. The outcomes of this game determine the proposer’s risk and, hence, the number of validators
to select. The proposer and the selected validators then play the seconds-stage game
in which the validators decide whether or not to validate. In both games, our proposed model reinforces honest behavior by rewarding honest parties and penalizing
dishonest ones. Our proposed two-stage game theoretical model has the following
advantages:
1. It reinforces the honest behavior of the consensus participants by rewarding
honest ones and penalizing dishonest ones.
2. The number of the selected validators is dynamic and variable. Hence, instead
of selecting a fixed number of validators, TrueBFT utilizes the outcomes of
the theoretical games to select a different number of validators on every block
proposal proportional to the risk likelihood of the proposing node.
3. It eliminates the always-validation mode. Instead, the validators validate with
probability proportional to the the proposing node risk.

5.2

Background

In economics, game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interaction among players (decision-makers) who are known to be rational [77]. Game
theory has been widely used for modeling conflict situations and predicting the participants’ behavior [57]. It has been applied to many applications in social science,
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military, logic and computer science [77]. In computer systems, Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs) that use game theory proved to outperform the always-on traditional
IDSs in terms of throughput [54], especially in resource-constrained networks. In
blockchain applications, the use of game theory can elevate security. For example,
we have seen in Bribery attacks that the fees associated with a proposed block are
not always sufficient to behave honestly. Game theory in such cases can be used as
a rewarding and punishing mechanism to further reinforce playing honestly and as
expected. Moreover, game theory can be utilized to analyze how risky a player is,
which is a useful piece of information in blockchain-based applications.
5.2.1

Definition

A theoretical game G consists of the three following elements [52, 89]:
• Players (P ): The entities participate in the game. They could be people,
institutions, or anything that can interact.
• Strategies (S): Each player has a set of strategies, in which he/she can choose
from. Each strategy represents an action (move). Strategies can be pure (i.e.,
single move) or mixed.
• Payoff functions (U ): When each player in the game has played his/her
strategy, the player gets a negative or a positive payoff determined by his/her
payoff function u ∈ U .
Formally, G is defined as a triplet (P, S, U ) [6]. The payoff ui (s) is the benefit b of
player i minus the cost c for plying the strategy s, and it is expressed as: u = b − c.
Based on the assumption that every player in the game is rational, the players
will select the strategies that maximize their playoff and minimize their cost (i.e.,
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the negative payoff) [52]. This leads to the concept of Equilibrium for the game.
Equilibrium is considered to be the solution to the game, as we will discuss shortly.
5.2.2

Classification of Game Theories

Theoretical games have many aspects [89]. The classifications of games based on
their aspects are as follows [89]:
1. Number of stages: A game can be played in one stage or multiple stages as
follows:
• Static/Strategic Game: This is a one stage game in which players take
actions (moves) simultaneously at the same time without knowing the
strategies chosen by other players.
• Dynamic/Extensive Game: This game consists of multiple stages. In such
games, the players can observe their own or others’ previous moves (i.e.,
perfect information). Hence, they can benefit from them at different stages
of the game. The number of stages can be finite or infinite [25].
2. Perfect or imperfect information: Based on this category, a game can be
classified into:
• Perfect Information Game: In this type, a player knows all the previous actions/moves of the other players. Hence, the player selects his/her
current move based on this knowledge.
• Imperfect Information Game: Here, one or more players do not know all
of the previous moves of the other players.
3. Complete or incomplete information: We can classify a game based on the
information a player has as:
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• Complete Information Game: In this type of game, each player knows the
payoff function and current strategy profile of every other player in the
game.
• Incomplete Information Game: One or more players do not know all players’ payoff functions and their current strategy profiles.
5.2.3

Bayesian Game

A Bayesian game is a game with incomplete information, and it introduces a new
component to the game G [89]. In such games, we use the term type to capture
the incomplete information. That is, in addition to the set of players P , the set
of strategies S, and the set of payoff functions U , the Bayesian game adds a set of
players types Φ. For each player i, this player can be of type θi ∈ Φi . The Bayesian
game is very suitable for the attacker-defender scenario. This is because the defender
player has incomplete information about the type of the other player, which could be
of two types: a) malicious, or b) regular.
5.2.4

Nash Equilibrium (NE)

The combination of the players’ strategies in which each player’s strategy is the
best response with respect to other players’ strategies is called an Equilibrium for the
game G [52]. The best response is the selected strategy that results in the maximum
payoff of a player, given other players’ strategies.
Formally, assuming there are n players, the strategy profile s = {si }ni=1 is the
n-tuple of the players’ strategies [57]. As mentioned above, player i has a set of
strategies which he/she can execute (denoted by Si ). bri (s−i ) is the best response
function for player i to the remaining players’ strategies s−i . bri (s−i ) is the function
that maximizes ui (si , s−i ), that is player i ’s payoff over his/her set of strategies Si
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with regard to other players’ strategies s−i formulated as below:

bri (s−i ) = argmax ui (si , s−i )

(5.1)

si

If a strategy profile s∗ satisfies si = bri (s−i ) for every player i, then no player has
the incentive to deviate from s∗ . This is because each player has his/her best response
function satisfied in terms of the payoff. We can say that the strategy profile s∗ is in
NE [64], which can be expressed as following, for each player i :

ui (s∗i , s∗−i ) ≥ ui (si , s∗−i ), ∀si ∈ Si
5.2.5

(5.2)

Mixed Strategies

The previous explained strategy profile s∗ is called pure strategies. However, a
player can randomize (or mix) with some probability between his/her pure strategies,
especially when there is no pure strategies NE for the game. This is called mixed strategy. In other words, for a player i, the mixed strategy xi is a probability distribution
over Si (i.e., his/her pure strategies set) [57]. A mixed strategy profile x∗ = {x∗i }ni=1
is considered a mixed-strategy NE solution for the game if,
ūi (x∗i , x∗−i ) ≥ ūi (xi , x∗−i ), ∀xi ∈ Xi

(5.3)

Where ūi is the expected payoff function for player i, Xi is the set of distributions
over Si (i.e., the set of pure strategies), and x−i is a set of mixed strategies of the
other players (i.e., excluding player i).

5.3

Related Work

Although blockchain technology has gained considerable attention from the computer science and economics communities, the use of game theory methods in this
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technology is limited [27,70]. In this section, we present the most relevant and recent
works that utilize game theory in blockchain technology.
Xu et al.

[98] proposed a game theoretical approach to suppress the attack

motivation on a blockchain that consists of mobile devices and edge servers. The
game is formulated between a mobile device and an edge server, where the mobile
device can send a request to the server to acquire a real-time service or launch an
attack. On the other hand, the server chooses to either provide the service or to
attack the mobile device. The authors introduced a punishment mechanism according
to the action record to mitigate the attacks on the blockchain. They have concluded
that both players tend to behave well when the punishment weight is significant.
The proposed approach was designed to deal with attacks like zero-day, DDoS, and
password-based attacks.
Kiayias et al.

[40] exploited game theory to study the miners’ behavior in the

Bitcoin protocol. They studied the incentive of selfish miners, in which a miner
decides not only which block to mine, but also when to release the mined block
to other miners. In this work, two games were introduced. The first one is the
immediate-release game in which the miner’s strategy is to select an appropriate
block to mine. In this game, every miner releases the mined blocks immediately.
The second game is the strategic-release game, where the miners have the choice to
withhold releasing the mined blocks in addition to selecting which blocks to mine.
In both games, the authors showed that when the computational power of a miner
is small, its best response matches the expected behavior. Nevertheless, when the
computational power is large, the miner deviates from the expected behavior.
Johnson et al. [38] employed a game theoretical model to analyze the incentives
for a mining pool to launch a DDoS attack against another mining pool. The players
in the game are two competing mining pools, where each one may utilize additional
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computing resources to increase the chance of winning the mining race, or to trigger
a DDoS attack to lower the expected success of the other competing mining pool.
Luu et al. [55] studied the block withholding attack on mining pools using a game
theoretical approach by formulating the Bitcoin mining as a game. They analyzed
the block withholding attack and concluded that the attack is profitable and wellincentivized in the long-term. The authors derived the game equilibrium state, which
is a mixed strategy where all clients are incentivized to attack rather than participate
honestly to maximize their payoffs. Finally, the authors concluded that the PoW
protocol is vulnerable to such an attack.
In a paper entitled ’The Miner’s Dilemma,’ Eyal [23] studied the scenario when
pools attack each other. Open pools (i.e., pools of miners that allow any miner to join
the mining work) are vulnerable to block withholding attacks performed by infiltrated
miners from competing pools. This paper defined a game where pools recruit some of
their participants to infiltrate other pools to diminish their mining capabilities. This
game is called the miner’s dilemma where players are two pools, and their strategies
are whether or not to attack each other. The author observed that attacking is the
dominant strategy for each player.
All the above works have introduced game theoretical approaches to the PoW
mining protocol. As previously discussed in Section 4.1, PoW is not an attractive
approach for blockchains that are efficiency-sensitive due to its massive computation
demands. In a more relevant work presented by Kiayias et al. [41], the Ouroboros
consensus protocol was proposed. Similar to TrueBFT, Ouroboros eliminates the
need for an energy-hungry PoW protocol. Ouroboros is based on the Proof of Stake
(PoS) mechanism. It works by dividing the time into rounds called slots in which
each slot is assigned to a leader. The leaders are picked based on the stake they have.
A chosen leader is responsible for producing a block for its time slot. The authors
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utilized game theory to introduce a reward mechanism to incentivize the participants
in the blockchain. By means of the game theoretical design, attacks such as selfishmining and block withholding are mitigated. The rewarding mechanism works by
awarding a positive payoff to participants who do not diverge from the protocol.

5.4

The Proposed Two-Stage Bayesian Game Model

In Chapter 4, we proposed a new consensus protocol that exploits randomness and
anonymous proposers-leaders mapping to achieve the true decentralization security.
The protocol works in two phases: the initialization phase, which is executed once
by the blockchain initiator, and the verification phase, which is executed by the
blockchain nodes every time a new block is proposed.
In this chapter, we propose a two-stage game theoretical model and integrate it
into TrueBFT. The two games (i.e., first-stage and second-stage) are played in the
verification phase of the protocol, each time a new block is proposed. The two games
are modeled as attacker-defender games. The proposer (player x) is the potential
attacker in both games. The defenders (player y) in the first-stage are the validationleaders. The defenders in the second-stage are the validators (player z) that have
been selected by the validation-leaders from the first-stage. The next two subsections
present an in-depth description of the proposed model.
5.4.1

First-Stage Game

As mentioned in Section 4.4.2, when a node becomes a proposer, it broadcasts its
secret (S1 ) to all nodes in the network. Every other node checks if it is a validationleader for this proposer. After a node finds that it is a leader for the proposer, this
leader plays the first-stage game with the proposer to decide how many validators
(m) to select.
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5.4.1.1

Game Model

This game takes place between the proposer (i.e., player x) and each of its validationleaders (i.e., player y). The validation-leader determines the number of validators
based on the outcome of the game. There are two strategies for the validation-leader
(i.e., Sy ), from which to choose. The first one is to UseMinimumValidators where the
minimum is four validators. The second strategy is to AddMoreValidators where the
number of validators varies based on the outcome of the game, which is proportional
to the risk likelihood of the proposer. The strategy profile for the proposer (Sx ) is
a) Cheat in which the proposer broadcasts an invalid block, and b) N otCheat. A
proposer could be of two types: malicious or regular.
Our game is considered to be a one-to-four game, where one proposer plays with
four leaders. Each of the four leaders has no cooperation with the other leaders, so we
consider each game between a leader and the proposer as an independent event. Since
the validation-leader does not know the type of player x (i.e., regular or malicious),
we model our game as a Bayesian game. This is because the leader node (player y) in
our model has incomplete information about the game. Player x, however, has this
private information about its type known only to it.

5.4.1.2

Strategic Form of First-Stage Bayesian Game

First, we model our game as a strategic form as shown in table 5.2 and 5.3. Table 5.1
shows the notation of the first-stage game. Table 5.2 shows the payoff matrix of the
game when player x is of type malicious. For each cell in the payoff matrix, the first
payoff is for player x, and the second one is for player y. Table 5.3 shows the payoff
matrix of the game when player x is of type regular. The goal of both players x and
y is to maximize their payoffs. We assume that the players are rational.
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Table 5.1: The first-stage game notation.
Symbol
β

γ

wx
gx
cx
wy
gy
cy
µ
N

Definition
Importance of the proposer. We assume that some proposing nodes in the blockchain network have higher criticality
than others. For example, in our Block-Supply Chain, a
node that supplies products (and proposes blocks for these
products) to 10 other nodes is more critical than a node
that supplies products to one node. Thus, β influences the
payoffs for both players.
A reward that player y can get if it maintains the performance of the consensus process under a certain threshold
by playing U seM inimumV alidators. However, player y
can loose γ (i.e., deducted from its gain gy ) if it plays
AddM oreV alidators and the performance violates the
specified threshold. We assume that player y will not win
γ in case of a successful attack (i.e., player x plays Cheat
and player y plays U seM inimumV alidators).
Work done by the proposing node (player x) to play Cheat.
The gain for player x from a successful attack.
The cost (risk) for player x if captured.
Work done by the validation-leader (player y) to play
AddM oreV alidators.
The gain for player y from capturing a cheater in case the
validation-leader employed more validators.
The cost (risk) for player y if it fails to capture a cheater.
The probability of player x being malicious.
The nature node, which determines the type of player x.

Table 5.2: Strategic form of the first-stage Bayesian game (player x is malicious)
Game Matrix
Player x

Cheat
N otCheat

Player y (Validation-leader)
AddMoreValidators
UseMinimumValidators
(β.cx ) − wx , [(β.gy ) − γ] − wy
(β.gx ) − wx , β.cy
0, −wy − γ
0, γ

Table 5.3: Strategic form of the first-stage Bayesian game (player x is regular)
Game Matrix
Player x

N otCheat

Player y (Validation-leader)
AddM oreV alidators U seM inimumV alidators
0, −wy − γ
0, γ
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Figure 5.1: Extensive form of the first-stage Bayesian game.

5.4.1.3

Extensive Form of First-Stage Bayesian game

The Bayesian game introduces a third player called Nature (denoted by N ), which
determines the type of player x by assigning a probability (µ) to player x of being
malicious. Figure 5.1 represents the Bayesian game extensive form. µ can be assigned
according to the environment of the network. A higher value of µ is given when the
environment is hostile.
In this game, player x will try to play a strategy to minimize the chances of being
detected, and player y will also try to play a strategy to maximize the chance of
detecting the cheating without much cost.

5.4.1.4

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) Analysis

A. Game Pure-Strategy BNE: In this section, we analyze BNE assuming that
player x knows player y’s belief of µ. If player x plays its pure strategy (Cheat if
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malicious, N otCheat if regular), then, based on our game in Figure 5.1, the expected
payoff of player y playing its pure strategy AddM oreV alidators is:
Eµy (AddM oreV alidators) = {µ.[((β.gy ) − γ) − wy ]} + {(1 − µ).(−wy − γ)}
Similarly, the expected payoff of player y playing its pure strategy UseMinimumValidators is:
Eµy (U seM inimumV alidators) = [µ.(β.cy )] + [(1 − µ).γ]
So, if Eµy (AddM oreV alidators) > Eµy (U seM inimumV alidators) Or,
{µ.[((β.gy ) − γ) − wy ]} + {(1 − µ).(−wy − γ)} > [µ.(β.cy )] + [(1 − µ).γ]
Which can be simplified to:
µ>

wy + 2γ
β(gy − cy ) + γ

(5.4)

Then, the best response of player y is to play AddM oreV alidators. Nevertheless,
if player y chooses to play AddM oreV alidators, Cheat will no longer is the best
response for player x type malicious and, instead, will choose to play N otCheat. As
a result, ((Cheat if malicious, N otCheat if regular), AddMoreValidators, µ) is not a
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). However, if Eµy (AddM oreV alidators) < Eµy
(U seM inimumV alidators) or,

µ<

wy + 2γ
β(gy − cy ) + γ

(5.5)

Then, the best response for player y is to play U seM inimumV alidators and thus
((Cheat if malicious, N otCheat if regular), U seM inimumV alidators, µ) is a purestrategy BNE.
If player x type malicious chooses to play the pure strategy N otCheat, player
y’s dominant strategy is U seM inimumV alidators, regardless of µ. Nevertheless, if
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player y plays U seM inimumV alidators, the best response for player x type malicious
is Cheat, which reduces to the above case. Hence, ((N otCheat if Malicious, N otCheat
if Regular ), U seM inimumV alidators) is not a BNE.
B. Game Mixed-Strategy BNE: We previously showed that when equation 5.4 is
true, there is no pure-strategy BNE. So, we have to find a mixed-strategy BNE. Let
p be the probability that player x plays Cheat. Let q be the probability that player
y plays AddM oreV alidators. The expected payoff of player y playing the strategy
AddM oreV alidators is:
Eµy (AddM oreV alidators) = {p.µ.[((β.gy ) − γ) − wy ]} + {(1 − p).µ.(−wy − γ)}
+{(1 − µ).(−wy − γ)}
The expected payoff of y playing U seM inimumV alidators is:
Eµy (U seM inimumV alidators) = {p.µ.(β.cy )} + {(1 − p).µ.γ} + {(1 − µ).γ}
So, player y plays AddM oreV alidators, if Eµy (AddM oreV alidators) >
Eµy (U seM inimumV alidators). Or,
p>

wy + 2γ
µβ(gy − cy ) + µγ

(5.6)

Similarly, we calculate the expected payoffs for player x. The expected payoff of x
playing Cheat is:
Eµx (Cheat) = {q.µ.[(β.cx ) − wx ]} + {(1 − q).µ.[(β.gx ) − wx ]}
The expected payoff of x playing N otCheat is:
Eµx (N otCheat) = 0
As a result, player x plays Cheat, if Eµx (Cheat) > Eµx (N otCheat), or:
q>

wx − (βgx )
µβ(gy − cy )

(5.7)
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Now, we derive our game’s mixed-strategy BNE as: ((q if malicious, N otCheat if
regular), p, µ). Expressed in words, player x mixes/plays with probability q if it is
malicious, player x always plays N otCheat if it is regular, player y always mixes/plays
with probability p, and the nature nod (N ) decides the type of player x with probability µ.
Thus far, we have obtained the above game’s mixed-strategy BNE. However,
this game is molded for one player x and one player y, and we have four defenders
(validation-leaders) and player x knows this fact. Hence, ((q if malicious, N otCheat
if regular), p, µ) is no longer a valid mixed-strategy BNE. Thus, we will derive a
new mixed-strategy BNE. The events of validations are independent. We have four
validation-leaders. Therefore, the likelihood that the four validators plays the strategy
AddM oreV alidators is p̂ and is calculated as:
p̂ = (4.p) − p4

(5.8)

Where p is the probability that one validation-leader plays AddMoreValidators. Now,
the attacker plays Cheat with probability q̂ defined as:
q̂ = q − (p̂ − p)

(5.9)

So, our new mixed-strategy BNE is: ((q̂ if malicious, N otCheat if regular), p, µ).

5.4.1.5

Deciding the Number of Validators (M )

After executing the first-stage game, each validation-leader decides its number of
validators (m), of which m < n where n is the total number of nodes in the network. The m value can be: a) four validators if the validation-leader chooses to
play U seM inimumV laidators, or b) a fraction of
AddM oreV alidators (we choose

n
4

n
4

proportional to p if it plays

because we have four validation-leaders).
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p is the probability that the proposing node (player x) might attack (plays Cheat).
Hence, we consider p as the ”risk likelihood ” of an attack. p is computed with the
assumption that the validation-leader is ’risk-neutral’; that is, in a fair game each
player aims to maximize its expected payoff. Note that p replaces the risk that we
introduced in our initial consensus protocol presented in Chapter 4. The difference
here is that each proposing node has a different p, where in the formal design, risk
is set to be the risk likelihood for all proposers in the network.
In case a validation-leader chooses to play AddM oreV alidators, the number of
validators (m) will be a random number bound by the minimum number of validators
(i.e. four) and a fraction of

n
4

proportional to p. In other words, a validation-leader

selects a random number between 5 (the minimum number of validators plus one)
and

p.(n−2)
4

(excluding the proposing and the validation-leader nodes) as follows:
]
m ← Random[5, p.(n−2)
4

After a validation-leader decides its m, the protocol proceeds as pre-described in
Section 4.4.2.2. Algorithm 7 is the new version of Algorithm 6 that we introduced in
Section 4.4.2.2.
The objectives of the first-stage game are:
1. Incentivize the good behavior for both players by rewarding the honest behavior
and penalizing the dishonest one.
2. Determine the number of validators (i.e., m) that a leader has to choose. The
aggregated number of validators (i.e., M ) selected by the four leaders is proportional to the risk likelihood of the proposer (i.e., p). This, as discussed before,
influences both the security and performance of the consensus protocol.
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Algorithm 7: Validators’ selection
Input : A population V of n−2
nodes having reputation values, AND the risk
4
likelihood p
Output: A set of validators/pre-voters P V and a set of pre-committers P C of
size m
1 if AddM oreV alidators then
]
2
m ← Random[5, p.(n−2)
4
3 else
4
m←4
5 end
6 for k ← 1 to m do
i
7
pi (k) ← Σv ∈VR−P
V Rj
j

8
9
10
11
12

Randomly select vi with probability pi (k) from V − P V
P V.add(vi )
end
for l ← 1 to mi do
i
pi (l) ← Σc ∈VR−P
C Rj
j

13
14
15
16

Randomly select ci with probability pi (l) from V − P C
P C.add(ci )
end
Return P V AND P C

5.4.2

Second-Stage Game

After selecting the validators by their leaders and after proposing and broadcasting the new block by the proposer, the second-stage game takes place between the
proposer (player x) and each of the validators (player z). The strategy profile for
a validator is a) V alidate, and b) N otV alidate. This game is modeled similarly to
the first-stage game. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the strategic form of the second-stage
Bayesian game. Figure 5.2 shows the extensive form of the second-stage game. We
use the same notations presented in Table 5.1 with following additional notations:
• wz is the work done by the validator (player z) to play V alidate.
• gz is the gain for player z from capturing a cheater.
• cz is the cost for player z if it fails to capture a cheater.
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Table 5.4: Strategic form of the second-stage Bayesian game (player x is malicious)
Game Matrix
player x

Cheat
N otCheat

Player z (Validator)
V alidate
N otV alidate
(β.cx ) − wx , (β.gz ) − wz (β.gx ) − wx , β.cz
0, −wz
0, 0

Table 5.5: Strategic form of the second-stage Bayesian game (Player x is regular)
Game Matrix
Player x

N otCheat

Player z (Validator)
V alidate N otV alidate
0, −wz
0, 0

Figure 5.2: Extensive form of the second-stage Bayesian game.
A. Game Pure-Strategy BNE: We follow a similar analysis that we presented in
the first-stage game. If player x plays its pure strategy (Cheat if malicious, N otCheat
if regular), then, the expected payoff of player z playing its pure strategy V alidate is:
Eµz (V alidate) = {µ.[(β.gz ) − wz ]} + {(1 − µ). − wz }
The expected payoff of player z playing its pure strategy N otV alidate is:
Eµz (N otV alidate) = µ.(β.cz )
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As a result if, Eµz (V alidate) > Eµz (N otV alidate) Or,

µ>

wz
β(gz − cz )

(5.10)

Then, the best response of player z is to play V alidate. Therefore, ((Cheat if malicious, N otCheat if regular), V alidate, µ) is not a BNE because Cheat is not
the best response for player x type malicious. However, if Eµz (V alidate) < Eµz
(N otV alidate) or,

µ<

wz
β(gz − cz )

(5.11)

Then, the best response for player z is to play N otV alidate and thus ((Cheat if malicious, N otCheat if regular), N otV alidate, µ) is a pure-strategy BNE. Nevertheless,
similar to the first-stage game ((N otCheat if Malicious,
N otCheat if Regular ), N otV alidate) is not a BNE.
B. Game Mixed-Strategy BNE: Let p0 be the probability that player x plays
Cheat. Let q 0 be the probability that player z plays V alidate. The expected payoff
of z playing V alidate is:
Eµz (V alidate) = {p0 .µ.[(β.gz ) − wz ]} + {(1 − p0 ).µ. − wz } + {(1 − µ). − wz }
The expected payoff of z playing N otV alidate is:
Eµy (N otV alidate) = p0 .µ.(β.cz )
So, the defender (player z) plays V alidate when:
p0 >

wz
µβ(gz − cz )

(5.12)

Similarly, we acquire the expected payoffs the attacker (player x). The expected
payoff of x playing Cheat is:
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Eµx (Cheat) = {q 0 .µ.[(β.cx ) − wx ]} + {(1 − q 0 ).µ.[(β.gx ) − wx ]}
The expected payoff of x playing N otCheat is:
Eµx (N otCheat) = 0
As a result, the attacker (player x) plays Cheat when:

q0 >

wx − (βgx )
µβ(gz − cz )

(5.13)

As in the first-stage game, this game is 1-to-M game, where M is the number
of validators (player z). Hence, our new mixed-strategy BNE is: ((q 00 if malicious,
N otCheat if regular), p0 , µ), where:
q 00 = q 0 − (p00 − p0 )

(5.14)

p00 = (M.p0 ) − p0M

(5.15)

And:

The objectives of the second-stage game are:
1. Incentivize the good behavior by rewarding the honest behavior and penalizing
the dishonest one.
2. Eliminate the unnecessary work done by the validators in case if the risk likelihood (i.e., p0 ) of a proposer is low. This would contribute to saving computation
and communication cost which, as a result, enhance the performance of the consensus protocol.

5.5

Security Analysis

In this section, we present some blockchain consensus attacks and demonstrate
how TrueBFT protects against them. Exploiting a game theoretical model that rewards honest behavior and penalizes dishonest behavior, motivates the defenders in
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TrueBFT to adhere to the protocol and disincentivizes malicious parties. This way,
the defenders (leaders and validators) will work hard to maximize the utility that each
can gain as a reward for excellent work and avoid the punishment (cost) that might
incur due to misbehaving or not obeying the protocol. Additionally, our approach
mitigates the incentive for a malicious proposer to cheat, especially if the punishment
cost is high. Our theoretical game model can protect against the following attacks:
5.5.1

Malicious or Lazy Validation-Leading

This attack happens when a validation-leader colludes with its corresponding malicious proposing node. It could result in many problems such as utilizing the minimum
number of validators or colluding with other malicious nodes as validators. Another
type of this attack is the lazy validation-leading, in which the validation-leader does
not execute the protocol or does not obey its requirements. For example, it is possible
for a validation-leader node to produce an assignment that is not random. Utilizing
the reward and punishment payoffs provided by the proposed game model mitigates
the incentive to conduct such an attack.
5.5.2

Block Withholding Attack [78]

In this attack, a dishonest validator does not participate in the validation process
or does not reveal the results of the verification in favor of a malicious proposing
node. The reward and punishment provided by our game incentivize the validators
to avoid this attack.
5.5.3

Denial of Service Attack [18]

In this attack, an omission fault occurs due to: (a) a leader avoiding selecting
validators as instructed by the protocol, or (b) a validator avoiding the validation
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process or broadcasting a vote. This attack could occur for various reasons, but
mostly that the fees associated with a proposed block are not worth working on
it [18]. Rewarding honest players can encourage the leaders and validators to deliver
their service as required.
5.5.4

Malicious Block Proposing

The main attack that we are defending against is the invalid blocks’ proposal
by malicious proposers. This attack happens when a proposing node maliciously
proposes an invalid new block. This attack occurs for various incentives, including
double spending. Integrating random and anonymous validators’ selection with a
game theoretical model contributes substantially to mitigating this attack. This is
because a malicious proposer does not know the nodes that will validate its proposed
block, which makes it hard to corrupt or bribe them to agree on its invalid block.
Additionally, the punishment enforced by the game model could alleviate the attack
motives.

5.6

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have proposed a two-stage game model and adapted it to
TrueBFT. Our resulting protocol randomly employs a different set of different size
of validators each time a new block is proposed. Additionally, TrueBFT applies a
game theoretical rewarding mechanism to reward honest adhered parties and punish
malicious ones. Furthermore, the second-stage game releases the validators from the
always-validate mode in case of environments with low hostility.
Our proposed TrueBFT protocol described so far, however, suffers from two limitations. First, the proposers-leaders mapping guarantees the anonymous mapping
only for one time. In other words, when a proposer proposes a block for the second
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time, its leaders’ identities are revealed. This protocol was originally designed for
our Block-Supply Chain, where each node authenticates a product and proposes a
block for it only once. Second, the round-robin scheduling for proposing new blocks
is vulnerable to DDoS attacks. This is because an adversary knows when a certain
proposer will propose its block. Hence, the adversary can launch an attack on this
proposer, preventing it from achieving the proposal. Again, TrueBFT was designed
for the Block-Supply Chain, where the products flow in a certain path known to all
nodes in the supply chain network.
To overcome the first limitation, we in Chapter 6, propose a dynamic proposersleaders mapping scheme that preserves anonymity and does not require a static mapping party (e.g., the blockchain initiator). Moreover, we propose anonymous scheduling, along with the dynamic mapping scheme, to counter the second limitation by
anonymizing the identities of the proposing nodes.
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6

Dynamic Proposers-Leaders Mapping

This chapter presents solutions to the limitations of our proposed TrueBFT protocol presented in Section 5.6 — specifically, the static proposers-leaders mapping
and the round-robin scheduling for proposing new blocks. In addition, we discuss in
this chapter the safety and liveness of TrueBFT.

6.1

Introduction

Our proposed TrueBFT protocol in Chapter 4 was initially designed for our BlockSupply Chain application (Chapter 3). In this protocol, the static proposers-leaders
mapping, performed at the genesis state, guarantees the anonymous mapping only
for one cycle of proposing. In other words, when a proposer proposes a block for
the second time, its leaders’ identities are revealed. Hence, they could be vulnerable
to attacks like DDoS, Eclipse, and Bribery. Consequently, we need to involve the
blockchain initiator to execute the proposers-leaders mapping at the beginning of
each cycle. This is suitable for our Block-Supply Chain use case, since each product
flows through the supply chain nodes and gets authenticated by every node ’only
once.’ As mentioned in Chapter 3, one successful authentication event corresponds
to one block added to the product’s blockchain. When the product reaches the market
(i.e., end consumer), none of the previous nodes in the supply chain will re-propose
a new block for this product. Thus, for an application that allows its blockchain’s
nodes to propose only once, the static mapping, which is executed by the blockchain
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initiator, is adequate and guarantees the anonymous mapping.
In blockchain applications that require the nodes to propose ’more than once,’
relying on static mapping is tedious and yields partial centralization. This is due
to involving the blockchain initiator or some special nodes in the network to map
the proposers to their leaders on every cycle of proposing (i.e., when nodes need to
re-propose again). As a result, to make TrueBFT suitable for any other blockchain
applications, we need to make the proposers-leaders mapping dynamic in a way that
preserves the anonymity.
In this chapter, we first propose a new dynamic proposers-leaders mapping mechanism that does not rely on any centralized proposers-leaders mapper. Instead, the
regular nodes in the network perform the mapping dynamically and anonymously.
Additionally, the new mapping scheme introduces new scheduling for proposing new
blocks that anonymizes the identities of the proposing nodes. In the second part of
this chapter, we analyze the safety and liveness of TrueBFT and argue that TrueBFT
enjoys the same level of Tendermint’s safety and liveness.

6.2

Dynamic Proposers-Leaders Mapping

In this section, we describe in detail the dynamic mapping mechanism, which
is executed in two phases: 1) initialization at the genesis state, and 2) during the
verification phase of TrueBFT.
6.2.1

Initialization Phase

Similar to the initialization phase described in Section 4.4.1, the blockchain initiator executes this phase at the genesis state. This phase is performed only once. After
the genesis state TrueBFT proceeds utilizing the dynamic proposers-leaders mapping
in a decentralized manner. The blockchain initiator uses its pair of keys (i.e., public
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in.pk and private in.sk) to execute this phase.
Each node in the network has two pairs of keys. The first pair (pk1 , sk1 ) is to
publicly identify the nodes, communicate with other nodes, and sign proposals and
votes. The second pair (pk2 , sk2 ) is a hidden identity used for the dynamic anonymous
proposer-leaders mapping. At the genesis state, the blockchain initiator executes this
phase as follows:
• Creates a publicly known list that holds the second public keys pk2 s (i.e., hidden
identities) for all nodes; we call this list SList. Each node in the network has
this list.
• Creates another list (CycleSlots) that represents the proposing slots in the
next cycle. Each cycle consists of many slots, so for each slot a proposer
proposes a new block. For example, a cycle may have slots equal to the number
of nodes in the network. For each slot, only one block is proposed. Therefore,
each cycle slot (cs) in this list can be selected only once, so that only one block
is proposed. A cycle slot has two fields:
– The cycle number (c): Each cycle has a number. This number is used to
identify a cycle. The number of cycles can be finite or infinite.
– The slot number within a cycle (s): As mentioned earlier, each cycle has
a finite number of slots, each of which is identified by a number.
An example of a cycle slot (cs) is (3,10), which identifies the slot number 10
in cycle 3. When a proposer is selected for that cycle slot, the proposer will
propose a new block. Upon selecting a cs, we exclude this cs from the list
CycleSlots.
Note that this initialization phase is only executed once at the genesis state. After
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Algorithm 8: Dynamic Mapping Initialization Phase
Input : A population A of n nodes having their pk1 s and pk2 s
1 foreach node ∈ A do
2
SList.add(node.pk2 )
3 end
4 Create CycleSlots, where r = 2 and s = [1, n]
5 foreach node ∈ A do
6
Append SList to the node’s genesis block
7
Append CycleSlots to the node’s genesis block
8 end
that, each cycle gets its anonymous proposers-leaders mapping from the previous cycle as will be explained in the next section. Nevertheless, the anonymous mapping for
the first cycle is static (i.e., executed by the blockchain initiator at the genesis state).
After the first cycle, the protocol proceeds independently, utilizing the dynamic approach to assign the anonymous mapping. Algorithm 8 illustrates the process of
dynamic mapping’s initialization phase. Note that we chose the number of slots in
our system to be equal to the number of nodes (n).
6.2.2

Dynamic Mapping During the Verification Phase

This phase takes place during the verification phase of TrueBFT. As mentioned
earlier, each cycle obtains its mapping from the previous one. That is, the current
proposers and leaders propose the mapping for the next new cycle and the current
validators validate and vote on this mapping. Note, we refer to the nodes that are
currently executing the protocol (i.e., proposers, leaders, and validators) as current.
On the other hand, we refer to the nodes that will execute the protocol for the next
cycle as new. Three entities execute the dynamic mapping:
1. The current proposer: This node selects and proposes a new proposer for a
cycle slot (cs) in the next cycle.
2. The current corresponding leaders: They are responsible for selecting the new
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leaders for this cs to be mapped to the newly selected proposer.
3. The current validators: These nodes assign the mapping for the new selected
proposer/leaders and vote on it.
The following subsections explain in detail how each of these entities performs
their roles.
6.2.2.1

New Proposers Selection

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the proposing nodes propose the new blocks, their leaders
select the validators for that block, and the chosen validators validate the new block
and reach consensus on it. The mapping between the proposers and their leaders
is anonymous, which contributes to greater security. In this section, we add a new
task for the current proposers, which is selecting a new proposer for a slot in the
next cycle. Algorithm 9 shows the anonymous new proposer selection, in which the
current proposer does the following:
1. Randomly selects a new proposer’s hidden ID (i.e., new.pk2 ) from the public
list SList.
2. Generates a random number (Rand0 ).
3. Randomly, selects a cycle slot (cs) from the list CycleSlots .
4. Forges an anonymous new proposer (N ewP r) by encrypting Rand0 , and cs with
new.pk2 as below:
N ewP r ← Enew.pk2 (Rand0 ||cs)
Note that no one can reveal the real identity of this selected proposer, since
the nodes are only identified by their first public keys (i.e., pk1 s), which are
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Algorithm 9: Selecting a New Proposer and its Cycle Slot
Input : SList and CycleSlots
Output: N ewP r, cs, and [gs1 , gs4 ]
1 Randomly select new.pk2 from SList − current.pk2
2 Randomly select cs from CycleSlots
3 Generate Rand0
4 N ewP r ← Enew.pk2 (Rand0 ||cs)
5 for i ← 1 to 4 do
6
gsi ← [((i − 1). SList.size
) + 1 , i. SList.size
]
4
4
7 end
8 Return N ewP r, cs, and [gs1 , gs4 ]

not involved in the dynamic proposers-leaders mapping at all. Although the
second public keys are publicly published, there is no correlation between a
node’s second public key (pks ) and first public key (pk1 ). The only node in the
network that can reveal the identity of this N ewP r is the node that has the
second private key (sk2 ), which corresponds to the selected second public key
in step 1 (i.e., new.pk2 ). Furthermore, sk2 is private and only known to the
owner node.
5. As discussed in Section 4.4.1, to avoid selecting a validator by more than one
leader, we assign each node a range of nodes (i.e., g) to choose from when
it becomes a leader, where each g contains different nodes. Similarly, in our
dynamic mapping approach, each node will have a pool that includes the hidden
IDs (i.e., pr2 s) for the nodes from which this node can select. We call this list
sg. sg is introduced in the dynamic mapping to avoid conflict in choosing the
leaders for the new cycle slot cs. As a result, the current proposer creates four
ranges (i.e., four sgs), each of which is assigned to one of its leaders as follows:
) + 1 , i. SList.size
]
gsi ← [((i − 1). SList.size
4
4
Where 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 and is the index of the current leader among its peers. Each
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leader is numbered by i. For example, the range gs3 is for leader number 3 to
avoid conflict.
A current leader can only select its new leader from the range in the list SList
that has been assigned to it to avoid choosing one new leader by more than one
current leader.
6. Signs and broadcasts N ewP r, cs, and the four ranges (i.e., [gs1 , gs4 ]).
It is worth mentioning that the anonymous new proposer selection is made simultaneously with proposing the current block.

6.2.2.2

New Leaders Selection

After receiving the newly selected proposer and its cycle slot, each current leader
anonymously selects a new leader for this new proposer. As stated earlier, each
current leader chooses a new leader from a range of nodes different from the ones
its peer leaders have to evade selecting the same new leader twice. The mechanism
for selecting new leaders is performed in a way similar to selecting a new proposer.
Algorithm 10 illustrates how to select new leaders anonymously, where each current
validation-leader i conducts the following:
1. Randomly selects a new validation-leader’s hidden Id (i.e., new.pk2 ) from the
current leader’s range sgi in the list SList.
2. Generates a random number (Rand0 ).
3. Forges an anonymous new leader (N ewV li ) by encrypting Rand0 , and cs with
the new selected leader’s public key new.pk2 as below:
N ewV li ← Enew.pk2 (Rand0 ||cs)

132

Algorithm 10: Selecting a New Leader for the Selected Proposer
Input : SList, N ewP r, and cs
Output: N ewV li , Si.1 , and Randi.2
1 Randomly select new.pk2 from SList − current.pk2
2 Generate Rand0
3 N ewV li ← Enew.pk2 (Rand0 ||cs)
4 Generate Randi.1
5 Si.1 ← hash(N ewP r||N ewV li ||Randi.1 )
6 Generate Randi.2
7 Return N ewV li , Si.1 , and Randi.2

4. Randomly generates a Randi.1 . This random number serves similar to the one
we utilize in the static mapping (Section 4.4.1).
5. Partially creates secret 1 (Si.1 ) for the new selected proposer N ewP r as follows:
Si.1 ← hash(N ewP r||N ewV li ||Randi.1 )

Note that every current leader participates in creating this secret. This is because secret 1 (S1 ) used in the static mapping (Section 4.4.1) consists of all four
leaders’ public keys.
6. Randomly generates a Randi.2 . This is to make a different Rand2 for each new
leader in order to make its S2 different from the others new leaders’ S2 s.
7. Signs and broadcasts N ewV li , Si.1 , and Randi.2 .
Since the current leaders do not know each other and have no means to communicate with each other, selecting the new leaders is performed anonymously and
independently. Moreover, the current leaders have no clue who the new proposer is
due to using Rand0 (step 3 in Algorithm 9). Hence, a current leader cannot select a
new leader that can collude maliciously with the new selected proposer.
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Algorithm 11: Mapping and Validating the New Proposer and Leaders
Input : N ewP r , N ewV l[1−4] , S[1−4].1 , Rand[1−4].2 , CycleSlots, and cs
Output: (N ewP r, S1 ) and (N ewV l[1−4] , S[1−4].2 , Rand[1−4].2 )
1 if Check cs is in CycleSlots then
2
S1 ← S1.1 ||S2.1 ||S3.1 ||S4.1
3
foreach N ewV li do
4
Si.2 ← hash(S1 ||Randi.2 )
5
end
6
Return (N ewP r, S1 ) and (N ewV l[1−4] , S[1−4].2 , Rand[1−4].2 )
7 else
8
Return Invalid cycle slot
9 end

6.2.2.3

New Proposer-Leaders Mapping and Validating

The current validators are responsible for finalizing the mapping and voting on it, so
the other nodes in the network can commit this mapping. The primary purpose of
this part of the dynamic mapping is for the validators to form the secret 1 (S1 ) for
the new proposer and secret 2 (Si.2 ) for each new leader. In addition, they need to
vote on mapping the same way they vote on the proposed block. Algorithm 11 shows
the task for every validator. Each validator does the following:
1. Validates that cs is an existing valid cycle slot in the CycleSlots.
2. Constructs S1 as follows:
S1 ← S1.1 ||S2.1 ||S3.1 ||S4.1 .
3. For each new selected validation-leader N ewV li , does:
Si.2 ← hash(S1 ||Randi.2 )
4. Signs and votes on:
• The new selected proposer and its secret (N ewP r and S1 ).
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Algorithm 12: Checking if a Node is a Proposer or a Leader
Input : N ewP r, N ewV l[1−4]
1 if Down.sk2 (N ewP r) then
2
own.cs ← N ewP r.cs
3
own.S1 ← N ewP r.S1
4 end
5 foreach N ewV li do
6
if Down.sk2 (N ewV li ) then
7
own.cs ← N ewV li .cs
8
own.S2 ← N ewV li .S2
9
own.Rand2 ← N ewV li .Rand2
10
own.C.add(own.cs, own.S2 , own.Rand2 )
11
end
12 end

• Each new selected leader N ewV li , its secret, and its random number
(N ewV li , Si.2 , and Randi.2 ).
6.2.2.4

Checking if a Node in the New Mapping

After reaching a consensus on the proposed proposer-leaders mapping, each node in
the network verifies if it has been selected as a new proposer or one of the new leaders.
A node can check if it is the N ewP r by decrypting the N ewP r, using its own second
private key (i.e., own.sk2 ) as below:
Down.sk2 (N ewP r)
If successful, then this node is the proposer for the slot s in the next cycle c. Similarly,
each node checks if it is a new leader for that cycle slot by decrypting all the N ewV ls.
Algorithm 12 illustrates this process.
It is worth noting that each time a new mapping is proposed, a cycle slot cs is
excluded from the list CycleSlots. By the end of the cycle (c), the CycleSlots will
be empty. At the beginning of the next cycle, every node in the network populates
its own copy of CycleSlots. The population mechanism is simple; only increase c
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by 1, while the slots numbers in the cycle c + 1 remain the same as in cycle c. We
mentioned earlier that the proposing/validation cycles have a number of slots. This
number could be any finite number, and it remains the same for every cycle (we
choose it to be equal to the number of nodes in the network (n)).
6.2.3

Proposers/Leaders’ Legitimacy Checking

So far, we have described how the dynamic mapping is executed. However, it is
possible that a malicious node manages to act as the proposer/leader for a particular
cycle slot cs, by sending its secret claiming it is the proposer/leader for this cs. Thus,
we counter this issue by introducing variable proofs that need to be submitted to the
network by the consensus participants (i.e., proposers and leaders) so the other nodes
can check their legitimacy.
At the initialization phase of TrueBFT, and to ensure that a proposer is legitimate
and has been selected by the blockchain’s initiator to propose a block for a cycle slot
cs, the initiator assigns each proposer a verifiable proof we call π 0 . This proof is a
digital signature signed by the initiator using its private key (in.sk). The proof π 0
includes the cycle slot number (cs) and is defined as below:
π 0 ← Signin.sk (pr.pk||cs)
The proposer must submit this proof to the network along with its secret (S1 ),
so that other nodes can verify π 0 using the initiator’s public key (in.pk) prior to
involving in the validation and consensus process. This protects against ’malicious
nodes’ claiming that they are ’proposers’ for a specific cycle slot.
Similarly, each validation-leader will be assigned a proof we call π defined as
follows:
π ← Signin.sk (vl.pk||cs)
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Since each cycle slot cs is uniquely identified, each proposer or leader can only be
involved in the cycle slot that they have been assigned to. Each other node in the
network can easily verify this, by decrypting the π 0 or π using the initiator’s public
key (in.pk) to check the legitimacy of their claims.
To apply the same proposers/leaders legitimacy checking approach after the initialization phase, each current proposer that selects and proposes a new proposer for a
cycle slot (cs) will forge the verifiable proof π 0 for this new selected proposer. The new
π 0 is a digital signature signed by the current proposer’s private key (current.sk1 ).
This new proof π 0 includes the current proposer’s proof (current.π 0 ) as a proof of its
legitimacy, and the cycle slot (cs) as below:
new.π 0 ← Signcurrent.sk1 (current.π 0 ||cs)
The new.π 0 is then included to the new selected proposer and its secret (i.e.,
N ewP r and S1 ). The new selected proposer (N ewP r) needs to submit new.π 0 along
with its secret (S1 ) as proof of its legitimacy to propose for cs.
Likewise, for the new leaders, each current leader is responsible for creating a
proof π for the new leader whom it selects. π is a digital signature signed by the
current leader’s private key (current.sk1 ), and includes the current leader’s proof
(current.π), and the cycle slot (cs) as below:
new.π ← Signcurrent.sk1 (current.π||cs)
This way, we protect the consensus from malicious nodes claiming that they are a
proposer or leaders for a cycle slot. Each node in the system that claims it is involved
in a cycle slot has to submit its proof, so that each other node can verify it.
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6.2.4

Liveness Issues

In TrueBFT, we employ only one proposer per cs. However, having one proposer
per cs could threaten the protocol liveness. This is because the selected proposer
for a particular slot may fail to propose due to regular crashes or maliciousness. To
overcome such an issue, TrueBFT allows a proposer to re-propose in case of failures
(Section 4.4.2.3). Each proposal attempt is called a round. A cycle slot has a finite
number of rounds (i.e., rounds-limit). The number of rounds is application-specific.
This way, the proposers are given several chances to propose equal to the number
of rounds. For example, if a proposer fails to propose at round0 due to network
failures, the validators vote to move to the next round (i.e., round1 ), and increase the
proposer-time-out, as discussed in Section 4.4.2.3.
Nevertheless, what happens if the proposer is malicious and refuses to propose,
or the proposer is off for a long time? In this case, the liveness of the protocol is
violated. In response to this, inspired by Tendermint design, TrueBFT allows the
next cycle slot to be triggered. Put differently, the proposer for the next cycle is
allowed to broadcast its proposal.
Although such an approach can preserve liveness, it raises a new problem. The
dynamic mapping in TrueBFT is executed in a 1:1 fashion. That is, one slot in a cycle
produces a mapping for one slot in the next cycle. If a proposer fails to accomplish
its proposal, then this implies no mapping is created for a slot in the next cycle.
To overcome this, in case of the proposal fails in a cycle slot, TrueBFT requires the
proposer for the following cycle slot to perform ’two’ mappings to offset the missing
mapping in the previous slot.
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6.2.5

Limitations

The dynamic proposers-leaders mapping achieves anonymity and randomizes the
mapping. A new selected proposer (N ewP r) or leader (N ewV l) is anonymous and
only known to the node that has the second private key (sk2 ) which corresponds to
the secret hidden identity (i.e., second public key (pk2 ). Note that the ’correlation’
between a node’s public identity (i.e., the first public key (pk1 )) and the secret hidden
identity (i.e., second public key (pk2 )) is private information and unknown to the
other nodes. Although the pk2 s for all nodes are publicly published in the list SList
(for the sake of new proposers and leaders selection), no node in the network knows
which pk2 relates to which node except the owner node (i.e., the node that has the
corresponding sk2 ). In addition, no current proposer recognizes its leaders nor does
a leader know its proposer or its peer leaders. Therefore, colluding between these
nodes to compose a malicious new mapping is not feasible. However, this mapping
suffers the following two limitations:
1. The current proposer may observe the public identity (i.e., pk1 ) of the new
proposer when this new proposer proposes its block in cs. Hence, it can correlate
the hidden identity (i.e., pk2 ) to pk1 . However, this is not useful knowledge since
the current proposer will only uncover this information after the new proposer
has proposed its block. Additionally, this malicious current proposer does not
know any of the corresponding new leaders since each one has been selected by
a different current leader.
However, one possible attack is for the current proposer to intently select the
same new proposer (i.e., selecting the same pk2 ), when the malicious current
proposer has the chance to re-propose in future. Then, the malicious current
proposer could launch a DDoS attack to prevent the new proposer from propos-
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ing. Nevertheless, switching to a new cs in case of faulty proposers can maintain
the protocol liveness and mitigate the consequences of such a case.
2. It is possible that a new selected proposer (N ewP r) for a cycle slot (cs) can
be also selected as a new leader (N ewV l) for itself by one of the current leaders. This is because there is no means of communication between the current
proposer and leaders. However, only one leader can select the N ewP r as a
N ewV l, because each leader has a range (sg) in the list SList to choose from.
TrueBFT, however, can tolerate this issue since it is based on Tendermint and
can tolerate up to one-third of Byzantine fault.

6.3

Discussion on Safety and Liveness

To a large extent, TrueBFT relies on the consensus mechanism used in Tendermint
[9,47] to reach consensus on blocks in the ledger. As a result, it inherits Tendermint’s
capability to ensure safety and liveness as long as the super-majority (i.e., more than
two-thirds) of the validators set are honest.
In this section, we argue that our proposed TrueBFT protocol can guarantee the
same level of safety and liveness of Tendermint. As mentioned, the main advantage
of TrueBFT is that it is truly decentralized (i.e., it does not rely on the same set of
validators), and it anonymizes the identities of the consensus participants to make it
resistant to attacks like DDoS. To achieve that, we have introduced new players and
roles to the existing design of Tendermint. In our TrueBFT, the consensus process
is carried out by three parties: proposers, leaders, and validators. Next, we show
that despite those newly introduced players and roles, TrueBFT can still preserve the
safety and liveness in case of faulty consensus participants.
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6.3.1

Safety

To recall, an atomic broadcast is a broadcast that either completes correctly at
all nodes, or all nodes abort with no side effects. For a message m, atomic broadcast
satisfies the following properties [10, 31]:
• Validity: If a correct node broadcasts m, it delivers m eventually.
• Agreement: If a correct node delivers m, then all correct nodes deliver m
eventually.
• Integrity: Message m is received (delivered) by each node at most once, and
only if it was previously broadcast.
• Total order: If the correct nodes p and q deliver m1 and m2 , then p delivers
m1 before m2 if and only if q delivers m1 before m2 .
We take m to be a block in the ledger. Satisfying safety implies satisfying atomic
broadcast. Nevertheless, TrueBFT, as in Tendermint, does not satisfy the validity
property. This is because there is no guarantee that a proposed block will be committed eventually, since validators may move to a new round and commit a different
block [9]. Put differently, the safety of a censuses protocol is compromised if two
correct nodes decide differently on a proposed block, two blocks are committed at the
same height in the ledger, or some correct nodes agree on an invalid block [9]. In this
section, we show how TrueBFT preserves safety in the presence of a malicious/faulty
consensus participant.
6.3.1.1

Faulty Proposers

Tendermint allows only one proposer per round, and every validator knows the proposer responsible for producing a block for that round. Thus, one block is added to
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the ledger at a time if the block is valid. Nevertheless, a faulty proposer may broadcast different blocks to different validators. However, Tendermint preserves safety in
such a case via locking mechanisms. As mentioned, TrueBFT strongly relies on this
design feature of Tendermint. The only difference between TrueBFT and Tendermint
is in the way the proposers are selected and ordered. In Tendermint, the proposers
are ordered via a simple, deterministic round-robin mechanism. However, as argued
before, because Tendermint selects blocks proposers deterministically, an adversary
could find exactly who the next blocks proposers will be and launch attacks on them.
In response, TrueBFT anonymizes the identities of proposers, so that the proposers
are only known after they broadcast their secrets and blocks. Next, we present several scenarios that might threaten the safety and the countermeasures provided by
TrueBFT.
• Scenario 1: As in Tendermint, it is possible for two blocks to be proposed by
a faulty proposer at the same round [9]. If the two blocks are proposed for the
same height, then this leads to compromising the safety of the protocol as two
correct nodes might decide differently.
Countermeasure: To overcome this, Tendermint restricts the number of committed blocks per height (i.e., only one block can be committed to the ledger
at a certain height). This is achieved via a locking mechanism. In this mechanism, a validator is locked on one block if it receives a valid polka for that block
(i.e., more than two-thirds of pre-votes). Once the validators are locked on a
block, they are not allowed to vote on another block. As a result, only one valid
block will be committed to the ledger at the same height. TrueBFT inherits
this property of Tendermint and enforces that only one block is committed per
cycle.
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• Scenario 2: Since TrueBFT does not use the round-robin scheduling used by
Tendermint for assigning proposers to rounds, it is possible for a proposer to
claim the right to propose for a particular cycle slot. As a result, if two proposers
propose for the same cycle slot, where each of them has different validators, the
nodes in the network may commit two blocks for the same height, or decide
differently. This is because the locking mechanism used in Tendermint will
not work. In Tendermint, the validators are only locked on a block when they
receive more than two third of pre-votes. If the same set of validators are used
for all the proposed blocks, this locking mechanism will work, assuming that
more than two-thirds of these validators are honest. However, in TrueBFT,
each proposer might have a different set of validators. As a result, it is possible
for the validators of a set to be locked on a block and the other validators in the
second set to be locked on another block. Thus, compromising the agreement
property of the atomic broadcast.
To illustrate this, consider two proposers X and Y , Each of them claims that it
is the legitimate proposer for the cycle slot cs. Proposer X is mapped to four
validators/pre-voters and four pre-committers. Proposer X proposes the block
blockX at round R in cs. Similarly, proposer Y is mapped to four validators/prevoters and four pre-committers. Proposer Y proposes the block blockY at the
same round (i.e., R). Assume that the pre-committers for proposer X receive
a polka for blockX (i.e., more than two-thirds of pre-votes on blockX form the
validators/pre-voters for proposer X). As a result, they are locked on blockX,
and they proceed accordingly. Note that they can only be locked on blockX,
and they disregard any pre-votes on other blocks (i.e., blockY in this case).
Similarly, let us assume that the pre-committers for proposer Y are locked on
blockY , as a result of receiving a polka for blockY . In this case, the two sets
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of pre-committers are locked on two different blocks, and they can proceed to
the commit step. Suppose a correct node A receives more than two-thirds of
pre-commits for blockX, and commits blockX. For the same round R, another
correct node B receives more than two-thirds of pre-commits for blockY and
commits blockY . This is a violation of safety since two correct nodes commit
two different blocks for the same height.
Countermeasure: To counter this, TrueBFT exploits verifiable proofs (i.e.,
π 0 ) assigned to proposers from the previous cycle. When a proposer broadcasts
its secret and block, it should broadcast its proof along with them, so each
other node in the network can easily verify this proof. This proof (π 0 ) is a
digital signature signed by the mapping proposer’s private key from the previous
cycle, and it includes the mapping proposer’s proof, and the unique cycle slot
number. In addition, π 0 is validated and voted on by the validators of the
mapping proposer to ensure the validity and uniqueness of this proof. As a
result, only the rightful proposer has the right to propose for a particular cycle
slot. Note that the proposer for a current cycle slot is selected blindly by
a mapping proposer from the previous cycle (Section 6.2.2.1). This way of
anonymous selection prevents the collusion between malicious nodes.
• Scenario 3: Since the leaders in TrueBFT determine the number of validators
and select them, it is possible for a malicious proposer to collude with its leaders to select a number of validators where more than two-thirds of them are
malicious. This can lead to committing an invalid block to the ledger; thus,
undermining safety.
Countermeasure: TrueBFT anonymizes the interaction between the consensus participants via a dynamic mapping, in which each proposer is blindly
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mapped to four leaders. These parties communicate with each other via secrets, and their identities are only revealed after completing their tasks. Hence,
this way of mapping and communicating prevents the malicious collusion, since
the proposers and their leaders do not know each other in advance.

6.3.1.2

Faulty Leaders

The leader nodes in TrueBFT are the newly introduced players in the consensus
process. Their job is to decide the number of validators and randomly select them.
Although the leaders do not contribute much in committing blocks, malicious leaders
might threaten the safety of the protocol. Next, we show a possible threat scenario
introduced by leaders, and how TrueBFT addresses it.
• Scenario: Since the leaders are not publicly known for a particular proposer,
it is possible that a malicious node claims that it is the leader for a malicious
proposer so that they collude to inject an invalid block to the ledger.
Countermeasure: TrueBFT, as described earlier, exploits verifiable proofs
assigned to leaders as well (i.e., π). Hence, when a leader broadcasts the number
of validators and instructs the selected validators, it should broadcast its proof
too. As a result, the leader’s proof serves as evidence of legitimacy.

6.3.1.3

Faulty Validators

We did not introduce any further roles for the validators in TrueBFT. The validators in TrueBFT function in a similar way to the ones in Tendermint. Hence, we will
discuss in this section how Tendermint preserves safety. Tendermint and TrueBFT ensure safety as long as more than two-thirds of validators are honest (non-Byzantine).
To achieve that, Tendermint exploits a locking mechanism. The locks are used to
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ensure that no two validators will commit a different block at the same height, assuming that less than one-third of the validators are malicious. Put differently, once
there exists more than two-thirds of pre-commits on a block in a round, the network
is locked on that block [9]. This way, it is impossible to produce a valid polka (i.e.,
more than two-thirds of pre-votes) for a different block at the same round or a higher
round in the same cycle slot. As a result, only one block can be committed to the
ledger by the network.
Tendermint guarantees that no validator can vote on two blocks for the same round
due to locks. Next, we sketch a brief proof that Tendermint (and hence TrueBFT)
guarantees that safety is always preserved (i.e., validators will never commit different
blocks at the same height), as long as more than two-thirds of validators are honest [9].
Assume that less than one-third of validators are Byzantine and at least one honest
validator decides on a block B. This means that no honest validator will decide on
any block other than B. To prove that, consider the current round R in which at least
one honest validator commits block B at this round. This implies that this validator
received a valid polka (i.e., more than two-thirds of pre-commits for block B at round
R). Taking into account that less than one-third of validators are Byzantine, by
arithmetic at least one-third of honest validators must have pre-committed block B
at round R. We know that to pre-commit a block, a validator should lock on that
block. This implies that this one-third of honest validators must have a lock on block
B at round R. As a result, no other block can be committed by honest validators
unless some of the honest validators unlock from block B, which is impossible because
they are honest. So, at most, less than two-thirds of validators are available to vote
for any block other than B, which is insufficient voting power.
The only difference between TrueBFT and Tendermint is the way the validators
are selected. In Tendermint, the validators are pre-determined and publicly known to
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the network. In contrast, the validators’ set in TrueBFT is replaced each time a new
block is proposed. As a result, it is possible for a node to claim the right to validate
and compromise safety if acted maliciously. To encounter this issue, each validator
in TrueBFT must submit a verifiable proof (τ ) along with its vote indicating that it
has been elected by a legitimate leader (Section 4.4.2). Each other node can easily
verify this proof before considering the received vote.
6.3.2

Liveness

In consensus, liveness means that all processes (nodes) will eventually agree on a
value, and the computation will terminate. TrueBFT’s ability to maintain liveness
is dependent on Tendermint. It is known that Tendermint prioritizes safety over
liveness [94]. As a result, Tendermint might halt momentarily until more than twothirds of the validators come to a consensus. Next, we discuss how TrueBFT preserves
liveness in the presence of faulty consensus participants.
6.3.2.1

Faulty Proposers

Proposers might undermine liveness if they fail to achieve their proposals. Below, we
present some possible scenarios of such a case, and show how TrueBFT deals with
them.
• Scenario 1: One way to violate liveness is when a malicious node rushes in at
the start of a proposing cycle slot to become a proposer, and then refuses to
perform the proposal.
Countermeasure: To withstand such a situation, TrueBFT uses a proposing verifiable proof (i.e., π 0 ) for each proposer to provide as evidence of its
legitimacy. In TrueBFT, there exists only one proposer per slot. So, only the
legitimate proposer’s block will be considered.
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• Scenario 2: It is possible for a legitimate proposer to be faulty and not accomplish the proposal.
Countermeasure: To encounter this, TrueBFT utilizes the proposer-time-out
used in Tendermint. If this time-out terminates, a new round of proposing
will start allowing the proposer to re-propose. The only difference between
TrueBFT and Tendermint in this regard is that we give a single proposer a
number of rounds to re-propose in case of failure, while in Tendermint, each
round is assigned to a new proposer. The reason behind this change in design is
that each cycle slot is assigned to one proposer, and we need to avoid migrating
to a new cycle slot in case of regular crashes. However, in case a faulty proposer
remains faulty for many tries and exceeds the number of rounds allowed, the
nodes in the network vote to move to the next cycle allowing the next proposer
in-line to propose; thus, preserving liveness, as discussed in Section 6.2.4.

6.3.2.2

Faulty Leaders

As mentioned, this is the only new player to the consensus with respect to Tendermint.
In this section, we show possible ways that leaders may compromise liveness, and we
discuss how TrueBFT design preserves it.
• Scenario 1: Since the leaders are not the same for all proposers and they are
not publicly known, it is possible for a set of malicious nodes to claim that they
are the leaders for a particular proposer, and then stop performing their roles.
This malicious act will undermine liveness, since no validators will be selected
to validate the proposal.
Countermeasure: The verifiable proofs for the leaders discussed in Section
6.2.3 serve as authorization cards, so that only the node that has that proof can
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serve as a leader.
• Scenario 2: It is possible for some legitimate leaders to be faulty/Byzantine;
thus, stalling the protocol.
Countermeasure: TrueBFT uses at least four leaders per proposer to overcome such halts. The reasoning behind this choice is that four is the minimum
number to provide tolerance to a single Byzantine fault [9]. It is worth noting
that this number (i.e., four) can be changed based on factors such as the network’s size and hostility, or the blockchain application that utilizes TrueBFT.
However, if more than one-third of leaders are faulty, TrueBFT, like in Tendermint, stalls momentarily, and then switches to a new round; thus preserving
liveness.

6.3.2.3

Faulty Validators

As discussed in Section 6.3.1.3, we use the same consensus mechanism as Tendermint,
and we did not introduce any further roles to the validators.
The locking mechanism used by Tendermint contributes to maintaining the liveness as well. As discussed earlier, a validator in Tendermint (a pre-committer in ours)
is locked on a block if it witnesses a valid polka (i.e., more than two-thirds of pre-votes
for that block). This contributes to maintaining safety since an honest validator will
not pre-vote on a block other than the one it has been locked on. Put differently,
only one valid block can be committed at a time. Nevertheless, if some nodes remain
locked on a block that the rest of the network does not wish to commit (e.g., not
enough pre-commits received for this block), then this can compromise liveness. In
response, Tendermint requires the node that was locked on a block from the previous
round to unlock when it sees a valid polka for another block in a higher round. Having
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that stated, next we summarize the liveness proof of Tendermint [9].
If there exists less than one-third of Byzantine validators, then the protocol preserves liveness (i.e., does not deadlock). This is because the only way the consensus
process will deadlock is if some honest validators from different rounds have been
locked on two different blocks. Assume that some honest validators are locked on
block B1 from round R1 , and some honest validators are locked on block B2 from
round R2 , where R1 < R2 . Using the unlock role, the validators that are locked on
B1 will unlock when they see the valid polka for B2 allowing the consensus process
to continue. Similarly, the locked pre-committers on B1 from R1 will immediately
unlock when they hear a polka for B2 . This way, TrueBFT provides the same level
of liveness as Tendermint.

6.4

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have proposed a novel dynamic anonymous proposers-leaders
mapping mechanism and integrated it into TrueBFT to: (1) avoid relying on the
blockchain initiator to anonymously map each proposer to its leaders (i.e., static
mapping) at the beginning of each cycle, and (2) anonymize the identities of the
proposing nodes to protect them against DDoS attacks. In our dynamic mapping
approach, a new mapping is created every time a new block is proposed. This new
mapping is utilized once in one of the next cycle slots (i.e., one slot represents one
new proposed block).
In addition, in this chapter, we have analyzed TrueBFT concerning safety and
liveness. TrueBFT is highly dependent on the consensus mechanism utilized by the
state-of-the-art Tendermint. Therefore, TrueBFT draws its ability to maintain safety
and liveness from Tendermint. The difference between TrueBFT and Tendermint
is in the way that the proposers and validators are selected. TrueBFT selects the
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proposers anonymously rather than relying on pre-determined scheduling. Moreover,
TrueBFT selects a different set of a different size of validators each time a new block
is proposed rather than relying on fixed, known validators. This method of selection
does not compromise the safety and liveness that Tendermint enjoys.
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7

CONCLUSION

To conclude this dissertation, we summarize our contributions and give directions
for future work.

7.1

Research Contributions

In this dissertation, we mainly focused on the problem of product counterfeiting
attacks; particularly, tag reapplication attacks. Detecting tag reapplication attacks
remains a significant challenge as it requires manual inspection of products. In addition, most current anti-counterfeiting supply chains are centralized, relying on a
centralized authentication/tracking server to coordinate the products’ authentication management. This centralization architecture creates several limitations such as
tremendous processing and storage overheads to authenticate products, and singlepoint of failure. To address these problems, we proposed the following solutions.
• First, the Tag Reapplication Detection (TRD) system to detect reapplication
attacks using low-cost NFC tags and public key cryptography. The key idea in
our solution is to exploit the read-only NFC tag’s counter to track the number
of times the tag has been read in the supply chain. To track the number of a
tag’s reads, TRD utilizes a ’central’ database to store this number, and digitally
signs this number on a re-writable memory on the tag. Tracking the number of
times a tag has been read ensures that only authorized parties authenticate the
tagged product.
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• The second contribution is the Block-Supply Chain, a permissioned blockchain
to decentralize the product authentication and tracking process. The BlockSupply Chain is a transformation of TRD into a decentralized supply chain. In
this system, each node maintains a blockchain (public ledger) for each product.
This blockchain comprises chained blocks, where each is an authentication event.
The Block-Supply Chain can detect tag modification, cloning, and reapplication
attacks without the need for a centralized authentication authority.
In this dissertation, we also addressed three problems of current blockchain consensus protocols. First, the lack of true decentralization in existing BFT consensus
protocols. Rather, most of them rely on fixed, static validators, which expose them
to attacks like DDoS. Second, the choice of the number of selected validators has
not received much attention in BFT consensus protocols. This is of importance as
the number of validators influences the security and efficacy of consensus protocols.
Third, validators’ diversion from honest behavior has introduced new attacks to the
blockchain technology such as block withholding and selfish mining. Such a deviation
is due to the lack of robust rewarding and punishing mechanisms. In response to
these problems, we proposed the following solutions.
• First, a new BFT-based true decentralized consensus protocol (TrueBFT) that
does not require PoW and randomly employs a different set of a different size
of validators each time a new block is proposed. The key idea of our solution is
to anonymously map each proposing node to some leader nodes in a way that
none of them knows its corresponding peer. However, these nodes communicate with each other via secrets assigned to them at the genesis state by the
blockchain initiators. The leaders are responsible for selecting the validators for
their corresponding proposer at random. This way, the identity of each node
(i.e., leader/validator) is revealed after it accomplishes its job.
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• Second, to determine the number of validators in a way that considers the
security and performance, and to enforce the honest behavior of validators,
we proposed a game theoretical model and integrated it into TrueBFT. This
game theoretical driven approach utilizes the game model to analyze the risk
likelihood of the proposing nodes. This risk likelihood is used to determine
the number of validators involved in the consensus process. As a result, the
number of validators depends on the hostility of the network environment. Thus,
this method of deciding the number of validators can enhance the consensus
performance, especially in a low hostile environment. Additionally, TrueBFT
rewards honest validators punishes dishonest ones.
• Third, although the anonymous proposer-leaders mapping mechanism used in
TrueBFT contributes towards true decentralization, the mapping is fixed and
anonymous for only one cycle of proposing. That is, when a proposer proposes a
block for the second time, its leaders’ identities are revealed. Hence, they could
be vulnerable to attacks like DDoS, Eclipse, and Bribery. To overcome such an
issue, we proposed a novel, decentralized, dynamic mapping between the nodes
that participate in the consensus process. This mapping mechanism does not
rely on any centralized proposers-leaders mapper (i.e., blockchain initiator).
Instead, the regular nodes in the network perform the mapping dynamically
and anonymously. Each time a new block is proposed, the proposer creates and
proposes a new mapping in a way that preserves anonymity.
Table 7.1 summarizes the problems that this dissertation describes, and the contributions to overcome these problems.
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Table 7.1: Contribution summary.
Problem

Contribution

Approach

Tag reapplication attack

Tag Reapplication

Public key cryptogra-

Detection (TRD)

phy and NFC tags

system
Centralization of current

Block-Supply

Blockchain

anti-counterfeiting supply chains

Chain

Technology

Non-true decentralization of current

TrueBFT: a Truly

Randomness and

consensus protocols

decentralized con-

anonymous proposers-

sensus protocol

leaders mapping

- Diversion from honest behavior,

Two-stage

Game theory

- The number of selected validators

Bayesian game
theoretical model

Static proposers-leaders mapping

7.2

Anonymous

Regular proposers

Dynamic mapping

forge the mapping

Future Directions

This dissertation addressed problems in two main domains; namely, product counterfeiting and blockchain consensus. We believe that there are many aspects to explore
in these two domains. Below, we present some future work directions.
Concerning product counterfeiting, as we discussed in Section 2.6, there are some
scenarios in which our approach to detect tag reapplication attacks may fail. This
occurs when a counterfeiter removes and reapplies a tag without reading it. TRD
(and Block-Supply Chain) cannot detect this attack, because the Counter value is not
increased. One way to counter this issue is to fingerprint products, digitally sign these
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fingerprints, and store them on the tags of the products. Any unique product’s special
features can be used as a fingerprint such as text and color patterns. Then, we can
extract these fingerprints and use machine learning algorithms to detect abnormalities
or false correlation between the extracted fingerprints and the corresponding, digitally
stored ones.
With regard to the dynamic mapping in TrueBFT, we discussed in Section 6.2.5
that a mapping proposer may observe the identity of the mapped proposer over time.
This knowledge might be used by the mapping, malicious proposer to launch a DDoS
attack on the mapped proposer. This is rare to occur, but it is feasible. To overcome
this, one possible solution is to link each hidden identity (i.e., the second public key
pk2 ) to a random number, so instead of selecting the hidden identity pk2 directly, the
mapping proposer selects this random number. Nevertheless, to prevent the mapping
proposer from observing the identity of the mapped proposer, we shuffle the linked
random numbers at the beginning of every cycle, so each pk2 will be linked to a
different random number every cycle.
Finally, blockchain technology can be applied to many aspects of supply chain
technology including provenance, brand protection, just-in-time forecasting, etc.
In conclusion, we believe that product anti-counterfeiting and the revolution of
blockchain technology are exciting research areas.
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